In-Season Transshipments Among Competitive Retailers

Cataloged from PDF version of article.A decentralized system of competing retailers that order and sell the same product in a sales season is studied. When a customer demand occurs at a stocked-out retailer, that retailer requests a unit to be transshipped from another retailer who charges a transshipment price. If this request is rejected, the unsatisfied customer may go to another retailer with a customer overflow probability. Each retailer decides on the initial order quantity from a manufacturer and on the acceptance/rejection of each transshipment request. For two retailers, we show that retailers' optimal transshipment policies are dynamic and characterized by chronologically nonincreasing inventory holdback levels. We analytically study the sensitivity of holdback levels to explain interesting findings, such as smaller retailers and geographically distant retailers benefit more from transshipments. Numerical experiments show that retailers substantially benefit from using optimal transshipment policies compared to no sharing. The expected sales increase in all but a handful of over 3,000 problem instances. Building on the two-retailer optimal policies, we suggest an effective heuristic transshipment policy for a multiretailer system

Inventory models with lateral transshipments : a review

Lateral transshipments within an inventory system are stock movements between locations of the same echelon. These transshipments can be conducted periodically at predetermined points in time to proactively redistribute stock, or they can be used reactively as a method of meeting demand which cannot be satised from stock on hand. The elements of an inventory system considered, e.g. size, cost structures and service level denition, all in uence the best method of transshipping. Models of many dierent systems have been considered. This paper provides a literature review which categorizes the research to date on lateral transshipments, so that these dierences can be understood and gaps within the literature can be identied

Inventory Sharing and Demand-Side Underweighting

Problem definition: Transshipment/inventory sharing has been used in practice because of its risk-pooling potential. However, human decision makers play a critical role in making inventory decisions in an inventory sharing system, which may affect its benefits. We investigate whether the opportunity to transship inventory influences decision makers’ inventory decisions and whether, as a result, the intended risk-pooling benefits materialize. Academic/practical relevance: Previous research in transshipment, which is focused on finding optimal stocking and sharing decisions, assumes rational decision making without any systematic bias. As one of the first to study inventory sharing from a behavioral perspective, we demonstrate a persistent stocking-decision bias relevant for inventory sharing systems. Methodology: We develop a behavioral model of a multilocation inventory system with transshipments. Using four behavioral studies, we identify, test, estimate, and mitigate a demand-side underweighting bias: although inventory sharing brings both a supply-side benefit and a demand-side benefit, players underestimate the latter. We show analytically that such bias leads to underordering. We also explore whether reframing the inventory sharing decision reduces this bias. Results: Our results show that subjects persistently reduce their order quantities when transshipments are allowed. This underordering, which persists even when a decision-support system suggests optimal quantities, causes insufficient inventory in the system, in turn reducing the risk-pooling benefits of inventory sharing. Underordering is evidently caused by an underweighting bias; although players correctly estimate the supply-side potential from transshipment, they only estimate 20% of the demand-side potential. Managerial implications: Although inventory sharing can profitably reduce inventory, too much underordering undermines its intended risk-pooling benefits. The demand-side benefits of transshipment need to be emphasized when implementing inventory sharing systems

Supply Chain Coordination under Advance-purchase Discount Contract with Sales Effort and Transshipment

In today’s business environment, a competition is no longer about competing between firms, but between supply chains. Improving supply chain’s performance has become necessary for companies to survive. Supply chain coordination ensures a maximumperformance of a supply chain. This dissertation studies impacts of an advance-purchase contract and supply chain coordination in two different supply chains.We first consider the supply chain with the manufacturer and retailer who can exert sales effort to stipulate demand. We develop the contract that combines the advance-purchase contract and the target rebate contract to coordinate the retailer’s ordering and effort decisions. We analytically show that supply chain coordination is achievable, but profit splitting may not be fully flexible depending on market conditions.We second consider the supply chain with the manufacturer and two retailers who can transship products to satisfy unmet demand as a result of an inventory shortage. We establish a new mechanism that integrates the advance-purchase contract to coordinate the supply chain. The coordination mechanism follows in two steps: it first aligns the objective of the retailer group with the objective of the supply chain, and second aligns the individual objective of each individual retailer with the joint objective of the retailer group. We analytically show that supply chain coordination and arbitrary profit split is achievable.The coordinating contracts lead to Pareto improving situations. The numerical analyses show the performance improvement of the supply chain from the inclusion of the advance-purchase contract. We also conduct the sensitivity analyses to see the impacts of the contract terms on the retailers’ optimal decisions, and the impacts of market conditions on the contracts. The potential future research directions for both studies are also discussed.Industrial Engineering & Managemen

Applying Revenue Management to the Reverse Supply Chain

We study the disposition decision for product returns in a closed-loop supply chain. Motivated by the asset recovery process at IBM, we consider two disposition alternatives. Returns may be either refurbished for reselling or dismantled for spare parts. Reselling a refurbished unit typically yields higher unit margins. However, demand is uncertain. A common policy in many firms is to rank disposition alternatives by unit margins. We show that a revenue management approach to the disposition decision which explicitly incorporates demand uncertainty can increase profits significantly. We discuss analogies between the disposition problem and the classical airline revenue management problem. We then develop single period and multi-period stochastic optimization models for the disposition problem. Analyzing these models, we show that the optimal allocation balances expected marginal profits across the disposition alternatives. A detailed numerical study reveals that a revenue management approach to the disposition problem significantly outperforms the current practice of focusing exclusively on high-margin options, and we identify conditions under which this improvement is the highest. We also show that the value recovered from the returned products critically depends on the coordination between forward and reverse supply chain decisions.remanufacturing;revenue management;onderdelen;revenues;spare parts inventory

Essays On Decentralized Financial Markets

In the first chapter, To Pool or Not to Pool? Security Design in OTC Markets with Vincent Glode and Christian C. Opp, we study security issuers\u27 decision whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Unlike in competitive markets, pooling assets may be suboptimal in the presence of market power --- both privately and socially --- in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. In these cases, pooling assets reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of market power. Our results shed light on recently observed time-variation in the prevalence of pooling in financial markets. In the second chapter, Selling to Investor Network: Allocations in the Primary Corporate Bond Market, I develop a model of the primary market for corporate bonds, in which an issuer optimally chooses an issuance price and allocations to investors based on their trading connections in the secondary over-the-counter market. Expected secondary market liquidity, which depends on the structure of the trading network in this market, determines investors\u27 demands in the primary market and, in turn, the issuer\u27s revenues. I show that trading by less connected investors has a relatively high negative impact on expected secondary market liquidity and disproportionately reduces the demands of all investors in the primary market. As a result, the issuer can increase her profits by restricting allocations of new bonds only to more connected investors. This explains the commonly observed exclusion of small institutional investors from the primary market, which is often coupled with seemingly underpriced bonds. In the third chapter, Initial Coin Offerings as a Commitment to Competition with Itay Goldstein and Deeksha Gupta, we model Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) of utility tokens, which are increasingly used to finance the development of online platforms where buyers and sellers can meet to exchange services or goods. Utility tokens serve as the sole medium of exchange on a platform and can be traded in a secondary market. We show that such a financing mechanism allows an entrepreneur to give up monopolistic rents associated with the control of the platform and make a credible commitment to long-run competitive prices. The entrepreneur optimally chooses to have an ICO, rather than operate as a monopolist, only if future consumers of the platform participate in financing. ICOs, therefore, endogenously require crowd-funding to be viable

A dynamic rationing policy for continuous-review inventory systems

Stock rationing is an inventory policy that allows differential treatment of customer classes without using separate inventories. In this paper, we propose a dynamic rationing policy for continuous-review inventory systems, which utilizes the information on the status of the outstanding replenishment orders. For both backordering and lost sales environments, we conduct simulation studies to compare the performance of the dynamic policy with the static critical level and the common stock policies and quantify the gain obtained. We propose two new bounds on the optimum dynamic rationing policy that enables us to tell how much of the potential gain the proposed dynamic policy realizes. We discuss the conditions under which stock rationing - both dynamic and static - is beneficial and assess the value of the dynamic policy. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

An Exact Optimal Solution to a Threshold Inventory Rationing Model for Two Priority Demand Classes

An Exact Optimal Solution to a Threshold Inventory Rationing Model for Two Priority Demand Classe