Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted Warfighting Solutions Version 1.0 : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph

Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations. Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got proper empirically supported foundations. Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, air and naval operations. This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical forms of autonomous weapons, that address the gap between Police or Law Enforcement and Military operations that is growing exponentially small. National adversaries are today in many instances hybrid threats, that manifest criminal and military traits, these often require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or Security objectives. The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.Comment: 52 pages, 6 Figures, over 40 references, reviewed by a reade

Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden

Operation Market Garden, Field Marshal B.L.M. Montgomery’s grand attempt to end the war in 1944, has been ceaselessly analysed in an attempt to understand the reasons for its failure. Factors such as the distance of the drop zones from the objectives in Arnhem, the delay in resupply, the presence of strong German forces in the area, as well as the slow progress of XXX Corps in linking the airborne bridgeheads, are some of the main reasons cited for the failure of the operation. Another element often raised has to do with the failure of communications equipment at Arnhem. Peter Harclerode, in his book, Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors, puts it bluntly: “Much of the blame for 1st Airborne Division’s demise has been laid at the door of signals failure as well as the unsuitability of radio equipment issued to the division as well as its failure to work satisfactorily under the condition in which it was employed.” Lewis Golden, the adjutant of Divisional Signals during the operation argues that this was not the case. Signals actually worked better than could be expected and that communications failure was not the principal reason for defeat at Arnhem. This article attempts a comprehensive survey of the role of communications and answers the question, “How far were poor communications responsible for the failure of Market Garden?” In particular, how far did poor communications contribute to the failure of 1st Airborne Division to consolidate a bridgehead at the Arnhem road bridge

Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict

The ergonomics of command and control

Since its inception, just after the Second World War, ergonomics research has paid special attention to the issues surrounding human control of systems. Command and Control environments continue to represent a challenging domain for Ergonomics research. We take a broad view of Command and Control research, to include C2 (Command and Control), C3 (Command, Control and Communication), and C4 (Command, Control, Communication and Computers) as well as human supervisory control paradigms. This special issue of ERGONOMICS aims to present state-of-the-art research into models of team performance, evaluation of novel interaction technologies, case studies, methodologies and theoretical review papers. We are pleased to present papers that detail research on these topics in domains as diverse as the emergency services (e.g., police, fire, and ambulance), civilian applications (e.g., air traffic control, rail networks, and nuclear power) and military applications (e.g., land, sea and air) of command and control. While the domains of application are very diverse, many of the challenges they face share interesting similarities

How much does a man cost? A dirty, dull, and dangerous application

Thesis (M.A.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2017This study illuminates the many abilities of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). One area of importance includes the UAV's capability to assist in the development, implementation, and execution of crisis management. This research focuses on UAV uses in pre and post crisis planning and accomplishments. The accompaniment of unmanned vehicles with base teams can make crisis management plans more reliable for the general public and teams faced with tasks such as search and rescue and firefighting. In the fight for mass acceptance of UAV integration, knowledge and attitude inventories were collected and analyzed. Methodology includes mixed method research collected by interviews and questionnaires available to experts and ground teams in the UAV fields, mining industry, firefighting and police force career field, and general city planning crisis management members. This information was compiled to assist professionals in creation of general guidelines and recommendations for how to utilize UAVs in crisis management planning and implementation as well as integration of UAVs into the educational system. The results from this study show the benefits and disadvantages of strategically giving UAVs a role in the construction and implementation of crisis management plans and other areas of interest. The results also show that the general public is lacking information and education on the abilities of UAVs. This education gap shows a correlation with negative attitudes towards UAVs. Educational programs to teach the public benefits of UAV integration should be implemented