WASH coalition building guidelines

The Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC) is an international membership organisation that has worked, since 1990, to achieve sustainable water supply and sanitation for all people, through enhancing collaboration among sector agencies and professionals. As part of its activities within two of its programme areas – Networking & Knowledge Management, and Advocacy & Communications – WSSCC encourages the development of national water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) Coalitions. The role of WASH Coalitions ranges from information sharing to the advocacy of specific policy changes, but they universally address a felt need for improved systematic communication, collaboration and joint action among the sector players in a certain country. As a vehicle for awareness raising and advocacy, most national WASH Coalitions have developed national WASH Campaigns. A special role is given to the National Coordinators, who are expected to maintain the links with the WSSCC Secretariat, exercise quality control and practise a degree of coordination and facilitation of the coalition. However, coalitions, like partnerships, are complicated organisms and some of the existing WASH Coalitions have had only limited impact and varying degrees of success. This is partly due to the complexity of building a successful coalition that responds to the specific needs of the country in which it is created, and partly due to the undefined or open mandate of the WASH Coalitions, resulting in a lack of clarity about what they are intended to do

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

Cooperative agreements among firms to coordinate R&D investments and share knowledge or coordination among nations to reduce trade barriers or to provide global public goods usually proves difficult due to free-rider incentives. In this paper, we propose a sharing scheme for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for games with externalities and heterogeneous players in order to mitigate free-rider problems. We show that every sharing rule belonging to our scheme leads to the same set of stable coalitions which is never empty. This scheme is “almost ideal” because it stabilizes those coalitions generating the highest possible global worth among the set of all “potentially stable coalitions”. Our Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems where outsiders benefit from the coalition’s actions (positive externalities) and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding

Regional Coalitions for Healthcare Improvement: Definition, Lessons, and Prospects

Outlines how regional quality coalitions can collaborate to help deliver evidence-based healthcare; improve care processes; and measure, report, and reward results. Includes guidelines for starting and running a coalition and summaries of NRHI coalitions

Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs

In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without modification of the MAC layer

Privacy-Friendly Collaboration for Cyber Threat Mitigation

Sharing of security data across organizational boundaries has often been advocated as a promising way to enhance cyber threat mitigation. However, collaborative security faces a number of important challenges, including privacy, trust, and liability concerns with the potential disclosure of sensitive data. In this paper, we focus on data sharing for predictive blacklisting, i.e., forecasting attack sources based on past attack information. We propose a novel privacy-enhanced data sharing approach in which organizations estimate collaboration benefits without disclosing their datasets, organize into coalitions of allied organizations, and securely share data within these coalitions. We study how different partner selection strategies affect prediction accuracy by experimenting on a real-world dataset of 2 billion IP addresses and observe up to a 105% prediction improvement.Comment: This paper has been withdrawn as it has been superseded by arXiv:1502.0533

Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations

This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiation

Coalitional Games for Transmitter Cooperation in MIMO Multiple Access Channels

Cooperation between nodes sharing a wireless channel is becoming increasingly necessary to achieve performance goals in a wireless network. The problem of determining the feasibility and stability of cooperation between rational nodes in a wireless network is of great importance in understanding cooperative behavior. This paper addresses the stability of the grand coalition of transmitters signaling over a multiple access channel using the framework of cooperative game theory. The external interference experienced by each TX is represented accurately by modeling the cooperation game between the TXs in \emph{partition form}. Single user decoding and successive interference cancelling strategies are examined at the receiver. In the absence of coordination costs, the grand coalition is shown to be \emph{sum-rate optimal} for both strategies. Transmitter cooperation is \emph{stable}, if and only if the core of the game (the set of all divisions of grand coalition utility such that no coalition deviates) is nonempty. Determining the stability of cooperation is a co-NP-complete problem in general. For a single user decoding receiver, transmitter cooperation is shown to be \emph{stable} at both high and low SNRs, while for an interference cancelling receiver with a fixed decoding order, cooperation is stable only at low SNRs and unstable at high SNR. When time sharing is allowed between decoding orders, it is shown using an approximate lower bound to the utility function that TX cooperation is also stable at high SNRs. Thus, this paper demonstrates that ideal zero cost TX cooperation over a MAC is stable and improves achievable rates for each individual user.Comment: in review for publication in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin