1,094 research outputs found
Algorithmic Security is Insufficient: A Comprehensive Survey on Implementation Attacks Haunting Post-Quantum Security
This survey is on forward-looking, emerging security concerns in post-quantum
era, i.e., the implementation attacks for 2022 winners of NIST post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) competition and thus the visions, insights, and discussions
can be used as a step forward towards scrutinizing the new standards for
applications ranging from Metaverse, Web 3.0 to deeply-embedded systems. The
rapid advances in quantum computing have brought immense opportunities for
scientific discovery and technological progress; however, it poses a major risk
to today's security since advanced quantum computers are believed to break all
traditional public-key cryptographic algorithms. This has led to active
research on PQC algorithms that are believed to be secure against classical and
powerful quantum computers. However, algorithmic security is unfortunately
insufficient, and many cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks (SCA), where an attacker passively or actively gets side-channel data
to compromise the security properties that are assumed to be safe
theoretically. In this survey, we explore such imminent threats and their
countermeasures with respect to PQC. We provide the respective, latest
advancements in PQC research, as well as assessments and providing visions on
the different types of SCAs
A practical key-recovery attack on LWE-based key-encapsulation mechanism schemes using Rowhammer
Physical attacks are serious threats to cryptosystems deployed in the real
world. In this work, we propose a microarchitectural end-to-end attack
methodology on generic lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms
to recover the long-term secret key. Our attack targets a critical component of
a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform that is used in the construction of almost all
lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms. We demonstrate our attack model on
practical schemes such as Kyber and Saber by using Rowhammer. We show that our
attack is highly practical and imposes little preconditions on the attacker to
succeed. As an additional contribution, we propose an improved version of the
plaintext checking oracle, which is used by almost all physical attack
strategies on lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms. Our improvement
reduces the number of queries to the plaintext checking oracle by as much as
for Saber and approximately for Kyber768. This can be of
independent interest and can also be used to reduce the complexity of other
attacks
Implementation Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptographic Schemes
Post-quantum cryptographic schemes have been developed in the last decade in response to the rise of quantum computers. Fortunately, several schemes have been developed with quantum resistance. However, there is very little effort in evaluating and comparing these schemes in the embedded settings. Low cost embedded devices represents a highly-constraint environment that challenges all post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Moreover, there are even fewer efforts in evaluating the security of these schemes against implementation attacks including side-channel and fault attacks. It is commonly accepted that, any embedded cryptographic module that is built without a sound countermeasure, can be easily broken. Therefore, we investigate the question: Are we ready to implement post-quantum cryptographic schemes on embedded systems? We present an exhaustive survey of research efforts in designing embedded modules of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and the efforts in securing these modules against implementation attacks. Unfortunately, the study shows that: we are not ready yet to implement any post-quantum cryptographic scheme in practical embedded systems. There is still a considerable amount of research that needs to be conducted before reaching a satisfactory level of security
From MLWE to RLWE: A Differential Fault Attack on Randomized & Deterministic Dilithium
The post-quantum digital signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium has
been recently selected by the NIST for standardization. Implementing CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and other post-quantum cryptography schemes, on embedded devices raises a new set of challenges, including ones related to performance in terms of speed and memory requirements, but also related to side-channel and fault injection attacks security. In this work, we investigated the latter and describe a differential fault attack on the randomized and deterministic versions of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Notably, the attack requires a few instructions skips and is able to reduce the MLWE problem that Dilithium is based on to a smaller RLWE problem which can be practically solved with lattice reduction techniques. Accordingly, we demonstrated key recoveries using hints extracted on the secret keys from the same faulted signatures using the LWE with side-information framework introduced by Dachman-Soled et al. at CRYPTO’20. As a final contribution, we proposed algorithmic countermeasures against this attack and in particular showed that the second one can be parameterized to only induce a negligible overhead over the signature generation
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