Geographies of Finance : Centers, Flows, and Relations

In this paper, I critically examine how geographers and other social scientists have developed complementary research programs for economistic studies of finance by drawing on new relational concepts such as networks and embeddedness and opening up new research frontiers. In so doing, I investigate how global financial spaces have been conceptualized in mainstream finance literature and how economic concepts have been applied to studies of finance. Drawing on these discussions, I suggest that we need to undertake an alternative research of financial space that pays more attention to relational power dynamics among financial firms and the macroeconomic impacts of financial flows on regional economies.Relational Turns, Financial Space, Financial Centers, Financial Flows

Product innovation and network survival in the U.S. ATM and debit card network industry

This paper studies product innovation and firm survival in the U.S. ATM/debit card industry. The industry started with a few shared ATM networks in the early 1970s. The number of networks grew quickly up until the mid 1980s, but then declined sharply. We construct a theoretical model based on Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994). In contrast to their model focusing on cost-saving technological innovation, our model shows a major product innovation may also trigger the shakeout. The theoretical predictions are tested using a novel dataset on network entry, exit, size, location, ownership and product choices. The findings suggest introducing the point of sale debit function in the mid 1980s played an important role driving the network consolidation. Unlike previous studies, we find little advantage of being early industry entrants. Rather, due to network effects in the industry, large networks had better chance to adopt the product innovation and survive the shakeout. ; Original title: Product innovation and firm survival in a network industry ; Also issued as a Payments System Research Working Paper

Tying lending and underwriting : scope economies, incentives, and reputation

Informational economies of scope between lending and underwriting are a mixed blessing for universal banks. While they can reduce the cost of raising capital for a firm, they also reduce incentives in the underwriting business. We show that tying lending and underwriting helps to overcome this dilemma. First, risky debt in tied deals works as a bond to increase underwriting incentives. Second, with limitations on contracting, tying reduces the underwriting rents as the additional incentives from debt can substitute for monetary incentives. In addition, reducing the yield on the tied debt is a means to pay for the rent in the underwriting business and to transfer informational benefits to the client. Thus, tying is a double edged sword for universal banks. It helps to compete against specialized investment banks, but it can reduce the rent to be earned in investment banking when universal banks compete against each other. We derive several empirical predictions regarding the characteristics of tied deals. JEL Classification: G21, G24, D4

Special Libraries, April 1969

Volume 60, Issue 4https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1969/1003/thumbnail.jp

Special Libraries, April 1953

Volume 44, Issue 4https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1953/1003/thumbnail.jp