An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we study empirically the manipulability of single transferable voting (STV) to determine if computational complexity is really a barrier to manipulation. STV was one of the first voting rules shown to be NP-hard. It also appears one of the harder voting rules to manipulate. We sample a number of distributions of votes including uniform and real world elections. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2010

Complexity of and Algorithms for Borda Manipulation

We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of this NP-hardness, we treat computing a manipulation as an approximation problem where we try to minimize the number of manipulators. Based on ideas from bin packing and multiprocessor scheduling, we propose two new approximation methods to compute manipulations of the Borda rule. Experiments show that these methods significantly outperform the previous best known %existing approximation method. We are able to find optimal manipulations in almost all the randomly generated elections tested. Our results suggest that, whilst computing a manipulation of the Borda rule by a coalition is NP-hard, computational complexity may provide only a weak barrier against manipulation in practice

Preconditioning Kernel Matrices

The computational and storage complexity of kernel machines presents the primary barrier to their scaling to large, modern, datasets. A common way to tackle the scalability issue is to use the conjugate gradient algorithm, which relieves the constraints on both storage (the kernel matrix need not be stored) and computation (both stochastic gradients and parallelization can be used). Even so, conjugate gradient is not without its own issues: the conditioning of kernel matrices is often such that conjugate gradients will have poor convergence in practice. Preconditioning is a common approach to alleviating this issue. Here we propose preconditioned conjugate gradients for kernel machines, and develop a broad range of preconditioners particularly useful for kernel matrices. We describe a scalable approach to both solving kernel machines and learning their hyperparameters. We show this approach is exact in the limit of iterations and outperforms state-of-the-art approximations for a given computational budget

Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections

Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no strategy-proof voting rule that simultaneously satisfies certain combinations of desirable properties. Researchers have attempted to get around the impossibility results in several ways such as domain restriction and computational hardness of manipulation. However these approaches have been shown to have limitations. Since prevention of manipulation seems to be elusive, an interesting research direction therefore is detection of manipulation. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of detection of possible manipulators in an election. We formulate two pertinent computational problems - Coalitional Possible Manipulators (CPM) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner (CPMW), where a suspect group of voters is provided as input to compute whether they can be a potential coalition of possible manipulators. In the absence of any suspect group, we formulate two more computational problems namely Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS), and Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search given Winner (CPMSW). We provide polynomial time algorithms for these problems, for several popular voting rules. For a few other voting rules, we show that these problems are in NP-complete. We observe that detecting manipulation maybe easy even when manipulation is hard, as seen for example, in the case of the Borda voting rule.Comment: Accepted in AAMAS 201

Analysis of multilevel Monte Carlo path simulation using the Milstein discretisation

The multilevel Monte Carlo path simulation method introduced by Giles ({\it Operations Research}, 56(3):607-617, 2008) exploits strong convergence properties to improve the computational complexity by combining simulations with different levels of resolution. In this paper we analyse its efficiency when using the Milstein discretisation; this has an improved order of strong convergence compared to the standard Euler-Maruyama method, and it is proved that this leads to an improved order of convergence of the variance of the multilevel estimator. Numerical results are also given for basket options to illustrate the relevance of the analysis.Comment: 33 pages, 4 figures, to appear in Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series

Hardness Amplification of Optimization Problems

In this paper, we prove a general hardness amplification scheme for optimization problems based on the technique of direct products. We say that an optimization problem ? is direct product feasible if it is possible to efficiently aggregate any k instances of ? and form one large instance of ? such that given an optimal feasible solution to the larger instance, we can efficiently find optimal feasible solutions to all the k smaller instances. Given a direct product feasible optimization problem ?, our hardness amplification theorem may be informally stated as follows: If there is a distribution D over instances of ? of size n such that every randomized algorithm running in time t(n) fails to solve ? on 1/?(n) fraction of inputs sampled from D, then, assuming some relationships on ?(n) and t(n), there is a distribution D\u27 over instances of ? of size O(n??(n)) such that every randomized algorithm running in time t(n)/poly(?(n)) fails to solve ? on 99/100 fraction of inputs sampled from D\u27. As a consequence of the above theorem, we show hardness amplification of problems in various classes such as NP-hard problems like Max-Clique, Knapsack, and Max-SAT, problems in P such as Longest Common Subsequence, Edit Distance, Matrix Multiplication, and even problems in TFNP such as Factoring and computing Nash equilibrium