Contested Killers, Contested Memories: Katyń

This thesis project examines the collective memory of Katyń from the midst of the Second World War to the late twentieth century. Katyń serves as the collective name for the series of mass executions of over 20,000 Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and various members of the Polish intelligentsia by the NKVD that took place throughout remote sites in the Soviet Union during the early months of the Second World War. From the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest by German forces in 1943, Katyń has been shrouded in contentions, secrecy, and processes of attempts to unveil the historical truth of the perpetrators of the mass executions. For nearly five decades, many scholars of Katyń argue that the “truth” of the mass executions remained hidden. While this claim is not entirely incorrect as the Soviet and Polish states’ sponsored versions of the truth of the crime’s perpetrators appeared “hidden,” this school of thought is disingenuous and problematic in its approach in examining contemporaries’ understanding and perceptions of Katyń throughout the latter portion of the twentieth century. This thesis project argues that to better understand what Katyń was and has been, we must examine the representations of Katyń from the discovery of the mass graves by German forces in the Katyń Forest in 1943 to the release of Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990. This thesis project examines selected representations of Katyń made by the German and Soviet governments during the Second World War, Polish émigrés living within the United States and Great Britain during the post-war period, and Poles living within the Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (PRL) and present-day Poland. Katyń has represented a myriad of meanings in the collective memories of states and societies throughout time. The understanding, representations, “truth,” and narratives surrounding Katyń have undoubtedly been influenced by the politics of memory at every stage of the Katyń story

Confronting the Past. Trauma, History and Memory in Wajda’s film

Confronting the Past. Trauma, History and Memory in Wajda’s filmHistorical films are important carriers of collective memory, and as a genre historical films can activate both strong feelings and strong debate. Historical fiction films often tell very accurate and almost documentary stories, but fictional films have the freedom to make historical reality in quite another way than factual historical films. This article deals with some of the most important historical film genres and uses a general theory of genres, emotions, memory and history to analyse the historical films of Polish film director Andrzej Wajda, especially those made post 1989. Dealing with both his heritage drama Pan Tadeusz (1999) and critical historical drama Katyń (2007), the article analyses the ways in which Wajda uses historical narratives to comment on both history and contemporary society, and how this strategy is reflected in all his historical films. The article argues that the traumatic and contrast-filled history of Poland makes historical films especially important and interesting as a critical part of public debate and the reframing and reinterpretation of the past

The Polish and Hungarian echoes of the Katyń massacre 1943¬–1989

A katyńi mészárlás a lengyelség egyik legnagyobb XX. századi tragédiája. A disszertáció fő célja annak a küzdelemnek a bemutatása, melyet a lengyel nép vívott a különböző hatalmi érdekekkel szemben azért, hogy a katyńi mészárlással kapcsolatban kimondhassa az igazságot. Katyń ugyanis közel fél évszázadon át a nagyhatalmi politika eszközeként funkcionált, s a Lengyelországot uraló mindenkori elnyomó hatalmak propagandagépezetei kényükre-kedvükre használták azt pillanatnyi politikai érdekeik mentén. Katyń számtalan szállal kapcsolódik Magyarországhoz is, így érdemes megismerkednünk az ügy magyar fogadtatástörténetével is. Vizsgálatunk első nagy fejezeteként Katyń második világháborús lengyel fogadtatástörténetével foglalkoztunk három főbb szempont alapján: a propagandacélokat, a téma megjelenésének sajátosságait és annak a lengyel közvéleményre gyakorolt hatását figyelembe véve. Vizsgálatunk eredményeképpen kijelenthettük, hogy a lengyel-szovjet kapcsolatok megromlása volt a goebbelsi propaganda egyetlen jelentős eredménye a katyńi ügyet illetően, ugyanis emellett a németek sem a közvélemény meggyőzését, sem pedig saját bűneinek elfedését nem érték el. Egyedül a nemzeti ellenálló szervezetek sajtója és propagandája volt elfogadható a lakosság többsége számára, a kommunista ellenálló szervezetek pedig kompromittálták magukat azzal, hogy a katyńi ügyben a gyilkosok mellé álltak. A téma háború alatti magyar fogtatástörténetét vizsgálva arra a következtetésre juthatunk, hogy a magyar közvélemény többségének sem volt kérdéses a szovjetek bűnössége. Habár fontos megemlíteni, hogy a németek Magyarországon némileg többet értek el propagandájukkal, mint Lengyelországban. A katyńi mészárlás hazánkban egyfajta "ébresztőként" is hatott, s a tömegmészárlás egyfajta jelképévé vált. A front közeledtével pedig mindkét országban megjelent az ún. Katyń-szindróma. Összegezve kijelenthetjük, hogy a magyar sajtó váltakozó érdeklődése és a magyar közvélemény "személyes érintettségének" hiánya ellenére Katyń nem csupán egy háborús szenzáció szintjén került be a korabeli köztudatba, de az eset sokáig fenntartotta a közvélemény érdeklődését és a tömegsírok a Szovjetunió bűnösségének egyik fő jelképévé váltak Magyarországon is. A téma háború utáni fogadtatástörténetét két részre bontva vizsgáltuk meg, először a sztálinista Bierut-rendszerre, majd a Lengyel Népköztársaság 1956–1989 közti időszakára koncentrálva. A kommunista Lengyelország első évtizedében az általános tévhittel szemben még nem a következetes cenzúra és elnyomás érvényesült, a külföldi eseményekhez kapcsolódva (Nürnberg, Madden-bizottság) ugyanis saját "igazának" alátámasztására a hatalom időnként mégis foglalkozott a katyńi üggyel. A közvélemény kommunistaellenes magatartása és a kérdés "kényes" mivolta azonban végül azt eredményezte, hogy az ügyet mindig visszatemették a cenzúra leple alá. Miután pedig kiderült, hogy a külföldi "rágalmakkal" szemben folytatott ellenpropaganda nem csak hatástalan, de még a lengyel társadalom belső feszültségeit is növeli, egyértelműen a hallgatás mellett döntött a párt vezetése. Az ügy háború utáni magyar megítélésével kapcsolatban összegezve azt állapíthattuk meg, hogy a magyar közvéleményből még ekkor sem, a tiltások ellenére sem kopott ki a tömeggyilkosság emléke. Ahogy az a visszaemlékezésekből is kiderül, a kérdés a lengyelek melletti szolidaritás kifejezésének eszközévé is vált, bár nem tett szert olyan nagy jelentőségre, mint Lengyelországban. Láthattuk, hogy 1956 után Lengyelországban a hatalom álláspontja az ügyben két végpont közt rekedt meg: a teljes igazság nyilvánosságra hozásától ódzkodtak, a teljes tiltás pedig kudarcba fulladt. Így hát a téma a továbbiakban egyfajta furcsa "kettős életet" élt: az állam cenzúrát vezetett be, a földalatti szervezetek pedig igyekeztek ezt megtörni. A kommunista vezetés tehát a "harmadik utat" választotta, mely folyamatos konfliktusokat eredményezve szempontjukból a legrosszabb döntésnek bizonyult. Mindent összevetve elmondható, hogy Katyń egy olyan jelképpé vált, mely egységbe tömörítette a rendszer ellen tiltakozókat, s egyúttal az ellenállási mozgalmak egyfajta katalizátoraként is működött. Katyń tehát óriási szerepet töltött be a Lengyel Népköztársaság ellenzékének gondolkodásában, jelképes összetartó kapoccsá és mozgatórugóvá válva, melynek eredményeként végül a kommunista párt már képtelen volt tovább fenntartani az elnyomás és a hazugság rendszerét. Vizsgálatunkat végül a téma 1956-1989 közti magyar emlékezetével és rendszerváltás utáni felszabadulásának bemutatásával zártuk. Elmondhatjuk, hogy a katyńi mészárlás ténye Magyarországon a Kádár-rendszer alatt is a közemlékezetben maradt - még annak ellenére is, hogy Lengyelországgal összevetve csak alig kapott nyilvánosságot. Munkánk eredményeit összegezve kijelenthetjük, hogy a tömegsírok 1943-as felfedezése után közel fél évszázadon át különböző nagyhatalmak igyekeztek meghatározni a közvélemény katyńi mészárlásról alkotott képét mindkét országban. Világos, hogy a mészárlás elsősorban a lengyel nép tudatában maradt meg fájó emlékként, de az is kétségtelen, hogy a magyar közvélemény túlnyomó többsége is mindvégig tisztában volt épp úgy az eset jelentőségével, mint a valódi bűnös (a Szovjetunió) kilétével. Így hát végül pedig egyik nagyhatalom sem tudta az igazságot "megváltoztatni". Habár a tragédiához való kötődésük révén a lengyelek voltak a katyńi igazság legharcosabb követelői és védelmezői, nem szabad elfelejtkeznünk arról sem, hogy számos magyar is kiállt a lengyelek igazsága mellett.The Katyń massacre is one of the biggest tragedies that the Poles had to suffer in the 20st century. The basic aim of the dissertation is to unfold the history of the struggle that took place between the Polish people and various political interests that tried to conquer Poland, the struggle that's main goal was to be able to speak out the truth about the Katyń massacre. Katyń namely played the role of a good instrument of propaganda for almost fifty years - the powers that tried to dominate Poland used it along their actual political interests without trying to reveal the truth. Katyń had a huge influence on the Hungarian public opinion, as well and it is worth to examine the Hungarian echoes of the massacre, too. We began our work with the Polish wartime recetipon history of the massacre focusing on three aspects: the goals of the propaganda, the ways how the topic appeared, and the effects it triggered. As a result of our investigation we can say, that the only significant result of the German propaganda-campaign was the breakdown of the Polish-Soviet relations, as Germans could not persuade the public opinion about their truth, and they also failed in glossing their own war crimes over. Only the press and propaganda of the patriotic resistant organisations remained acceptable for the majority of the Poles, and the communist underground organisations compromised themselves by standing up for the Soviet opinion. After examining the wartime Hungarian reception history of the topic we can come to the conclusion, that the Hungarian public opinion treated the case as a Soviet crime too. However compared to Poland, German propaganda could achieve a bit more in Hungary, but based on plain fear. The news of the massacre acted alarming in Hungary, and Katyń turned to a symbol of mass murder. And as the war front got closer to the borders, the so called Katyń-sydrom appeared in both countries. In general we can clearly state, that despite the fluctuating interest of the Hungarian press and despite the "distance" of the tragedy, Katyń meant for Hungarians far more than a "war-sensation", and its Hungarian aspects could maintain interest in the topic for a long time - and Katyń became a symbol of the Soviet Union's guilt in Hungary, too. We reviewed the postwar Polish reception history of the case focusing fist on the stalinist Bierut-system, then on the People's Republic of Poland (1956-1989). In opposite to the widespreadly appearing misbelief, in the first decade of the communist led Poland the system of censorship and opression was still not consistent, namely the state power was willing to deal with the Katyń case in connection with foreign events (Nuremberg, Madden-committee) just to try proving his "right". The anti-commmunist attitude of the Polish public opinion and the fact that Katyń remained a highly "sensitive" topic for the Polish communists made the politics to bury the topic underneath the veil of censorship again and again. And after it turned out that the counterpropaganda against the foreign "accusations" is not only ineffective, but even increases the internal tensions of the society, they decided not to mention the case once again. Regarding the Hungarian reception of the issue between 1945-1956 we can say, that the memory of the mass murder was still "alive" in public opinion - even despite that the Hungarian communists finally decided to ban the whole topic too. As it turned out of the recollections, the case remained a mean of expressing solidarity towards the Poles, too. Of course the topic was not of such importance as in Poland - simply because the Hungarian society was not affected. We could see, the standpoint of the Polish government regarding the Katyń case got stuck between two endpoints after 1956: they were unwilling to unveil the truth, but they were not able successfully ban the topic as well. They have chosen the "third way", that proved to be the worst option for them: they had to face continuus conflicts. All in all we can say, that in Poland Katyń became a symbol that brought the protesters together to a strong unity. Katyń not only played a unifying role, but the struggle with the Katyń lie also enforced hope in getting to the common goal. So the Katyń issue served as a catalyst of resistance movements, and at the same time it had a postive effect on the unveiling of the truth as well, since the truth about Katyń became more and more discussed and accepted as well trough this process. Katyń filled an important role in the thinking of the opposition in the People's Republic of Poland and it became a cohesive factor and catalyst of movements that finally achieved the situation when the communist party just could not maintain the system of lies and oppession anymore. We ended our investigation with presenting the Hungarian memory of the massacre (1956-1989). In conclusion we can say, that although the Hungarian "official history" and political literature lied about the issue, the Katyń massacre remained in the common memory of the Hungarians (with the help of Polish underground organisations) even under the Kádár-era - despite that it was not so well known as in Poland. To summarize the results of our work we can say, that after the discovery of the Katyń graves in 1943, the issue became a mean of propaganda in the eyes of the superpowers that ruled both countries. It is clear, that the case remained a painful memory mainly in the common sense of the Polish society, but it is unquestionable as well, that the Hungarians were aware of the importance of the case and the guilt of the Soviet Union, too. As a conclusion, we can state that none of the leading superpowers managed to "change the truth". However the Poles were the most resolute defenders of the truth about Katyń, we should not forget that lot of Hungarians stood up for the truth of the Poles, as well

Moving Ahead into the Past: Historical Contexts in Recent Polish Cinema

Moving Ahead into the Past: Historical Contexts in Recent Polish CinemaThe article looks at treatments of Poland’s 20th-century history in Polish films made over the last several years. Since 2007, Polish cinema has seen an explosion of films dealing in various ways with the history of the last century. These include mega-productions by directors known for making historically themed films, like Wajda’s Katyń or Hoffman’s 1920. Battle of Warsaw, and traditional historical dramas dealing with iconic personalities (Rafał Wieczyński’s Popiełuszko. Freedom Is Within Us) and moments in time (Antoni Krauze’s Black Thursday. Janek Wiśniewski Fell). However, a number of other works make use of historical settings from the last century in new and innovative ways. Most choose smaller-scale, less grand approaches to the past, though without abandoning an ambition to accurately depict the times they portray. Films focused on issues related to family and personal relationships, such as Jan Kidawa-Błoński’s Little Rose or Borys Lankosz’s Reverse, likewise speak about life during communism, but attempt to do so without repeating clichéd images by engaging new problems or returning to familiar ones using new techniques. Lastly, memory often plays an important role as a source of knowledge about the past, and as a filter for mediating experiences of it. This can be best seen in Rafael Lewandowski’s The Mole, Władysław Pasikowski’s Consequences (Pokłosie), and Wojciech Smarzowski’s Dark House. Archival evidence, memories of relatives, and the camera itself are used in the films to pose questions about the subjectivity inherent to film as a means of learning about the past

Does the Lie Contradict the Truth?

The main task of this work is not to determine the bases for a moral evaluation of the lie; neither is it to describe its negative qualification. We are interested rather in the very problemate of the truth and the lie itself, considered as a juxtaposition of two of its notions: the truth and the lie, one that aims to provide a positive – as it would seem obvious – answer to the question contained in the title of the present work: Does the lie contradict the truth

The myth of the Great Patriotic War as a tool of the Kremlin’s great power policy. OSW Commentary NUMBER 316 31.12.2019

The sacralised Soviet victory over Nazism is a central element of the politics of memory, as utilised by the Russian state today. It constitutes an important theme in the Kremlin’s ideological offensive that is intended to legitimise Russia’s great-power ambitions. The messianic myth of saving the world from absolute evil is supposed to cover up the darker chapters of Soviet history and to legitimise all subsequent Soviet or Russian wars and military interventions, starting with Hungary, through Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and ending with Ukraine and Syria. According to the current neo-Soviet interpretation, all these military actions were purely defensive and justified by external circumstances. The glorification of the “Yalta order” and the justification of the use of force in foreign policy is intended to legitimise Moscow’s pursuit of its current strategic aims, first and foremost of these being hegemony in the post-Soviet area and revision of the European security architecture. The war mythology and Russia’s great-power ambitions continue to resonate with the wider Russian public; thus contributing to legitimisation of the authoritarian regime in the eyes of a large swathe of society and offsetting the effect of growing socio-economic problems. The myth of a wartime ‘brotherhood of arms’ has a smaller impact on other post-Soviet states, which have increasingly been distancing themselves – especially since 2014 – from Moscow’s neo-imperial historical narrative. The use of historical myths as a form of soft power finds even less resonance in Europe and the US. Nevertheless, low susceptibility in the West to Russian historical propaganda does not diminish the gravity of the challenge posed by Russian information-psychological warfare, resorting to historical falsehoods and specious analogies between the current international situation and political-military tensions of the 1930s

Katyn massacre : basic facts

Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish nation. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic facts of Katyn massacre - the execution of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, Kalinin (Tver) and also other Polish prisoners (soldiers and civilians), which took place in the spring of 1940 in different places of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus republics based on the decision of the Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. This article refers not only to the massacre itself, but also its origin, historical processes and the lies accompanying Katyn massacre