The Case Against Powers

Powers ontologies are currently enjoying a resurgence. This would be dispiriting news for the moderns; in their eyes, to imbue bodies with powers is to slide back into the scholastic slime from which they helped philosophy crawl. I focus on Descartes’s ‘little souls’ argument, which points to a genuine and, I think persisting, defect in powers theories. The problem is that an Aristotelian power is intrinsic to whatever has it. Once this move is accepted, it becomes very hard to see how humble matter could have such a thing. It is as if each empowered object were possessed of a little soul that directs it and governs its behavior. Instead of attempting to resurrect the Aristotelian power theory, contemporary philosophers would be best served by taking their inspiration from its early modern replacement, devised by John Locke and Robert Boyle. On this view, powers are internal relations, not monadic properties intrinsic to their bearers. This move at once drains away the mysterious directedness of Aristotelian powers and solves the contemporary version of the little souls argument, Neil Williams’s ‘problem of fit.

Theory for solvent, momentum, and energy transfer between a surfactant solution and a vapor atmosphere

We develop a complete set of equations governing the evolution of a sharp interface separating a volatile-solvent/nonvolatile-surfactant solution from a vapor atmosphere. In addition to a sorption isotherm equation and the conventional balances for mass, linear momentum, and energy, these equations include a counterpart of the Hertz???Knudsen???Langmuir equation familiar from conventional theories of evaporation-condensation. This additional equation arises from a consideration of configurational forces within a thermodynamical framework. While the notion of configurational forces is well-developed and understood for the description of materials, like crystalline solids, that possess natural reference configurations, very little has been done regarding their role in materials, such as viscous fluids, that do not possess preferred reference states. We therefore provide a comprehensive discussion of configurational forces, the balance of configurational momentum, and configurational thermodynamics that does not require a choice of reference configuration. The general evolution equations arising from our theory account for the thermodynamic structure of the solution and the interface and for sources of dissipation related to the transport of surfactant, momentum, and heat in the solution, the transport of surfactant and momentum within the interface, and the transport of solute, momentum, kinetic energy, and heat across the interface. Due to the complexity of these equations, we provide approximate equations which we compare to relations that appear in the literature.published or submitted for publicationis peer reviewe

Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness

The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett. The aim of the present contribution is to review the core similarities and differences of these exemplars, as well as to outline the main strengths and remaining challenges to this general sort of approach

The Causal Theory of Properties

This thesis investigates the causal theory of properties (CTP). CTP states that properties must be understood via the complicated network of causal relations to which a property can contribute. If an object instantiates the property of being 900C, for instance, it will burn human skin on contact, feel warm to us if near, etc. In order to best understand CTP, I argue that we need to distinguish between properties and particular instances of them. Properties should be analysed via the causal relations their instances stand in, it is this oven’s being 900C which causes my skin to burn, etc. The resulting CTP offers an illuminating analysis of properties. First, it provides a criterion of identity for properties, their identity being analysed via the causal roles property instances realise. It also offers an account of how property instances are sorted into genuine kinds, in cases of determinables and determinates. I show how we can distinguish between genuine and non-genuine similarity via the property instances of objects. The implications of CTP for an analysis of causation are then investigated. I argue that the proposed CTP offers a plausible causal ontology. The fine-grainedness of property instances enables us to capture the subtleties involved in questions concerning what causes what. But, even more importantly, CTP enables us to reconcile two highly attractive theses concerning the causal relation. The first of these is the generalist’s thesis. This states that causal relations are part of more general patterns. The second of these is the singularist’s thesis. This states that the causal connection between two entities, doesn’t depend upon anything extraneous to that relation. I argue that by combining CTP with an ontology of tropes, we can thereby respect what is driving both singularism and generalism.Logic & Metaphysic

On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter

Some recent philosophical debate about persistence has focussed on an argument against perdurantism that discusses rotating perfectly homogeneous discs (the `rotating discs argument'; RDA). The argument has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though it appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. After introducing the argument and emphasizing the relevance of physics (Sections 1 to 3), I review some metaphysicians' replies to the argument (Section 4). Thereafter, I argue for three main conclusions. They all arise from the fact, emphasized in Section 2, that classical mechanics (non-relativistic as well as relativistic) is both more subtle, and more problematic, than philosophers generally realize. The main conclusion is that the RDA can be defeated (Section 6 onwards). Namely, by the perdurantist taking objects in classical mechanics (whether point-particles or continuous bodies) to have only temporally extended, i.e. non-instantaneous, temporal parts: which immediately blocks the RDA. Admittedly, this version of perdurantism defines persistence in a weaker sense of `definition' than {\em pointilliste} versions that aim to define persistence assuming only instantaneous temporal parts. But I argue that temporally extended temporal parts are supported by both classical and quantum mechanics.Comment: 100 pages, no figures; an extract of this paper is at: physics/040602

A Modal Account of Essence

According to the simple modal account of essence, an object has a property essentially just in case it has it in every world in which it exists. As many have observed, the simple modal account is implausible for a number of reasons. This has led to various proposals for strengthening the account, for example, by adding a restriction to the intrinsic or sparse properties. I argue, however, that these amendments to the simple modal account themselves fail. Drawing on lessons from these failures, I propose a new version of a modal account, inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus's defense of the coherence of quantified modal logic, according to which an object has a property essentially just in case (i) it has it in every world in which it exists, (ii) the property is discriminating (or non-trivial), and (iii) the property is qualitative. The resulting account of essence does not face any of the standard objections other accounts face, and I defend it from other potential objections

Structuralist Qualia

Structuralist theories of properties state that properties are individuated by their nomological or causal roles. It has previously been suggested that structuralism is incompatible with robust conceptions of qualia. In this paper, I argue that structuralism should be taken as a theory of de re representation, and under this formulation it is able to accommodate qualia as intrinsic, introspectable properties of experiences. I then turn to various thought experiments used by qualia theorists to expand the notion of qualia, and find the majority of these compatible with structuralism as well. I conclude that the structuralists and qualia theorists need not be at odds with each other

Intrinsic nonlinear elasticity: An exterior calculus formulation

In this paper we formulate the theory of nonlinear elasticity in a geometrically intrinsic manner using exterior calculus and bundle-valued differential forms. We represent kinematics variables, such as velocity and rate-of-strain, as intensive vector-valued forms while kinetics variables, such as stress and momentum, as extensive covector-valued pseudo-forms. We treat the spatial, material and convective representations of the motion and show how to geometrically convert from one representation to the other. Furthermore, we show the equivalence of our exterior calculus formulation to standard formulations in the literature based on tensor calculus. In addition, we highlight two types of structures underlying the theory. First, the principle bundle structure relating the space of embeddings to the space of Riemannian metrics on the body, and how the latter represents an intrinsic space of deformations. Second, the de Rham complex structure relating the spaces of bundle-valued forms to each other