Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy with Restricted Preferences

In this paper, we study liquid democracy, a collective decision making paradigm which lies between direct and representative democracy. One main feature of liquid democracy is that voters can delegate their votes in a transitive manner so that: A delegates to B and B delegates to C leads to A delegates to C. Unfortunately, this process may not converge as there may not even exist a stable state (also called equilibrium). In this paper, we investigate the stability of the delegation process in liquid democracy when voters have restricted types of preference on the agent representing them (e.g., single-peaked preferences). We show that various natural structures of preferences guarantee the existence of an equilibrium and we obtain both tractability and hardness results for the problem of computing several equilibria with some desirable properties

As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy

In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised, is that current academic literature focuses solely on static inputs, concealing a key characteristic of Liquid Democracy: the right for a voter to change her mind as time goes by, regarding her options of whether to vote herself or delegate her vote to other participants, till the final voting deadline. In real life, a period of extended deliberation preceding the election-day motivates voters to adapt their behaviour over time, either based on observations of the remaining electorate or on information acquired for the topic at hand. By adding a temporal dimension to Liquid Democracy, such adaptations can increase the number of possible delegation paths and reduce the loss of votes due to delegation cycles or delegating paths towards abstaining agents, ultimately enhancing participation. Our work takes a first step to integrate a time horizon into decision-making problems in Liquid Democracy systems. Our approach, via a computational complexity analysis, exploits concepts and tools from temporal graph theory which turn out to be convenient for our framework

Popular Branchings and Their Dual Certificates

Let G be a digraph where every node has preferences over its incoming edges. The preferences of a node extend naturally to preferences over branchings, i.e., directed forests; a branching B is popular if B does not lose a head-to-head election (where nodes cast votes) against any branching. Such popular branchings have a natural application in liquid democracy. The popular branching problem is to decide if G admits a popular branching or not. We give a characterization of popular branchings in terms of dual certificates and use this characterization to design an efficient combinatorial algorithm for the popular branching problem. When preferences are weak rankings, we use our characterization to formulate the popular branching polytope in the original space and also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute a branching with least unpopularity margin. When preferences are strict rankings, we show that “approximately popular” branchings always exist.TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 202

Reforming political party organization in the XXIst century. On the Transformative Effect of Network Parties on Modern Representative Democracy

This thesis contributes to a better understanding of current political parties, critically engaging with their merits through the lens of the Network Society. It draws on five case studies in order to flesh out the nuances of the network party type. I review the genealogy of party types, advancing the existing literature on a broad range of party types, from the mass party to the catch-all party, as well as filling in the gaps related to network party type. Firstly, I argue that the crucial novelties brought on by network parties are explicit in the following characteristics: A vision of expert-citizen democracy and "strong" participation, a desideratum of openness and transparency, an alignment to "disintermediation" and the revision of the concept of representation, and an organizational vision of permeable intra-party democracy. Drawing on the five case studies, I then identify sub-types of network parties: the procedural, the plebiscitary and the municipalist.Esta tesis contribuye comprender mejor los partidos políticos actuales y analiza críticamente sus méritos a través de la óptica de la network society. Se basa en cinco estudios de caso para establecer y definir los matices de cada tipo de network party. Asimismo, revisa la genealogía de los tipos de partidos y avanza en la literatura existente sobre una amplia gama de tipos de partidos, desde los mass parties hasta los catch-all parties, y se completan algunas lagunas relacionadas con los tipos de network parties. En primer lugar, se sostiene que las novedades cruciales que aportan los network parties se hacen explícitas en las siguientes características: una visión de la democracia experto-ciudadano y de la participación "fuerte", un desiderátum de apertura y transparencia, una alineación con la "desintermediación" y la revisión del concepto de representación y una visión organizativa de la democracia intrapartidaria permeable. A partir de los cinco estudios de caso, se identifican, a continuación, varios subtipos de network parties: los procedimentales, los plebiscitarios y los municipalistas.Aquesta tesi contribueix a comprendre més bé els partits polítics actuals i analitza críticament els seus mèrits a través de l'òptica de la network society. Es basa en cinc estudis de cas per establir i definir els matisos de cada tipus de network party. Així mateix, revisa la genealogia dels tipus de partits i avança en la literatura existent sobre una àmplia gamma de tipus de partits, des dels mass-parties fins als catch-all parties, i es completen les mancances relacionades amb els tipus de network parties. En primer lloc, se sosté que les novetats crucials que aporten els network parties es fan explícites en les característiques següents: una visió de la democràcia expert-ciutadà i de la participació "forta", un desideràtum d'obertura i transparència, una alineació amb la "desintermediació" i la revisió del concepte de representació i una visió organitzativa de la democràcia intrapartidària permeable. A partir dels cinc estudis de cas, s'identifiquen, a continuació, diferents subtipus de network parties: els procedimentals, els plebiscitaris i els municipalistes.Societat de la informació i el coneixemen

Tax Planning and Policy Drift

This Article proposes a framework for analyzing how private-sector legal interpretations influence public policy. Political scientists and legal scholars use the terms “bureaucratic drift” and “legislative drift” to describe how administrative agencies and future legislative coalitions affect public policy enacted by Congress. This Article identifies a third category of policy drift: “planning drift.” Planning drift describes deviations from an enacting legislature’s policy preferences that result from private experts’ interpretations of existing law. After Congress enacts a statute, the first people to interpret and apply the new legislation generally are not regulators or judges, but instead are private experts, such as lawyers, acting in the service of their clients. Although these experts’ interpretations do not have legal authority in a formal sense, this Article elaborates mechanisms through which these interpretations shape the course of public policy. Specifically, these interpretations give private experts a first-mover advantage in the interpretation of new legislation and affect the substance of subsequent legislative and bureaucratic interventions. Where private experts’ legal interpretations distort legislative policy preferences, Congress may have an incentive to limit planning drift. From Congress’s perspective, however, planning drift is not always undesirable. As this Article argues, Congress may tolerate or even welcome planning drift, depending on how it interacts with other types of policy drift and congressional politics and purpose. This Article concludes by outlining strategies that Congress could use to constrain planning drift where it is not desired. In an appendix, this Article illustrates planning drift using a detailed historical case study of the rules restricting “trafficking” in corporate tax losses

A Design Theory for Digital Platforms Supporting Online Communities: A Multiple Case Study

This research proposes and validates a design theory for digital platforms that support online communities (DPsOC). It addresses ways in which digital platforms can effectively support social interactions in online communities. Drawing upon prior literature on IS design theory, online communities, and platforms, we derive an initial set of propositions for designing effective DPsOC. Our overarching proposition is that three components of digital platform architecture (core, interface, and complements) should collectively support the mix of the three distinct types of social interaction structures of online community (information sharing, collaboration, and collective action). We validate the initial propositions and generate additional insights by conducting an in-depth analysis of an European digital platform for elderly care assistance. We further validate the propositions by analyzing three widely used digital platforms, including Twitter, Wikipedia, and Liquidfeedback, and we derive additional propositions and insights that can guide DPsOC design. We discuss the implications of this research for research and practice