13,375 research outputs found
Learning Language from a Large (Unannotated) Corpus
A novel approach to the fully automated, unsupervised extraction of
dependency grammars and associated syntax-to-semantic-relationship mappings
from large text corpora is described. The suggested approach builds on the
authors' prior work with the Link Grammar, RelEx and OpenCog systems, as well
as on a number of prior papers and approaches from the statistical language
learning literature. If successful, this approach would enable the mining of
all the information needed to power a natural language comprehension and
generation system, directly from a large, unannotated corpus.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, research proposa
Critical Foundations of the Contextual Theory of Mind
The contextual mind is found attested in various usages of the term complement, in the background of Kant. The difficulties of Kant's intuitionism are taken up through Quine, but referential opacity is resolved as semantic presence in lived context. A further critique of rationalist linguistics is developed from Jakobson, showing generic functions in thought supporting abstraction, binding and thereby semantic categories. Thus Bolzano's influential philosophy of mathematics and science gives way to a critical view of the ancient heritage acknowledged by Plato.\ud
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Epistemological vs. Ontological Relationalism in Quantum Mechanics: Relativism or Realism?
In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use
in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article
we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism,
relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In
the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum
mechanics, namely, Bohr's relational approach, the modal interpretation by
Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational
interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground
their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into
account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the
fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics
in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational
literature. This possibility is to consider relations in (non-relativist)
ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of
providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum
mechanics is really talking about.Comment: Welcome
Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (review revised 2019)
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior.
First one might note that putting āmetaā in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of āherā and āhersā and āsheā or āhe/sheā etc., where ātheyā and ātheirsā and āthemā would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searleās framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of Wās anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to āOn Certaintyā, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles.
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia dot edu and philpapers dot org , but for PMS Hacker see his papers on his Oxford page.
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen.
āThere must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Fregeās reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackieās error theory or Dummettās intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quineās account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarskiās response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical āteleportationā scenarios.ā
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book āThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleā 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see āTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Ontology of core data mining entities
In this article, we present OntoDM-core, an ontology of core data mining
entities. OntoDM-core defines themost essential datamining entities in a three-layered
ontological structure comprising of a specification, an implementation and an application
layer. It provides a representational framework for the description of mining
structured data, and in addition provides taxonomies of datasets, data mining tasks,
generalizations, data mining algorithms and constraints, based on the type of data.
OntoDM-core is designed to support a wide range of applications/use cases, such as
semantic annotation of data mining algorithms, datasets and results; annotation of
QSAR studies in the context of drug discovery investigations; and disambiguation of
terms in text mining. The ontology has been thoroughly assessed following the practices
in ontology engineering, is fully interoperable with many domain resources and
is easy to extend
Non-Duality
Self ā organizing is closely connected to the phenomenon of life. The creation of complexity, which is necessary for the creation of life, is connected to the process of storing information in molecules of which the living cell is constituted. All living systems, either unicellular or multicellular organisms, are extremely complex systems compared to all the other species of the non living matter that exist in the Universe. Complexity is the result of effect processes, leading to systems with great organization, containing large information stocks. This organization of the molecules of a living organism, a result of accumulation of information, is what makes them able to produce useful work. The useful work involves both the fulfillment of basic biological processes, such as metabolism and reproduction, and the further increase in the information content that builds up in living systems. This last process is subject to the great chain of evolution of biological systems, this development is governed by the law of natural selection. The capability of reproduction, mutation and metabolism are necessary conditions for the latter
Is Captain Kirk a natural blonde? Do X-ray crystallographers dream of electron clouds? Comparing model-based inferences in science with fiction
Scientific models share one central characteristic with fiction: their relation to the physical world is ambiguous. It is often unclear whether an element in a model represents something in the world or presents an artifact of model building. Fiction, too, can resemble our world to varying degrees. However, we assign a different epistemic function to scientific representations. As artifacts of human activity, how are scientific representations allowing us to make inferences about real phenomena? In reply to this concern, philosophers of science have started analyzing scientific representations in terms of fictionalization strategies. Many arguments center on a dyadic relation between the model and its target system, focusing on structural resemblances and āas ifā scenarios. This chapter provides a different approach. It looks more closely at model building to analyze the interpretative strategies dealing with the representational limits of models. How do we interpret ambiguous elements in models? Moreover, how do we determine the validity of model-based inferences to information that is not an explicit part of a representational structure? I argue that the problem of ambiguous inference emerges from two features of representations, namely their hybridity and incompleteness. To distinguish between fictional and non-fictional elements in scientific models my suggestion is to look at the integrative strategies that link a particular model to other methods in an ongoing research context. To exemplify this idea, I examine protein modeling through X-ray crystallography as a pivotal method in biochemistry
On the Role of Mathematics in Scientific Representation
In this dissertation, I consider from a philosophical perspective three related questions concerning the contribution of mathematics to scientific representation. In answering these questions, I propose and defend Carnapian frameworks for examination into the nature and role of mathematics in science.
The first research question concerns the varied ways in which mathematics contributes to scientific representation. In response, I consider in Chapter 2 two recent philosophical proposals claiming to account for the explanatory role of mathematics in science, by Philip Kitcher, and Otavio Bueno and Mark Colyvan. My novel and detailed critique of these accounts shows that they are too limited to encompass the diverse roles of mathematics in science in historical and contemporary scenarios. The conclusion is that any such philosophical account should aim to faithfully capture the structure of our theories and their use in applied contexts.
This insight prompts the second question guiding this dissertation that I consider in Chapter 3, regarding a viable philosophical account of the role of mathematics in scientific theories. I respond by proposing a modified form of the reconstructive frameworks for philosophical analysis developed by Rudolf Carnap for theoretical entities. I propose three amendments to Carnapās account: i) a semantic view for the representation of theories, ii) a careful consideration of instances of the use of theory in representing target systems, and iii) consideration of the practical complexity of relating theory to experimental data.
The final research question for this dissertation asks what, if anything, we can legitimately conclude about the nature of theoretical entities invoked by a theory in light of its success in representing phenomena. In the backdrop of the Carnapian frameworks proposed in Chapter 3, I argue that contemporary ontological debates in the philosophy of science are largely premised on an acceptance of Willard Quineās epistemological outlook on the world and a dismissal of Carnapās approach, which can be used to offer a satisfactory deflationary resolution. This is in the service of my contention that a Carnapian attitude to central issues in the philosophy of science is decidedly preferable to the route championed by Quine
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