1,941 research outputs found
Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support
A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering
of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The
overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and
governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal
framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic
combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic
higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of
powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model
finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent
agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations,
with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same
time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further
ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the
LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence
that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure
Computer Science and Metaphysics: A Cross-Fertilization
Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computational techniques to
unearth philosophical insights that are either difficult or impossible to find
using traditional philosophical methods. Computational metaphysics is
computational philosophy with a focus on metaphysics. In this paper, we (a)
develop results in modal metaphysics whose discovery was computer assisted, and
(b) conclude that these results work not only to the obvious benefit of
philosophy but also, less obviously, to the benefit of computer science, since
the new computational techniques that led to these results may be more broadly
applicable within computer science. The paper includes a description of our
background methodology and how it evolved, and a discussion of our new results.Comment: 39 pages, 3 figure
Adaptive logic characterizations of input/output logic
We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions
On Automating the Doctrine of Double Effect
The doctrine of double effect () is a long-studied ethical
principle that governs when actions that have both positive and negative
effects are to be allowed. The goal in this paper is to automate
. We briefly present , and use a first-order
modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus, as our framework to
formalize the doctrine. We present formalizations of increasingly stronger
versions of the principle, including what is known as the doctrine of triple
effect. We then use our framework to simulate successfully scenarios that have
been used to test for the presence of the principle in human subjects. Our
framework can be used in two different modes: One can use it to build
-compliant autonomous systems from scratch, or one can use it to
verify that a given AI system is -compliant, by applying a
layer on an existing system or model. For the latter mode, the
underlying AI system can be built using any architecture (planners, deep neural
networks, bayesian networks, knowledge-representation systems, or a hybrid); as
long as the system exposes a few parameters in its model, such verification is
possible. The role of the layer here is akin to a (dynamic or
static) software verifier that examines existing software modules. Finally, we
end by presenting initial work on how one can apply our layer
to the STRIPS-style planning model, and to a modified POMDP model.This is
preliminary work to illustrate the feasibility of the second mode, and we hope
that our initial sketches can be useful for other researchers in incorporating
DDE in their own frameworks.Comment: 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2017;
Special Track on AI & Autonom
Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT"
This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues
The Current State of Normative Agent-Based Systems
Recent years have seen an increase in the application of ideas from the social sciences to computational systems. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the domain of multiagent systems. Because multiagent systems are composed of multiple individual agents interacting with each other many parallels can be drawn to human and animal societies. One of the main challenges currently faced in multiagent systems research is that of social control. In particular, how can open multiagent systems be configured and organized given their constantly changing structure? One leading solution is to employ the use of social norms. In human societies, social norms are essential to regulation, coordination, and cooperation. The current trend of thinking is that these same principles can be applied to agent societies, of which multiagent systems are one type. In this article, we provide an introduction to and present a holistic viewpoint of the state of normative computing (computational solutions that employ ideas based on social norms.) To accomplish this, we (1) introduce social norms and their application to agent-based systems; (2) identify and describe a normative process abstracted from the existing research; and (3) discuss future directions for research in normative multiagent computing. The intent of this paper is to introduce new researchers to the ideas that underlie normative computing and survey the existing state of the art, as well as provide direction for future research.Norms, Normative Agents, Agents, Agent-Based System, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Modeling
A Paradox of Inferentialism
John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell
argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the content of an observational judgment in terms of itself. This paper examines the semantical consequences of the analysis of the content of empirical judgments in terms of their inferential role. These, it is suggested, are distinct from the epistemological paradoxes that McDowell charges the inferentialist approach with
Philosophical logics - a survey and a bibliography
Intensional logics attract the attention of researchers from differing academic backgrounds and various scientific interests. My aim is to sketch the philosophical background of alethic, doxastic, and deontic logics, their formal and metaphysical presumptions and their various problems and paradoxes, without attempting formal rigor. A bibliography, concise on philosophical writings, is meant to allow the reader\u27s access to the maze of literature in the field
The Present and Future of Judgement Aggregation Theory. A Law and Economics Perspective
This chapter briefly reviews the present state of judgment aggregation theory and tentatively suggests a future direction for that theory. In the review, we start by emphasizing the difference between the doctrinal paradox and the discursive dilemma, two idealized examples which classically serve to motivate the theory, and then proceed to reconstruct it as a brand of logical theory, unlike in some other interpretations, using a single impossibility theorem as a key to its technical development. In the prospective part, having mentioned existing applications to social choice theory and computer science, which we do not discuss here, we consider a potential application to law and economics. This would be based on a deeper exploration of the doctrinal paradox and its relevance to the functioning of collegiate courts. On this topic, legal theorists have provided empirical observations and theoretical hints that judgment aggregation theorists would be in a position to clarify and further elaborate. As a general message, the chapter means to suggest that the future of judgment aggregation theory lies with its applications rather than its internal theoretical development
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