2,052 research outputs found
The Price of Anarchy for Minsum Related Machine Scheduling
We address the classical uniformly related machine scheduling problem with minsum objective. The problem is solvable in polynomial time by the algorithm of Horowitz and Sahni. In that solution, each machine sequences its jobs shortest first. However when jobs may choose the machine on which they are processed, while keeping the same sequencing rule per machine, the resulting Nash equilibria are in general not optimal. The price of anarchy measures this optimality gap. By means of a new characterization of the optimal solution, we show that the price of anarchy in this setting is bounded from above by 2. We also give a lower bound of e/(e-1). This complements recent results on the price of anarchy for the more general unrelated machine scheduling problem, where the price of anarchy equals 4. Interestingly, as Nash equilibria coincide with shortest processing time first (SPT) schedules, the same bounds hold for SPT schedules. Thereby, our work also fills a gap in the literature
Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to
bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system's
equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well known paradox in
multimarket Cournot competition, where a positive price shock on a monopoly
market may actually reduce the monopolist's profit. We use our approach to
quantify for the first time the worst case profit reduction for multimarket
oligopolies exposed to arbitrary positive price shocks. For markets with affine
price functions and firms with convex cost technologies, we show that the
relative profit loss of any firm is at most 25% no matter how many firms
compete in the oligopoly. We further investigate the impact of positive price
shocks on total profit of all firms as well as on social welfare. We find tight
bounds also for these measures showing that total profit and social welfare
decreases by at most 25% and 16.6%, respectively. Finally, we show that in our
model, mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria are essentially
unique, thus, all our bounds apply to these game solutions as well.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figur
Efficiency in Multi-objective Games
In a multi-objective game, each agent individually evaluates each overall
action-profile on multiple objectives. I generalize the price of anarchy to
multi-objective games and provide a polynomial-time algorithm to assess it.
This work asserts that policies on tobacco promote a higher economic
efficiency
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