Risk, Unexpected Uncertainty, and Estimation Uncertainty: Bayesian Learning in Unstable Settings

Recently, evidence has emerged that humans approach learning using Bayesian updating rather than (model-free) reinforcement algorithms in a six-arm restless bandit problem. Here, we investigate what this implies for human appreciation of uncertainty. In our task, a Bayesian learner distinguishes three equally salient levels of uncertainty. First, the Bayesian perceives irreducible uncertainty or risk: even knowing the payoff probabilities of a given arm, the outcome remains uncertain. Second, there is (parameter) estimation uncertainty or ambiguity: payoff probabilities are unknown and need to be estimated. Third, the outcome probabilities of the arms change: the sudden jumps are referred to as unexpected uncertainty. We document how the three levels of uncertainty evolved during the course of our experiment and how it affected the learning rate. We then zoom in on estimation uncertainty, which has been suggested to be a driving force in exploration, in spite of evidence of widespread aversion to ambiguity. Our data corroborate the latter. We discuss neural evidence that foreshadowed the ability of humans to distinguish between the three levels of uncertainty. Finally, we investigate the boundaries of human capacity to implement Bayesian learning. We repeat the experiment with different instructions, reflecting varying levels of structural uncertainty. Under this fourth notion of uncertainty, choices were no better explained by Bayesian updating than by (model-free) reinforcement learning. Exit questionnaires revealed that participants remained unaware of the presence of unexpected uncertainty and failed to acquire the right model with which to implement Bayesian updating

A Multi-Experimental Examination of Analyzing Mouse Cursor Trajectories to Gauge Subject Uncertainty

Providing information online is pervasive in human-computer interactions. While providing information, people may deliberate their responses. However, organizations only receive the end-result of this deliberation and therefore have no contextual information surrounding the response. One type of contextual information includes knowing people’s response uncertainty while providing information. Knowing uncertainty allows organizations to weigh responses, ask follow-up questions, provide assistance, or identify problematic instructions or responses. This paper explores how mouse cursor movements may indicate uncertainty in a human-computer interaction context. Specifically, it hypothesizes how uncertainty on multiple-choice questions influences a mouse-movement statistic called area-under-the-curve (AUC). We report the result of two studies that suggest that AUC is higher when people have moderate uncertainty about an answer than if people have high or low uncertainty. The results suggest a methodology for measuring uncertainty to facilitate multi-method research and to assess data in a pragmatic setting

Managing uncertainty through robust-satisficing monetary policy

We employ information-gap decision theory to derive a robust monetary policy response to Knightian parameter uncertainty. This approach provides a quantitative answer to the question: For a specified policy, how much can our models and data err or vary, without rendering the outcome of that policy unacceptable to a policymaker? For a given acceptable level of performance, the policymaker selects the policy that delivers acceptable performance under the greatest range of uncertainty. We show that such information-gap robustness is a proxy for probability of policy success. Hence, policies that are likely to succeed can be identified without knowing the probability distribution. We adopt this approach to investigate empirically the robust monetary policy response to a supply shock with an uncertain degree of persistence.Knightian uncertainty, Monetary policy, Info-gap decision theory.

Affective adaptation = effective transformation? Shifting the politics of climate change adaptation and transformation from the status quo

Alarming rates of environmental change have catalyzed scholars to call for fundamental transformations in social-political and economic relations. Yet cautionary tales about how power and politics are constitutive of these efforts fill the literature. We show how a relational framing of adaptation and transformation demands a political, cross-scalar, and socionatural analysis to probe the affects and effects of climate change and better grasp how transformative change unfolds. We bring affect theory into conversation with the literature on adaptation politics, socio-environmental transformations, subjectivity, and our empirical work to frame our analysis around three under investigated aspects of transformation: (i) the uncertain and unpredictable relations that constitute socionatures; (ii) other ways of knowing; and (iii) the affective and emotional relations that form a basis for action. Affective adaptation represents a different ontological take on transformation by reframing the socionatural, normative and ethical aspects as relational, uncertain, and performative. This directs analytical attention to processes rather than outcomes. The emphasis on the encounter between bodies in affect theory points to the need for experiential and embodied ways of knowing climate to effect transformative change. Effective transformation requires recognizing uncertainty and unpredictability as part of transformative processes. This is not because all outcomes are acceptable, but rather because uncertainty and unpredictability are elements which help generate affects (action) and emotional commitment to shared human and more than human relations in action, projects, and policies. This article is categorized under: Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change > Values-Based Approach to Vulnerability and Adaptatio

Using Ignorance as (Un)Conscious Bureaucratic Strategy: Street-Level Practices and Structural Influences in the Field of Migration Enforcement

Street-level bureaucrats working in the field of migration enforcement have the uneasy task of finding irregularised migrants and processing their cases – often until deportation. As the encounters are unforeseeable and characterised by tension and emotions, bureaucrats develop practices and strategies, which help them to manage the often very personal encounters. Besides the frequently debated strategies summarised under the term ‘copying mechanisms’ and the problem of ‘dirty’ or many hands, ignorance as a tactic in the daily work of bureaucrats has not been studied to a sufficient extent. This work looks at how ignorance, including deliberate not-knowing or blinding out, as well as undeliberate partial-knowing or being kept ignorant, is used in public administration, through multi-sited, ethnographic fieldwork in migration offices and border police/guard offices of three Schengen Member States: Sweden, Switzerland and Latvia. It distinguishes between structural and individual ignorance, which both have the ability to limit migrant’s agency. Further, by analysing their intertwined relation, this article furthers our understanding of how uncertainty and a lack of accountability become results of everyday bureaucratic encounters. Ignorance thus obscures state practices, subjecting migrants with precarious legal status to structural violence

Leadership of changing universities :a case for criticality

Contemporary universities are changing universities that function under conditions of\ud uncertainty, even unknowability, to meet often-unclear demands from within and\ud outside their walls. The complexities of changing universities render unfeasible a\ud singular perspective by which to guide them. At issue is how leaders might\ud understand, correlate, and utilize the awarenesses within their universities to develop\ud a sense of institutional knowing. It is hypothesized in this thesis that, given the above\ud conditions, the effective leadership of changing universities necessitates a critical\ud method. Case studies of the CEOs of three universities, one in Great Britain and two\ud in the United States, form the empirical basis of the study. From the case studies three\ud interlocking themes (knowledge frameworks, institutional identity, and social\ud exchange) emerged. The study revealed that in a time of change and uncertainty, the\ud effective leadership of universities requires a means by which to transform\ud information into knowledge, knowledge into knowing, and knowing into being. The\ud study further revealed that 1) knowledge frameworks (cognitive structures for\ud understanding) are adaptable; 2) the leadership of changing universities is largely\ud transactional; and 3) leaders and staff make their way amidst change and uncertainty\ud through their collective efforts to address institutional issues. Based on Barnett's\ud (1997) idea of criticality, which encompasses critical knowing, critical action, and\ud critical being, criticality for university leadership is here developed as a set of\ud theoretical propositions for the practice of university leadership under conditions of\ud change and uncertainty. The study will contribute to the body of knowledge on, and\ud aid in the examination of, the leadership of contemporary universities as well as the\ud sociology of organisations.\u

Toward a relational concept of uncertainty: about knowing too little, knowing too differently, and accepting not to know

Uncertainty of late has become an increasingly important and controversial topic in water resource management, and natural resources management in general. Diverse managing goals, changing environmental conditions, conflicting interests, and lack of predictability are some of the characteristics that decision makers have to face. This has resulted in the application and development of strategies such as adaptive management, which proposes flexibility and capability to adapt to unknown conditions as a way of dealing with uncertainties. However, this shift in ideas about managing has not always been accompanied by a general shift in the way uncertainties are understood and handled. To improve this situation, we believe it is necessary to recontextualize uncertainty in a broader way¿relative to its role, meaning, and relationship with participants in decision making¿because it is from this understanding that problems and solutions emerge. Under this view, solutions do not exclusively consist of eliminating or reducing uncertainty, but of reframing the problems as such so that they convey a different meaning. To this end, we propose a relational approach to uncertainty analysis. Here, we elaborate on this new conceptualization of uncertainty, and indicate some implications of this view for strategies for dealing with uncertainty in water management. We present an example as an illustration of these concepts. Key words: adaptive management; ambiguity; frames; framing; knowledge relationship; multiple knowledge frames; natural resource management; negotiation; participation; social learning; uncertainty; water managemen

The ethics of uncertainty for data subjects

Modern health data practices come with many practical uncertainties. In this paper, I argue that data subjects’ trust in the institutions and organizations that control their data, and their ability to know their own moral obligations in relation to their data, are undermined by significant uncertainties regarding the what, how, and who of mass data collection and analysis. I conclude by considering how proposals for managing situations of high uncertainty might be applied to this problem. These emphasize increasing organizational flexibility, knowledge, and capacity, and reducing hazard

The Burden of Knowing: Camus, Qohelet, and the Limitations of Human Reason

In one of the most influential works of the twentieth century, The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus writes this: “This heart within me I can feel, and I judge that it exists. This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is construction.” Here, Camus addresses what he believes to be one of the main sources of the absurd: the limitations of human reason. He claims that his inability to fully understand human reality creates a gap between his existence and its meaning, and, in effect, renders the whole of human experience as absurd. Because Camus makes these conclusions from a purely atheistic position, it would seem that his notion of the absurd is incompatible with a theistic understanding of the human condition. Interestingly, however, the main speaker of the ancient Hebrew wisdom book Ecclesiastes, Qohelet, also concludes that the limits of human knowledge give life a sense of absurdity. Although Camus (an atheist) and Qohelet (a theist) begin with different assumptions regarding the existence of God—the very Being who gives meaning and clarity to his creation—their similar conclusions reveal an unlikely compatibility between atheistic and theistic attitudes towards the human predicament. While Camus and Qohelet recognize that the world cannot be explained by human reasoning, and is therefore absurd, they each conclude that uncertainty and human limitations may prompt a certain liberation and solace that allows them to move beyond the absurd. This curious parallel between Camus’s modern existential attitudes in The Myth of Sisyphus and the ancient Hebraic wisdom of Ecclesiastes show that the awareness of the limitation of human reason may compel man to live authentically and passionately despite the seeming unreasonableness of his life