210 research outputs found

    SNR degradation in GNSS-R measurements under the effects of radio-frequency interference

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    ©2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.Radio-frequency interference (RFI) is a serious threat for systems working with low power signals such as those coming from the global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). The spectral separation coefficient (SSC) is the standard figure of merit to evaluate the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) degradation due to the RFI. However, an in-depth assessment in the field of GNSS-Reflectometry (GNSS-R) has not been performed yet, and particularly, about which is the influence of the RFI on the so-called delay-Doppler map (DDM). This paper develops a model that evaluates the contribution of intra-/inter-GNSS and external RFI effects to the degradation of the SNR in the DDM for both conventional and interferometric GNSS-R techniques. Moreover, a generalized SSC is defined to account for the effects of nonstationary RFI signals. The results show that highly directive antennas are necessary to avoid interference from other GNSS satellites, whereas mitigation techniques are essential to keep GNSS-R instruments working under external RFI degradation.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

    The Impact of Interference on GNSS Receiver Observables – A Running Digital Sum Based Simple Jammer Detector

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    A GNSS-based navigation system relies on externally received information via a space-based Radio Frequency (RF) link. This poses susceptibility to RF Interference (RFI) and may initiate failure states ranging from degraded navigation accuracy to a complete signal loss condition. To guarantee the integrity of the received GNSS signal, the receiver should either be able to function in the presence of RFI without generating misleading information (i.e., offering a navigation solution within an accuracy limit), or the receiver must detect RFI so that some other means could be used as a countermeasure in order to ensure robust and accurate navigation. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to identify an interference occurrence and not to confuse it with other signal conditions, for example, indoor or deep urban canyon, both of which have somewhat similar impact on the navigation performance. Hence, in this paper, the objective is to investigate the effect of interference on different GNSS receiver observables in two different environments: i. an interference scenario with an inexpensive car jammer, and ii. an outdoor-indoor scenario without any intentional interference. The investigated observables include the Automatic Gain Control (AGC) measurements, the digitized IF (Intermediate Frequency) signal levels, the Delay Locked Loop and the Phase Locked Loop discriminator variances, and the Carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) measurements. The behavioral pattern of these receiver observables is perceived in these two different scenarios in order to comprehend which of those observables would be able to separate an interference situation from an indoor scenario, since in both the cases, the resulting positioning accuracy and/or availability are affected somewhat similarly. A new Running Digital Sum (RDS) -based interference detection method is also proposed herein that can be used as an alternate to AGC-based interference detection. It is shown in this paper that it is not at all wise to consider certain receiver observables for interference detection (i.e., C/N0); rather it is beneficial to utilize certain specific observables, such as the RDS of raw digitized signal levels or the AGC-based observables that can uniquely identify a critical malicious interference occurrence

    Jamming of GPS & GLONASS signals - a study of GPS performance in maritime environments under jamming conditions, and benefits of applying GLONASS in Northern areas under such conditions

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    Project thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Positioning and Navigation Technology, The University of Nottingham.Growing dependence on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), especially GPS, for positioning and navigation at sea has raised a concern about the potential risks of signal interference. Technology for jamming is easily available, and in recent years there have been many cases of intentional jamming. As GPS is the principal means of position fixing used by the Norwegian Navy, important questions to find answers to is how vulnerable the GPS and the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) are to a jamming attack, and further whether employing the Glonass satellite system in addition to GPS will provide better performance regarding robustness and redundancy when receivers are exposed to jamming. By having a Coast Guard Vessel operating inshore the Norwegian fjords as case, this research aims to explore these issues and it does so by asking the following research questions: - Will employing Glonass in addition to GPS provide better performance in Northern areas when the systems are exposed to GNSS jammers? - How is the ability of the existing GPS system on board a Norwegian Coastguard Vessel to provide a reliable position when there is a jamming threat, and how will the ECDIS system on board handle an eventually loss of GPS position? The study consists of two jamming tests: A static test where focus is to analyze and compare the GPS and Glonass system and a dynamic test where the GPS and ECDIS system on board is analyzed when exposed to jamming. The results from the static test showed that the jammer has effect on large distances, and that the different receivers used react differently when exposed to jamming. Further, the carrier-to-noise ratios for Glonass are less affected by the jammer, and the receiver is able to track Glonass satellites with lower carrier-to-noise ratios than GPS satellites. We have seen that utilizing Glonass satellites in addition to GPS satellites in the receiver contribute to a later loss of position fix and an earlier calculation of new position under difficult jamming conditions. The dynamic test showed that the marine grade GPS receiver is easy to jam. A weak jamming signal caused the GPS receivers to give misleading information without any warning from itself or the ECDIS system. The ECDIS system provided an adequate DR positioning, but there are issues that need to be resolved for better functionality. As Glonass signals has shown to be more resistant to jamming than GPS signals, applying the Glonass system in addition to GPS might provide benefits with regards to reliability and redundancy, especially for maritime navigation in Northern areas where the Glonass satellites also have higher elevation and better coverage than GPS

    Radio Frequency Interference Impact Assessment on Global Navigation Satellite Systems

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    The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen of the EC Joint Research Centre (IPSC-JRC) has been mandated to perform a study on the Radio Frequency (RF) threat against telecommunications and ICT control systems. This study is divided into two parts. The rst part concerns the assessment of high energy radio frequency (HERF) threats, where the focus is on the generation of electromagnetic pulses (EMP), the development of corresponding devices and the possible impact on ICT and power distribution systems. The second part of the study concerns radio frequency interference (RFI) with regard to global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). This document contributes to the second part and contains a detailed literature study disclosing the weaknesses of GNSS systems. Whereas the HERF analysis only concerns intentional interference issues, this study on GNSS also takes into account unintentional interference, enlarging the spectrum of plausible interference scenarios.JRC.DG.G.6-Security technology assessmen

    GNSS jamming resilience for close to shore navigation in the Northern Sea

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    avigational error accounts for half of the accidents and serious incidents in close to shore maritime transport in Norway predominantly due to the rapidly changing weather conditions and the dangerous nature of the narrow inshore waters found along the Norwegian coast. This creates a dependence on Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) use and any disruption to this service can lead to an increased accident rate. The aim of this paper is to research the jamming vulnerability of existing maritime receivers and to understand if an upgrade to a multi-constellation or multi-frequency receiver would improve system resilience. The novelty of this work is a comparison of jamming resilience between different combinations of multiple constellations (GPS and Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS)) and multi-frequency Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. This paper presents results from GNSS jamming trials conducted in the northern part of Norway, confirming previous research and indicating that typical maritime GPS receivers are easy to jam and may produce erroneous positional information. Results demonstrate that the single frequency multi-constellation receivers offer better jamming resilience than multi-frequency (L1 + L2) GPS receivers. Further, the GLONASS constellation demonstrated a better resilience than GPS. Results demonstrate a known correlation between GPS L1 and L2 frequencies, as well as a probable over-dependence on GPS for signal acquisition, meaning that no signal can be received without GPS L1 present. With these limitations in mind, the authors suggest that the most economic update to the single frequency GPS receivers, currently used for maritime applications, should be multi-constellation GPS + GLONASS receivers. This solution is cheaper and it also offer better jamming resistance for close to shore navigation than dual frequency receivers

    Parametric models for a database of realistic threats to GNSS receivers

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    Threats to GNSS receivers are becoming increasingly complex and easier to implement due to technological advancement. So, these attacks have become now a serious problem for any user, not only, for example, for military or safety-of-life purposes anymore. In this context, TAM has been created to collect data about these attacks and possible mitigations. This thesis describes how tested threat scenarios to GNSS signals have been parameterized to be inserted in the TAM database.openEmbargo tempraneo per motivi di segretezza e/o di proprietĂ  dei risultati e informazioni di enti esterni o aziende private che hanno partecipato alla realizzazione del lavoro di ricerca relativo alla tes

    On the Threat of Systematic Jamming of GNSS

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    This paper presents a study of the threat of malicious interference to GNSS and examines the special case where the jamming device is incrementally more sophisticated than a typical always-on interference source. The concept of a systematic jamming attack is considered, where the interference signal is intentionally synchronized with the GNSS signals, with the intention of causing maximum disruption with the minimum power expenditure. Various attack methodologies are examined for the case of a civilian L1 receiver. It is shown that, depending on the attack strategy, the target signal and the target receiver, data-recovery, navigation and timing can be denied to a user with some tens of decibels less average power than a traditional jamming attack. It is further shown that some attacks may be capable to effectively deny some receiver functionality in a subtle manner such that presence of the malicious interference goes undetected. Key signal and receiver features that expose a vulnerability are identified and some means of improving receiver robustness are provided

    Characterization of the GNSS RFI Threat to DFMC GBAS Signal Bands

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    This article presents analysis results from a long-term multi-site Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) monitoring campaign in the context of Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) Dual Frequency Multi Constellation (DFMC) concept operation. GBAS resilience against unintentional RFI is an important area for investigation as the ground station receivers often must operate adjacent to high-traffic roads where chances of being affected by RFI are high. To be able to develop algorithms and reaction strategies necessary to ensure continuity and availability of service, knowledge of interference signal characteristics and frequency band/bands affected, as well as relative occurrence rates between the considered frequencies and frequency combinations, is necessary. The analysis presented in the article covers the prevalence and properties of the RFI events observed on the GPS L1 and L5 and the Galileo E1 and E5a frequency bands that are considered by the on-going DFMC GBAS concept development initiatives. Due to being spectrally adjacent, the observed event analysis is also carried out for the Galileo E5b and GLONASS G1 frequency bands. The article also addresses the issue of spectral occupancy distribution of the observed events and presents new interesting RFI event types captured during the considered monitoring period.publishedVersio

    On the Impact of Channel Cross-Correlations in High-Sensitivity Receivers for Galileo E1 OS and GPS L1C Signals

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    One of the most promising features of the modernized global navigation satellite systems signals is the presence of pilot channels that, being data-transition free, allow for increasing the coherent integration time of the receivers. Generally speaking, the increased integration time allows to better average the thermal noise component, thus improving the postcorrelation SNR of the receiver in the acquisition phase. On the other hand, for a standalone receiver which is not aided or assisted, the acquisition architecture requires that only the pilot channel is processed, at least during the first steps of the procedure. The aim of this paper is to present a detailed investigation on the impact of the code cross-correlation properties in the reception of Galileo E1 Open Service and GPS L1C civil signals. Analytical and simulation results demonstrate that the S-curve of the code synchronization loop can be affected by a bias around the lock point. This effect depends on the code cross-correlation properties and on the receiver setup. Furthermore, in these cases, the sensitivity of the receiver to other error sources might increase, and the paper shows how in presence of an interfering signal the pseudorange bias can be magnified and lead to relevant performance degradatio
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