3 research outputs found

    Formal Analysis of SPDM: Security Protocol and Data Model version 1.2

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    DMTF is a standards organization by major industry players in IT infrastructure including AMD, Alibaba, Broadcom, Cisco, Dell, Google, Huawei, IBM, Intel, Lenovo, and NVIDIA, which aims to enable interoperability, e.g., including cloud, virtualization, network, servers and storage. It is currently standardizing a security protocol called SPDM, which aims to secure communication over the wire and to enable device attestation, notably also explicitly catering for communicating hardware components. The SPDM protocol inherits requirements and design ideas from IETF’s TLS 1.3. However, its state machines and transcript handling are substantially different and more complex. While architecture, specification, and open-source libraries of the current versions of SPDM are publicly available, these include no significant security analysis of any kind. In this work we develop the first formal models of the three modes of the SPDM protocol version 1.2.1, and formally analyze their main security propertie

    Modeling Advanced Security Aspects of Key Exchange and Secure Channel Protocols

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    Secure communication has become an essential ingredient of our daily life. Mostly unnoticed, cryptography is protecting our interactions today when we read emails or do banking over the Internet, withdraw cash at an ATM, or chat with friends on our smartphone. Security in such communication is enabled through two components. First, two parties that wish to communicate securely engage in a key exchange protocol in order to establish a shared secret key known only to them. The established key is then used in a follow-up secure channel protocol in order to protect the actual data communicated against eavesdropping or malicious modification on the way. In modern cryptography, security is formalized through abstract mathematical security models which describe the considered class of attacks a cryptographic system is supposed to withstand. Such models enable formal reasoning that no attacker can, in reasonable time, break the security of a system assuming the security of its underlying building blocks or that certain mathematical problems are hard to solve. Given that the assumptions made are valid, security proofs in that sense hence rule out a certain class of attackers with well-defined capabilities. In order for such results to be meaningful for the actually deployed cryptographic systems, it is of utmost importance that security models capture the system's behavior and threats faced in that 'real world' as accurately as possible, yet not be overly demanding in order to still allow for efficient constructions. If a security model fails to capture a realistic attack in practice, such an attack remains viable on a cryptographic system despite a proof of security in that model, at worst voiding the system's overall practical security. In this thesis, we reconsider the established security models for key exchange and secure channel protocols. To this end, we study novel and advanced security aspects that have been introduced in recent designs of some of the most important security protocols deployed, or that escaped a formal treatment so far. We introduce enhanced security models in order to capture these advanced aspects and apply them to analyze the security of major practical key exchange and secure channel protocols, either directly or through comparatively close generic protocol designs. Key exchange protocols have so far always been understood as establishing a single secret key, and then terminating their operation. This changed in recent practical designs, specifically of Google's QUIC ("Quick UDP Internet Connections") protocol and the upcoming version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, the latter being the de-facto standard for security protocols. Both protocols derive multiple keys in what we formalize in this thesis as a multi-stage key exchange (MSKE) protocol, with the derived keys potentially depending on each other and differing in cryptographic strength. Our MSKE security model allows us to capture such dependencies and differences between all keys established in a single framework. In this thesis, we apply our model to assess the security of both the QUIC and the TLS 1.3 key exchange design. For QUIC, we are able to confirm the intended overall security but at the same time highlight an undesirable dependency between the two keys QUIC derives. For TLS 1.3, we begin by analyzing the main key exchange mode as well as a reduced resumption mode. Our analysis attests that TLS 1.3 achieves strong security for all keys derived without undesired dependencies, in particular confirming several of this new TLS version's design goals. We then also compare the QUIC and TLS 1.3 designs with respect to a novel 'zero round-trip time' key exchange mode establishing an initial key with minimal latency, studying how differences in these designs affect the achievable key exchange security. As this thesis' last contribution in the realm of key exchange, we formalize the notion of key confirmation which ensures one party in a key exchange execution that the other party indeed holds the same key. Despite being frequently mentioned in practical protocol specifications, key confirmation was never comprehensively treated so far. In particular, our formalization exposes an inherent, slight difference in the confirmation guarantees both communication partners can obtain and enables us to analyze the key confirmation properties of TLS 1.3. Secure channels have so far been modeled as protecting a sequence of distinct messages using a single secret key. Our first contribution in the realm of channels originates from the observation that, in practice, secure channel protocols like TLS actually do not allow an application to transmit distinct, or atomic, messages. Instead, they provide applications with a streaming interface to transmit a stream of bits without any inherent demarcation of individual messages. Necessarily, the security guarantees of such an interface differ significantly from those considered in cryptographic models so far. In particular, messages may be fragmented in transport, and the recipient may obtain the sent stream in a different fragmentation, which has in the past led to confusion and practical attacks on major application protocol implementations. In this thesis, we formalize such stream-based channels and introduce corresponding security notions of confidentiality and integrity capturing the inherently increased complexity. We then present a generic construction of a stream-based channel based on authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) that achieves the strongest security notions in our model and serves as validation of the similar TLS channel design. We also study the security of such applications whose messages are inherently atomic and which need to safely transport these messages over a streaming, i.e., possibly fragmenting, channel. Formalizing the desired security properties in terms of confidentiality and integrity in such a setting, we investigate and confirm the security of the widely adopted approach to encode the application's messages into the continuous data stream. Finally, we study a novel paradigm employed in the TLS 1.3 channel design, namely to update the keys used to secure a channel during that channel's lifetime in order to strengthen its security. We propose and formalize the notion of multi-key channels deploying such sequences of keys and capture their advanced security properties in a hierarchical framework of confidentiality and integrity notions. We show that our hierarchy of notions naturally connects to the established notions for single-key channels and instantiate its strongest security notions with a generic AEAD-based construction. Being comparatively close to the TLS 1.3 channel protocol, our construction furthermore enables a comparative design discussion

    Investigating the Multi-Ciphersuite and Backwards-Compatibility Security of the Upcoming TLS 1.3

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