1,960 research outputs found
Logic of Intuitionistic Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Perfect Knowledge Transfer)
We produce a decidable super-intuitionistic normal modal logic of
internalised intuitionistic (and thus disjunctive and monotonic) interactive
proofs (LIiP) from an existing classical counterpart of classical monotonic
non-disjunctive interactive proofs (LiP). Intuitionistic interactive proofs
effect a durable epistemic impact in the possibly adversarial communication
medium CM (which is imagined as a distinguished agent), and only in that, that
consists in the permanent induction of the perfect and thus disjunctive
knowledge of their proof goal by means of CM's knowledge of the proof: If CM
knew my proof then CM would persistently and also disjunctively know that my
proof goal is true. So intuitionistic interactive proofs effect a lasting
transfer of disjunctive propositional knowledge (disjunctively knowable facts)
in the communication medium of multi-agent distributed systems via the
transmission of certain individual knowledge (knowable intuitionistic proofs).
Our (necessarily) CM-centred notion of proof is also a disjunctive explicit
refinement of KD45-belief, and yields also such a refinement of standard
S5-knowledge. Monotonicity but not communality is a commonality of LiP, LIiP,
and their internalised notions of proof. As a side-effect, we offer a short
internalised proof of the Disjunction Property of Intuitionistic Logic
(originally proved by Goedel).Comment: continuation of arXiv:1201.3667; extended start of Section 1 and 2.1;
extended paragraph after Fact 1; dropped the N-rule as primitive and proved
it derivable; other, non-intuitionistic family members: arXiv:1208.1842,
arXiv:1208.591
Reasoning about Knowledge in Linear Logic: Modalities and Complexity
In a recent paper, Jean-Yves Girard commented that âit has been a long time since philosophy has stopped intereacting with logicâ[17]. Actually, it has no
Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic
We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for
the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These
systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of
assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as
intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent
calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and
strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the
usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical
semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see
arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089
A Pragmatic Interpretation of Quantum Logic
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether the language of quantum
mechanics introduces a quantum notion of truth which is formalized by quantum
logic (QL) and is incompatible with the classical (Tarskian) notion. We show
that QL can be interpreted as a pragmatic language of assertive formulas which
formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically justified or
unjustified in the framework of quantum mechanics. According to this
interpretation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic notion of
empirical justification within quantum mechanics rather than properties of a
quantum notion of truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist
perspective that interprets nonstandard logics as theories of metalinguistic
notions different from truth, thus avoiding incompatibility with classical
notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of
the standard notion of quantum truth are also obtained.
Key words: pragmatics, quantum logic, quantum mechanics, justifiability,
global pluralism.Comment: Third version: 20 pages. Sects. 1, 2, and 4 rewritten and improved.
Explanations adde
A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax
In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a
[standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and
problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative
extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical
predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a
pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying
posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation
translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto
QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal
propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic
modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel -
and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type
theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the
axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual
interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation
(incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof
interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two
interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC
neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a
simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic
Constructive Provability Logic
We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that
validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting
logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL
and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which
are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of
constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic
programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
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