What Can We Say about Information? Agreeing a Narrative

The nature of information remains contested. This paper proposes a set of principles for a narrative of information, and explores the consequences of taking these principles as normative in the present rhetoric of the information society

Complexity and Action: Reflections on Decision Making and Cybernetics.

This paper highlights some theoretical and epistemological reflections about the relevance of action for managerial studies. These reflections show how the cybernetic paradigm of complexity management can be used for better decision making that unites knowledge and action in a comprising, dynamic, and evolving approach. Cybernetics can help to overcome the fear of decision making in the face of uncertainty in complex scenarios, and can be an effective tool for improving the viability and competitiveness of firms in the twenty-first century

Investigating e-business practices in tourism :a comparative analysis of three countries

This study examined the behaviour of tourist companies in relation to the adoption of e-business technologies and applications. The study aimed to identify groups of companies with homogenous behaviour among three European countries (Greece, Portugal and Norway). Based on data from a European survey, the study employed two-step cluster analysis which revealed 14 clusters of common behaviour (five clusters in Greece, five in Portugal and four in Norway). These clusters were named as: Leaders’ ‘Technology Experts’, ‘Fast Adopters’ ‘Beginners’, ‘Late Adopters’. In Norway, the group ‘Late Adopters’ also included companies characterised as ‘Beginners’ in the other two countries. We suggest further investigation among European countries in order to reveal more groups of similar behaviour toward e-business adoption

MER Model of Integral Management: Culture as Enterprise’s Key Success Factor

Enterprise culture is judged by many acknowledged scientists and researchers now as a major determinant of any enterprise’s success. The present article shows the research cognitions on the impact of enterprise culture to the success of the enterprises observed.

Entanglement of Conceptual Entities in Quantum Model Theory (QMod)

We have recently elaborated 'Quantum Model Theory' (QMod) to model situations where the quantum effects of contextuality, interference, superposition, entanglement and emergence, appear without the entities giving rise to these situations having necessarily to be of microscopic nature. We have shown that QMod models without introducing linearity for the set of the states. In this paper we prove that QMod, although not using linearity for the state space, provides a method of identification for entangled states and an intuitive explanation for their occurrence. We illustrate this method for entanglement identification with concrete examples

Reductionism ad absurdum: Attneave and Dennett cannot reduce Homunculus (and hence the mind)

Purpose – Neuroscientists act as proxies for implied anthropomorphic signal- processing beings within the brain, Homunculi. The latter examine the arriving neuronal spike-trains to infer internal and external states. But a Homunculus needs a brain of its own, to coordinate its capabilities – a brain that necessarily contains a Homunculus and so on indefinitely. Such infinity is impossible – and in well-cited papers, Attneave and later Dennett claim to eliminate it. How do their approaches differ and do they (in fact) obviate the Homunculi? Design/methodology/approach – The Attneave and Dennett approaches are carefully scrutinized. To Attneave, Homunculi are effectively “decision-making” neurons that control behaviors. Attneave presumes that Homunculi, when successively nested, become successively “stupider”, limiting their numbers by diminishing their responsibilities. Dennett likewise postulates neuronal Homunculi that become “stupider” – but brain-wards, where greater sophistication might have been expected. Findings – Attneave’s argument is Reductionist and it simply assumes-away the Homuncular infinity. Dennett’s scheme, which evidently derives from Attneave’s, ultimately involves the same mistakes. Attneave and Dennett fail, because they attempt to reduce intentionality to non-intentionality. Research limitations/implications – Homunculus has been successively recognized over the centuries by philosophers, psychologists and (some) neuroscientists as a crucial conundrum of cognitive science. It still is. Practical implications – Cognitive-science researchers need to recognize that Reductionist explanations of cognition may actually devolve to Homunculi, rather than eliminating them. Originality/value – Two notable Reductionist arguments against the infinity of Homunculi are proven wrong. In their place, a non-Reductionist treatment of the mind, “Emergence”, is discussed as a means of rendering Homunculi irrelevant

Homunculus strides again: why ‘information transmitted’ in neuroscience tells us nothing

Purpose – For half a century, neuroscientists have used Shannon Information Theory to calculate “information transmitted,” a hypothetical measure of how well neurons “discriminate” amongst stimuli. Neuroscientists’ computations, however, fail to meet even the technical requirements for credibility. Ultimately, the reasons must be conceptual. That conclusion is confirmed here, with crucial implications for neuroscience. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – Shannon Information Theory depends upon a physical model, Shannon’s “general communication system.” Neuroscientists’ interpretation of that model is scrutinized here. Findings – In Shannon’s system, a recipient receives a message composed of symbols. The symbols received, the symbols sent, and their hypothetical occurrence probabilities altogether allow calculation of “information transmitted.” Significantly, Shannon’s system’s “reception” (decoding) side physically mirrors its “transmission” (encoding) side. However, neurons lack the “reception” side; neuroscientists nonetheless insisted that decoding must happen. They turned to Homunculus, an internal humanoid who infers stimuli from neuronal firing. However, Homunculus must contain a Homunculus, and so on ad infinitum – unless it is super-human. But any need for Homunculi, as in “theories of consciousness,” is obviated if consciousness proves to be “emergent.” Research limitations/implications – Neuroscientists’ “information transmitted” indicates, at best, how well neuroscientists themselves can use neuronal firing to discriminate amongst the stimuli given to the research animal. Originality/value – A long-overdue examination unmasks a hidden element in neuroscientists’ use of Shannon Information Theory, namely, Homunculus. Almost 50 years’ worth of computations are recognized as irrelevant, mandating fresh approaches to understanding “discriminability.