6,736 research outputs found

    Reconstruction of concept of Paradigm in Thomas S. Kuhn

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    This article aims to discuss an evaluation of the concept of paradigm of T. Kuhn in his representative work: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ERC, [Ku96] and the complementary version by W. Stegmüller, Structure and dynamics of theories EDT, [Steg83]. This refined interpretation of the concept of paradigm allows for a more complete set of central Kuhnian concept.Paradigm, Kuhn, Economics, Stegmüller, Epistemology

    SHOULD AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS CARE THAT THE SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS IS FALSE?

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    This paper argues that the subjective expected utility (SEU) hypothesis has serious limitations in both positive and normative analysis. In addition to experimental evidence, we discuss examples where alternatives to the SEU model provide a richer framework for the study problems of choice under uncertainty.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

    Traceability in the U.S. Food Supply: An Application of Transaction Cost Analysis

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    Suboptimal supply of food and agricultural traceability is framed in a transaction cost analysis. We propose a model that considers the variables of opportunism potential, agency costs, uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency, and transaction costs. The model is then applied to the development of a typology of feasible governance modes – market, hybrid, firm, or public bureau, considering levels of transaction costs and competencies of private firms. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed and future research opportunities are suggested.traceability supply, transaction cost economics, agency theory, Agribusiness,

    Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

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    Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper

    Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

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    A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable

    Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics

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    When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, (reason's) conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and 'tis difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained with difficulty (Hume, 1739/, p 507). we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed rules (of caring intervention to do visible 'good') of the small band or troop, or our families to the (extended order of cooperation through markets), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were to always apply the (noncooperative) rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. (Hayek, 1988, p 18). (Italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).behavioral economics; experimental economics

    The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy

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    We offer here the psychological attraction approach to accounting and disclosure rules, regulation, and policy as a program for positive accounting research. We suggest that psychological forces have shaped and continue to shape rules and policies in two different ways. (1) Good Rules for Bad Users: rules and policies that provide information in a form that is useful for users who are subject to bias and cognitive processing constraints. (2) Bad Rules: superfluous or even pernicious rules and policies that result from psychological bias on the part of the ‘designers’ (managers, users, auditors, regulators, politicians, or voters). We offer some initial ideas about psychological sources of the use of historical costs, conservatism, aggregation, and a focus on downside outcomes in risk disclosures. We also suggest that psychological forces cause informal shifts in reporting and disclosure regulation and policy, which can exacerbate boom/bust patterns in financial markets.Investor psychology; accounting regulation; disclosure policy; salience; omission bias; scapegoating; limited attention; overconfidence; conservatism; loss aversion; accrual; smoothing; mental accounting; historical cost; risk disclosure; value-at-risk

    New European tricksters: Polish jokes in the context of European Union labour migration

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    In the context of contemporary European labour migration, where the most publicised pattern of labour migration sees Eastern European migrants move West, the dominant scholarly interpretation of Polish jokes is not applicable for the analysis of much of the joking by or about the Poles. Humour scholars frequently categorise jokes about ethnic groups into stupid or canny categories, and the Poles have been the butt of stupidity (‘Polack’) jokes in Europe and the United States. Today, in the European Union, Polish stupidity stereotyping in humour is less active and the Polish immigrant is hard working and a threat to indigenous labour, yet joking does not depict this threat in a canny Pole. The article applies the liminal concept of the trickster – an ambiguous border crosser or traveller – to elaborate some of the characteristics of jokes told by and about Polish migrants in the EU, mainly in the British context. A more robust explanatory framework is thus offered than is currently available in humour studies
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