9,785 research outputs found

    Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols

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    Gift-giving has often puzzled economists, especially because efficient gifts-like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for-seem crass or inappropriate. It is shown in a formal game-theoretic model that gifts serve as "signals" of a person's intentions about future investment in a relationship, and inefficient gifts can be better signals. Other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced, and some stylized facts about gift-giving practices are described (many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts)

    Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games as solution of a generalized Euler Equations System

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    This paper gives a new method to characterize Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games by means of a set of Generalized Euler Equations. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given.Stochastic differential games, Dynamic programming, Hamiltonā€“Jacobiā€“Bellman equation, Semilinear parabolic equation, Stochastic productive assets

    Quantum Games Entropy

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    We propose the study of quantum games from the point of view of quantum information theory and statistical mechanics. Every game can be described by a density operator, the von Neumann entropy and the quantum replicator dynamics. There exists a strong relationship between game theories, information theories and statistical physics. The density operator and entropy are the bonds between these theories. The analysis we propose is based on the properties of entropy, the amount of information that a player can obtain about his opponent and a maximum or minimum entropy criterion. The natural trend of a physical system is to its maximum entropy state. The minimum entropy state is a characteristic of a manipulated system i.e. externally controlled or imposed. There exist tacit rules inside a system that do not need to be specified or clarified and search the system equilibrium under the collective welfare principle. The other rules are imposed over the system when one or many of its members violate this principle and maximize its individual welfare at the expense of the group.Comment: 6 page

    怈Research Notes怉Corruption in a repeated psychological game with imperfect monitoring

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    The aim of this note is to examine the effect of imperfect monitoring on bribery and corrupt practices in public administration. Our findings suggest that if we would reconstruct public service system to exterminate its bribery and corrupt practices, the rate of turnover of the bureaucrat and the amount of the noise in monitoring its behavior should be in the suitable regions respectively. We introduce imperfectness of monitoring the behaviour of the bureaucrat into the infinitely repeated game model developed by Balafoutas (2011). Supposing that the players adopt strategies with two-phases, the corruption and punishment phase, we derive the extent of the amount of the bribe for the bureaucrat and the lobby to sustain collusion in the corruption phase. Moreover, we show a sufficient condition for the two-phase strategies to constitute a psychological Nash equilibrium

    Seeing With the Two Systems of Thoughtā€”a Review of ā€˜Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of Perceptionā€™ by John Searle (2015)

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    As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the authorā€™s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ā€˜Seeing things as they areā€™ and whether itā€™s possible to have a ā€˜philosophicalā€™ ā€˜theory of perceptionā€™ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic Searleā€”superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ā€˜The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleā€™ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ā€˜Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

    Seeing With the Two Systems of Thoughtā€”a Review of ā€˜Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of Perceptionā€™ by John Searle (2015)(review revised 2019)

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    As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but exposes the authorā€™s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make sense of the language game ā€˜Seeing things as they areā€™ and whether itā€™s possible to have a ā€˜philosophicalā€™ ā€˜theory of perceptionā€™ (which can only be about how the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic Searleā€”superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the book. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ā€˜The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleā€™ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ā€˜Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

    Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Rule of Law

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    This paper presents a model of Rule of Law in which a continuum of agents plays against the State for the appropriation of the economic assets of a stylised economy. The model shows how each agent can either challenge the State or acquiesce, with the latter having the choice of either protecting property rights or abandoning the economy to anarchy. Players' payoffs are affected by strategic complementarities, not only between State and agents but also among agents themselves. As a consequence of this, a Coordination Failure is generated. The solution of the game is given by two Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria emerging from the context. Introducing idiosyncratic information and sequential play generates a unique equilibrium, according to the global game approach. On the one hand, this model predicts that high uncertainty and sunk costs in law enforcement have a negative effect, pushing the economy towards a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. On the other hand, the high value given to the economy's assets (embedded social norms) has a positive influence, leading to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium.Rule of Law, Coordination Failure, Global Games
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