The Knowledge of Good

This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson

또 다른 인간의 동반자: 동물의 권리를 로봇에게도?

학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제대학원 국제학과(국제협력전공), 2020. 8. Jiyeoun Song.This paper considers the academic debate on and different responses to the emergence of lifelike social robots as others from humans in society. The philosophical issues surrounding legal rights that are raised by this regulatory issue will be analyzed by deploying a 2x2 matrix based on two modalities: can and should social robots have rights? On these two questions, this thesis examines how the legal treatment of animals, the original others, has evolved historically, and how the animal-robot analogy, which encourages an understanding of social robots as analogues of animals, has risen to prominence as a line of argument to push for the extension of legal rights to protect social robots akin to animals. Using the same modalities, other positions on robot rights will be examined to suggest that the debate on robot rights shows parallels to the debate on animal rights and can be modeled along similar lines. In doing so, this thesis provides an overview of the current rights debate and suggests that the robot rights debate may follow a similar trajectory to the animal rights debate in the future.I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 8 II.1. ANALYSIS 9 II.1.1. On Social Robots 9 II.1.2. On Anthropomorphism 12 II.1.3. On the Comparison between Animal and Robot Rights 14 II.2. LIMITATIONS 16 III. METHODOLOGY 18 IV. DEFINING SOCIAL ROBOTS: WHY DO WE TALK ABOUT THEM? 22 IV.1. BACKGROUND 22 IV.2. EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL ROBOTS 25 IV.3. ANTHROPOMORPHISM AS INTENTIONAL DESIGN CHOICE 27 V. THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 34 V.1. BACKGROUND 34 V.2. DEBATE ANALYSIS: FROM INDIFFERENCE TO ADVOCACY 35 V.3. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 44 VI. THE ROBOT RIGHTS DEBATE 49 VI.1. BACKGROUND 49 VI.2. DEBATE ANALYSIS: FROM TOOLS TO SOCIAL ENTITIES 51 VI.2.1. Q1: Since social robots cannot have rights, they should not have rights. 52 VI.2.2. Q2: Even though social robots cannot have rights, they should have rights. 55 VI.2.3. Q3: Even though social robots can have rights, they should not have rights. 59 VI.2.4. Q4: Since social robots can have rights, they should have rights. 62 VI.2.5. The Dynamics of The Discourse 64 VI.3. THE ANIMAL-ROBOT ANALOGY 73 VI.4. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 86 VII. CONCLUSION 89 VIII. REFERENCES 92Maste

NEGLIGENCE AS OPTIMIZATION PUZZLES: A NEW THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE

This thesis addresses the following questions, among others. Can two people take the exact same precautions yet face different liabilities for identical accidents? Can two people exercise the same overall care yet face different liabilities? Can a person take more precautions than the efficient level of care requires at the time of the accident, yet justifiably be found liable in negligence? More generally, is the Hand Formula economically misguided or inapplicable, at least in many real-world scenarios? Is the Restatement (Third) of Torts equally misguided or imprecise? Is orthodox economic analysis of negligence law predicated and contingent upon over-constrained and unrealistic assumptions? What are the prerequisites for the application of the conventional model of negligence adjudication? The principle issues examined include (i) Interacting precautions and multidimensional frameworks; (ii) Short-run versus long-run optimization of negligence puzzles; (iii) Pathdependencies and dynamic analysis of care measures; (iv) Non-strictly convex and discontinuous social costs functions; (v) Fluctuating and discontinuous social cost functions; (vi) Threshold effects in costs and efficiency functions; (vii) An expansive methodology to cost-benefit analysis in torts: degrees of freedom, mixed and tailored approaches

The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples: Exploring the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU

This thesis explores a conception of the EU as a modified confederal system of sovereign member peoples and their states. A confederal conception which demonstrates how, contrary to popular belief, European integration does not conflict with sovereignty or democracy. For, properly conceived and constituted, the EU reasserts the sovereignty of the member peoples, and liberates national democracy from the confines of the state. To this end, this thesis reconnects the EU to two classic constructs of constitutional theory: confederalism and sovereignty. Two powerful but unfashionable constructs whose joint potential for European integration remains largely unexplored and undervalued. The primary instrument to explore this potential is comparative. The EU is contrasted with the rather unknown but rich example of the American Articles of Confederation, and their evolution into the now famous American federate system. A comparison with the confederal roots of the United States which is revealing for both confederalism and sovereignty, and illustrates the potential of linking both for a constructive constitutional theory of the EU. A theory which does not have to overcome history and the statal system it has created, but connects with it. A theory, therefore, that may help to recapture the EU and the increasing authority it wields, both in theory and in practise.  The thesis is subdivided in three parts. Part I addresses confederalism. It demonstrates how the constitutional system of the EU combines a confederal foundation with a federate superstructure, and explores the particular strengths, weaknesses and limits of this modified confederal system. Part II discusses sovereignty. It first demonstrates how the EU forms a logical confederal evolution of popular sovereignty, and how European integration does not conflict with sovereignty. Subsequently, it shows how the concept of confederal sovereignty equally helps to dispel the presumed conflict between statism and pluralism, how it respects and conciliates national and EU claims to supremacy, and how it allows a confederal evolution of national democracy, which updates democracy to the global reality it is to control. Part III applies the findings of Part I and II to the EMU crisis and the challenge of establishing an effective democratic foundation for the EU at the national level. An application which demonstrates the concrete and attractive contributions a confederal approach can make to addressing some of the core challenges facing the EU.Book (monograph

Instructional strategies in explicating the discovery function of proof for lower secondary school students

In this paper, we report on the analysis of teaching episodes selected from our pedagogical and cognitive research on geometry teaching that illustrate how carefully-chosen instructional strategies can guide Grade 8 students to see and appreciate the discovery function of proof in geometr

The Significance of Evidence-based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines