50,095 research outputs found

    The ⋆\star-operator and Invariant Subtraction Games

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    We study 2-player impartial games, so called \emph{invariant subtraction games}, of the type, given a set of allowed moves the players take turn in moving one single piece on a large Chess board towards the position 0\boldsymbol 0. Here, invariance means that each allowed move is available inside the whole board. Then we define a new game, ⋆\star of the old game, by taking the PP-positions, except 0\boldsymbol 0, as moves in the new game. One such game is \W^\star= (Wythoff Nim)⋆^\star, where the moves are defined by complementary Beatty sequences with irrational moduli. Here we give a polynomial time algorithm for infinitely many PP-positions of \W^\star. A repeated application of ⋆\star turns out to give especially nice properties for a certain subfamily of the invariant subtraction games, the \emph{permutation games}, which we introduce here. We also introduce the family of \emph{ornament games}, whose PP-positions define complementary Beatty sequences with rational moduli---hence related to A. S. Fraenkel's `variant' Rat- and Mouse games---and give closed forms for the moves of such games. We also prove that (kk-pile Nim)⋆⋆^{\star\star} = kk-pile Nim.Comment: 30 pages, 5 figure

    Two-Player Perfect-Information Shift-Invariant Submixing Stochastic Games Are Half-Positional

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    We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a payoff function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary. This result relies on the existence of ϵ\epsilon-subgame-perfect equilibria in shift-invariant games, a second contribution of the paper

    Bounds for the Nakamura number

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    The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric quota games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized. However, in general, not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending of invariants on simple, complete or weighted games. Here, we survey such results and highlight connections with other game theoretic concepts.Comment: 23 pages, 3 tables; a few more references adde

    Translation invariant mean field games with common noise

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    This note highlights a special class of mean field games in which the coefficients satisfy a convolution-type structural condition. A mean field game of this type with common noise is related to a certain mean field game without common noise by a simple transformation, which permits a tractable construction of a solution of the problem with common noise from a solution of the problem without

    The algorithmics of solitaire-like games

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    One-person solitaire-like games are explored with a view to using them in teaching algorithmic problem solving. The key to understanding solutions to such games is the identification of invariant properties of polynomial arithmetic. We demonstrate this via three case studies: solitaire itself, tiling problems and a novel class of one-person games. The known classification of states of the game of (peg) solitaire into 16 equivalence classes is used to introduce the relevance of polynomial arithmetic. Then we give a novel algebraic formulation of the solution to a class of tiling problems. Finally, we introduce an infinite class of challenging one-person games, which we call ``replacement-set games'', inspired by earlier work by Chen and Backhouse on the relation between cyclotomic polynomials and generalisations of the seven-trees-in-one type isomorphism. We present an algorithm to solve arbitrary instances of replacement-set games and we show various ways of constructing infinite (solvable) classes of replacement-set games

    Bilateral symmetry and modified Pascal triangles in Parsimonious games

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    We discuss the prominent role played by bilateral symmetry and modified Pascal triangles in self twin games, a subset of constant sum homogeneous weighted majority games. We show that bilateral symmetry of the free representations unequivocally identifies and characterizes this class of games and that modified Pascal triangles describe their cardinality for combinations of m and k, respectively linked through linear transforms to the key parameters n, number of players and h, number of types in the game. Besides, we derive the whole set of self twin games in the form of a genealogical tree obtained through a simple constructive procedure in which each game of a generation, corresponding to a given value of m, is able to give birth to one child or two children (depending on the parity of m), self twin games of the next generation. The breeding rules are, given the parity of m, invariant through generations and quite simple.Comment: pp. 2

    Deep Q-Learning for Nash Equilibria: Nash-DQN

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    Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other simplified settings. Here, we develop a new data efficient Deep-Q-learning methodology for model-free learning of Nash equilibria for general-sum stochastic games. The algorithm uses a local linear-quadratic expansion of the stochastic game, which leads to analytically solvable optimal actions. The expansion is parametrized by deep neural networks to give it sufficient flexibility to learn the environment without the need to experience all state-action pairs. We study symmetry properties of the algorithm stemming from label-invariant stochastic games and as a proof of concept, apply our algorithm to learning optimal trading strategies in competitive electronic markets.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figure
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