Genetic gold : the post-human homunculus in alchemical and visual texts

The phenomenon of the homunculus as an aspect of creating life in the laboratory is a documented attribute of Western premodern and medieval Arabic alchemy. Early alchemical texts can be seen to reveal the archetypes and myths present in the contemporary practice of creating life in the laboratory. Current genetics research endeavours to create ever-more complex genetic chimeras using human DNA and the creation of such creatures can be seen to constitute a return to the homunculus mythology. The extent to which this creature, this genetic homunculus, manifests in contemporary society is revealed in popular visual culture and the arts to be a prominent feature of the contemporary psyche. Ontological means of negotiation of a genetically engineered being falls to arguments of natural versus artificial in terms of post-humanism. The homunculus is shown to be impossible to arbitrate in terms of a transcendent mythology in this sense and the provided examples from visual culture reveal that this marvel is, as a result, myriad in teleological outcomes. CopyrightDissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2009.Visual Artsunrestricte

Experience in Action: Incorporating Somatic Education into the General Music Classroom

This thesis seeks to introduce principles of somatic education to children grades kindergarten through grade five in order to prevent future music-related injury and to promote free, wholebody movement. To do so, the principals of somatic education, specifically those of the Alexander Technique and Body Mapping, were combined with the current general music pedagogies by altering pre-existing lesson plans. Alterations include a variety of methods of integration, including, but not limited to: teaching about and exploring the different parts of the body, understanding the relationships between seemingly unrelated body parts, and engaging in student-led constructive rest in the semi-supine position. Somatic education pairs fluidly with the general music curriculum, as the primary pedagogues already incorporate movement and body awareness into their lessons. By pairing these lessons with an education about the body, students can move in a manner that relies on the skeletal structure rather than muscular effort, thus preventing common pains and music-related performance injuries

Rewired animals and sensory substitution: the cause is not cortical plasticity

Cortical plasticity is often invoked to explain changes in the quality or location of experience observed in rewired animals, in sensory substitution, in extension of the body through tool use, and in the rubber hand illusion. However this appeal to cortical plasticity may be misleading, because it suggest that the cortical areas that are plastic are themselves the loci of generation of experience. This would be an error, I claim, since cortical areas do not generate experience. Cortical areas participate in enabling the interaction of an agent with its environment, and the quality of this interaction constitutes the quality of experience. Thus it is not plasticity in itself, but the change in modes of interaction which plasticity allows, which gives rise to the change of experience observed in these studies

Can Science Explain Consciousness?

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science

Systems, Resilience, and Organization: Analogies and Points of Contact with Hierarchy Theory

Aim of this paper is to provide preliminary elements for discussion about the implications of the Hierarchy Theory of Evolution on the design and evolution of artificial systems and socio-technical organizations. In order to achieve this goal, a number of analogies are drawn between the System of Leibniz; the socio-technical architecture known as Fractal Social Organization; resilience and related disciplines; and Hierarchy Theory. In so doing we hope to provide elements for reflection and, hopefully, enrich the discussion on the above topics with considerations pertaining to related fields and disciplines, including computer science, management science, cybernetics, social systems, and general systems theory.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of ANTIFRAGILE'17, 4th International Workshop on Computational Antifragility and Antifragile Engineerin

"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001

This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001

The evolution and development of consciousness: the subject-object emergence hypothesis

A strategy for investigating consciousness that has proven very productive has focused on comparing brain processes that are accompanied by consciousness with processes that are not. But comparatively little attention has been given to a related strategy that promises to be even more fertile. This strategy exploits the fact that as individuals develop, new classes of brain processes can transition from operating ‘in the dark’ to becoming conscious. It has been suggested that these transitions occur when a new class of brain processes becomes object to a new, emergent, higher-level subject. Similar transitions are likely to have occurred during evolution. An evolutionary/developmental research strategy sets out to identify the nature of the transitions in brain processes that shift them from operating in the dark to ‘lighting up’. The paper begins the application of this strategy by extrapolating the sequence of transitions back towards its origin. The goal is to reconstruct a minimally-complex, subject-object subsystem that would be capable of giving rise to consciousness and providing adaptive benefits. By focusing on reconstructing a subsystem that is simple and understandable, this approach avoids the homunculus fallacy. The reconstruction suggests that the emergence of such a minimally-complex subsystem was driven by its capacity to coordinate body-environment interactions in real time e.g. hand-eye coordination. Conscious processing emerged initially because of its central role in organising real-time sensorimotor coordination. The paper goes on to identify and examine a number of subsequent major transitions in consciousness, including the emergence of capacities for conscious mental modelling. Each transition is driven by its potential to solve adaptive challenges that cannot be overcome at lower levels. The paper argues that mental modelling arose out of a pre-existing capacity to use simulations of motor actions to anticipate the consequences of the actions. As the capacity developed, elements of the simulations could be changed, and the consequences of these changes could be ‘thought through’ consciously. This enabled alternative motor responses to be evaluated. The paper goes on to predict significant new major transitions in consciousness

A compatibilist computational theory of mind

This thesis defends the idea that the mind is essentially computational, a position that has in recent decades come under attack by theories that focus on bodily action and that view the mind as a product of interaction with the world and not as a set of secluded processes in the brain. The most prominent of these is the contemporary criticism coming from enactivism, a theory that argues that cognition is born not from internal processes but from dynamic interactions between brain, body and world. The radical version of enactivism in particular seeks to reject the idea of representational content, a key part in the computational theory of mind. To this end I propose a Compatibilist Computational Theory of Mind. This compatibilist theory incorporates embodied and embedded elements of cognition and also supports a predictive theory of perception, while maintaining the core beliefs pertaining to brain-centric computationalism: That our cognition takes place in our brain, not in bonds between brain and world, and that cognition involves manipulation of mental representational content. While maintaining the position that a computational theory of mind is the best model we have for understanding how the mind works, this thesis also reviews the various flaws and problems that the position has had since its inception. Seeking to overcome these problems, as well as showing that computationalism is still perfectly compatible with contemporary action and prediction-based research in cognitive science, the thesis argues that by revising the theory in such a way that it can incorporate these new elements of cognition we arrive at a theory that is much stronger and more versatile than contemporary non-computational alternatives

Handedness impacts the neural correlates of kinesthetic motor imagery and execution: A FMRI study

The human brain functional lateralization has been widely studied over the past decades, and neuroimaging studies have shown how activation of motor areas during hand movement execution (ME) is different according to hand dominance. Nevertheless, there is no research directly investigating the effects of the participant's handedness in a motor imagery (MI) and ME task in both right and left‐handed individuals at the cortical and subcortical level. Twenty‐six right‐handed and 25 left‐handed participants were studied using functional magnetic resonance imaging during the imagination and execution of repetitive self‐paced movements of squeezing a ball with their dominant, non‐dominant, and both hands. Results revealed significant statistical difference (p < 0.05) between groups during both the execution and the imagery task with the dominant, non‐dominant, and both hands both at cortical and subcortical level. During ME, left‐handers recruited a spread bilateral network, while in right‐handers, activity was more lateralized. At the critical level, MI between‐group analysis revealed a similar pattern in right and left‐handers showing a bilateral activation for the dominant hand. Differentially at the subcortical level, during MI, only right‐handers showed the involvement of the posterior cerebellum. No significant activity was found for left‐handers. Overall, we showed a partial spatial overlap of neural correlates of MI and ME in motor, premotor, sensory cortices, and cerebellum. Our results highlight differences in the functional organization of motor areas in right and left‐handed people, supporting the hypothesis that MI is influenced by the way people habitually perform motor actions