Intuitions as Invitations

Recently, there has been a great deal of skepticism about appeals to intuitions in philosophy. Appeals to intuition often get expressed in the form of what ‘we’ believe. Many people take the ‘we’ in this context to refer to what the folk believe. So the claim about what we believe is an empirical claim. And it looks like the support for this claim comes from a biased sample consisting solely of analytic philosophers. In this paper I want to explain a different way appeals to intuition are used in the literature and why it survives such attacks. The basic idea, which comes from Bernard Williams, is that the \u27we\u27 used in many appeals to intuitions is not a referring expression at all. The appeal to intuition is not a claim about what any group of individuals believes. Rather it is an invitation to make a judgment. I argue that when you hear a philosopher say \u27P is what we intuitively believe\u27 the proper response is not \u27who is this \u27we\u27?’ The proper response is to wonder whether one ought to accept P

Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance

Intuitions as Invitations

Recently, there has been a great deal of skepticism about appeals to intuitions in philosophy. Appeals to intuition often get expressed in the form of what ‘we’ believe. Many people take the ‘we’ in this context to refer to what the folk believe. So the claim about what we believe is an empirical claim. And it looks like the support for this claim comes from a biased sample consisting solely of analytic philosophers. In this paper I want to explain a different way appeals to intuition are used in the literature and why it survives such attacks. The basic idea, which comes from Bernard Williams, is that the \u27we\u27 used in many appeals to intuitions is not a referring expression at all. The appeal to intuition is not a claim about what any group of individuals believes. Rather it is an invitation to make a judgment. I argue that when you hear a philosopher say \u27P is what we intuitively believe\u27 the proper response is not \u27who is this \u27we\u27?’ The proper response is to wonder whether one ought to accept P

Russell reading Bergson

This chapter examines Bertrand Russell’s various confrontations with Bergson’s work. Russell’s meetings with Bergson during 1911 would be followed in 1912 by the publication of Russell’s earliest polemical pieces. His 1912 review of Bergson’s Laughter ridicules the effort to develop a philosophical account of humour on the basis of some formula. In his 1912 “The Philosophy of Bergson”, Russell develops a series of objections against Bergson’s accounts of number, space, and duration. Bergson’s position is defended against Russell’s onslaught by H. W. Carr (1913) and Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1914), though Russell only replies to the former. By contrast to Bergson’s silence in the face of Russell’s criticisms, Russell would continue responding to Bergson’s views in multiple works during the 1910s and 1920s. As this chapter shows, Russell not only develops further objections against specific theses upheld by Bergson, but also comments upon the political implications of Bergson’s philosophy, as well as its positioning within the history of French philosophy

What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account

Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong (that is, unjustified) with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the (degree of) evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. I will argue that the evidential account captures the epistemic wrongness of three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias

What is Epistemically Wrong with Research Affected by Sponsorship Bias? The Evidential Account

Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong (that is, unjustified) with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the (degree of) evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. I will argue that the evidential account captures the epistemic wrongness of three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias

What is Epistemically Wrong with Research Affected by Sponsorship Bias? The Evidential Account

Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. In this paper, I will focus on one particular kind of biased research: research that is subject to sponsorship bias. I will address the following epistemological question: what precisely is epistemically wrong (that is, unjustified) with biased research of this kind? I will defend the evidential account of epistemic wrongness: that is, research affected by sponsorship bias is epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question make false claims about the (degree of) evidential support of some hypothesis H by data E. I will argue that the evidential account captures the epistemic wrongness of three paradigmatic types of sponsorship bias

Poincaré's philosophy of mathematics

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's negative thesis, which is based on constructivist sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains a classical conception of the mathematical continuum. The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition. I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics. Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides a viable alternative in contemporary debates in the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori intuitions, and which describes a position in between the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be true