Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en Uruguay

Uruguay genera una variedad de resultados políticos. Primero, hay políticas relativamente estables que permiten la apertura comercial y financiera del país. También, hay políticas de baja calidad e inflexibles relacionadas con políticas sociales, algunas áreas de reforma estatal (los salarios de los funcionarios del estado y mecanismos de contratación), el régimen de bancarrota, etc. Finalmente, estan los resultados volátiles que son generalmente los efectos de choques económicos, algunas veces relacionados con los gastos públicos. En los casos en que hay un precedente histórico o que la disponibilidad de mecanismos externos de cumplimento no conducen a políticas relativamente estables, la principal característica saliente de las políticas Uruguayas es la rigidez. La fuente de rigidez de las políticas Uruguayas parece ser una mezcla de factores institucionales (múltiples vetos, partidos fraccionados, y mecanismos de democracia directa) y conflictos políticos (preferencias de políticas divergentes), en los cuales es muy costoso moverse del status-quo debido a la gran amenaza de un reverso de las políticas. Las instituciones políticas en el Uruguay son propicias a alcanzar un acuerdo político a corto plazo, pero no pueden cooperar efectivamente y establecer políticas estables y flexibles al largo plazo. La dificultad está en conseguir intercambios políticos ínter temporales que son consistentes con las principales características del ambiente político: una cifra alta de principales actores políticos y vetos, una cifra considerable de maniobras políticas inobservables, una pobre aplicación de tecnología en el área económica, una burocracia políticamente influenciada, intercambios políticos que ocurren fuera del ruedo legislativo, y una particular constelación de partidos y preferencias además de un diseño costoso de políticas y cambios institucionales. (Disponible en Inglés)

PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE PROSPECT OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN ETHIOPIA

The principal democratic institutions in democracy are political parties. Party law plays a crucial role in institutionalizing multi-party politics. Institutionalization of a party system is vital for the success of democratic system. Unfortunately, several writers show a bleak picture concerning the institutionalization of African political system in general and the party system in particular (Lindberg, 2007; Bogaards, 2003). Given multiparty politics is a late comer in Ethiopia, this problem is perhaps more direr in Ethiopia. Observation of their structure, social base, resources, procedure of internal decision-making, and the like clearly show the weak level of institutionalization as assumed by democratic theory. Thus, they are less likely to fulfill their democratic functions in democracy. Given these problems, strict implementation of the regulatory regimes, especially in the areas of internal democracy and transparency of financial management, is an important in step towards institutionalization. But, there should be a delicate balance as heavy-handed regulation at early stage of party development may become counterproductive (Randall, 2008: 256)

Problems of categorizing and explaining party systems in Africa

Starting from controversial findings about the relationship between party systems and the prospects of democratic consolidation, this article argues that problems can only be properly addressed on the basis of a differentiated typology of party systems. Contradictory research results do not pose an ‘African puzzle’ but can be explained by different and inadequate approaches. We argue that a modified version of Sartori's typology of party systems provides an appropriate method for classifying African party systems. Based on Sartori's framework, a preponderance of predominant and dominant party systems is identified. This can partly be explained by the prevailing authoritarian nature of many multiparty regimes in Africa as well as by the ethnic plurality of African societies. High ethnic fragmentation is not transformed into highly fragmented party systems. This phenomenon can be attributed to the most frequent ‘ethnic congress party’ which is based on an ethnic elite coalition.Die Parteienforschung zu Afrika hat bisher widersprüchliche Befunde zum Zusammenhang von Parteiensystem und zu den Aussichten für eine demokratische Konsolidierung hervorgebracht. Die widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse lassen sich zunächst mit unterschiedlichen und unangemessenen Ansätzen erklären. Zur Lösung des Problems ist jedoch eine differenzierte Parteiensystemtypologie notwendig. Zu einer sinnvollen Klassifizierung afrikanischer Parteiensysteme kann auf die Typologie von Giovanni Sartori zurückgegriffen werden, die allerdings modifiziert werden muss. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann das Vorherrschen dominanter und prädominanter Parteiensysteme in Afrika identifiziert werden. Diese können im Wesentlichen mit zwei Faktoren erklärt werden: 1. mit dem autoritären Charakter vieler Mehrparteienregime und 2. mit der ethnischen Pluralität afrikanischer Gesellschaften. Entgegen mancher Erwartungen äußert sich die hohe ethnische Fragmentierung nicht in hoch fragmentierten Parteiensystemen. Dieses Phänomen beruht wiederum darauf, dass es sich bei den weitaus meisten Parteien in Afrika um „ethnische Kongressparteien” handelt, die auf einer Koalition verschiedener ethnischer Eliten fußen

Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa

Starting from controversial findings about the relationship between party systems and the prospects of democratic consolidation, this article argues that problems can only be properly addressed on the basis of a differentiated typology of party systems. Contradictory research results do not pose an ‘African puzzle’ but can be explained by different and inadequate approaches. We argue that a modified version of Sartori's typology of party systems provides an appropriate method for classifying African party systems. Based on Sartori's framework, a preponderance of predominant and dominant party systems is identified. This can partly be explained by the prevailing authoritarian nature of many multiparty regimes in Africa as well as by the ethnic plurality of African societies. High ethnic fragmentation is not transformed into highly fragmented party systems. This phenomenon can be attributed to the most frequent ‘ethnic congress party’ which is based on an ethnic elite coalition.Africa, South of Sahara, party systems, conceptual analysis, democratisation,electoral system, social cleavage, ethnicity

Consociationalism in the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina

This paper outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the consociational power-sharing approach and its presence in the political system of the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The power-sharing framework used in this study provides insights into the theory of consociationalism as a power-sharing approach and tries to contribute to our understanding of the presence and relevance of this model to the Bosnian political system. The consociational framework emphasises the role of the political elites in providing the political stability and economic prosperity in the heterogeneous societies. It has four main features: grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. The functioning and performance of this model depends, to a large extent, on factors that are conducive to elite cooperation. These factors are: population size, balance of power among segments, multiparty system, segmental isolation, nature of social cleavages, overarching loyalties and tradition of elite accommodation. This paper shows that all features of consociationalism exist in the post-Dayton Bosnian political system. However, grand coalitions are always made after the elections and mainly for the distribution of positions in the executive bodies of state apparatus and without any strategic platform and goals to be achieved and accounted for, agreed in advance. Proportionality has been mainly replaced with the parity-giving rise to imbalanced representation in state institutions. Segmental autonomy has been misconceived and veto power has been used to block all legislation beneficial to the state

With a Little Help from My Friends: Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending Composition in Parliamentary Democracies. LEQS Paper No. 133/2018 April 2018

The determinants of public spending composition have been studied from three broad perspectives in the scholarly literature: functional economic pressures, institutional constraints and party-political determinants. This paper engages with the third perspective by placing intra-governmental dynamics in the center of the analysis. Building on the portfolio allocation approach in the coalition formation literature and the common pool perspective in public budgeting, I argue that spending ministers with party-political backing from the Finance Minister or the Prime Minister are in a privileged positon to obtain extra funding for their policy jurisdictions compared to their colleagues without such support or without any partisan affiliation (non-partisan ministers). I test these propositions via a system of equations on six spending categories using seemingly unrelated regressions on a panel of 32 parliamentary democracies over two decades and offer largely supportive empirical evidence. With the exception of education, I provide evidence that budget shares accruing to key spending departments reflect this party-political logic of spending outcomes. In addition to the econometric results, I also illustrate the impact of ministerial alignment by short qualitative accounts from selected country cases

The determinants of ideological moderation in the South African party systems: 1994-2014

This Dissertation, written at the Department of Political Studies in the School of Social Sciences, is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D), to the Faculty of Humanities at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, September 2017The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of ideological moderation in the South African party system in the post-1994 period. Previous research stresses the non-left-right feature of politics and when it recognises the centrist feature of major parties and moderation of the party system, the causes of the latter are unexplained. The deficiency in previous research is that moderation and limited left-right disagreements as fundamental causes of broader political dynamics are overlooked — moderate systems foster political consensus and democratic stability. In this study I critically examine three theoretical causal variables that account for moderation: the electoral system, the electorate, and the dominant party. This study relies on a measurement of party system fragmentation, and voter and party system polarisation, as well as an intensive qualitative assessment of the ANC. The evidence is based on a number of nationally representative surveys that measure public opinion; interviews with political party leaders and representatives, and officials from labour and business; and document analysis. The finding is that the ANC as the dominant party is the main driver of moderation in the party system. Coupled with electoral dominance, the centripetal, non-dogmatic, pragmatic and flexible tendencies that characterise the ANC permit the party to induce and stabilise party system moderation. This study: develops a causal framework for understanding moderation; builds on previous research about the centrism of major parties and the moderation of the party system (both quantitatively and qualitatively); departs from the argument about the fragmented and rightist nature of the opposition bloc and the race-based approach to the electorate; and extends the debate about the ANC by arguing that left-right movement occurs within centrist terrain, and that the party is not an amorphous or client entity but a clearly defined one. I also add to: the growing body of knowledge that finds no necessary connection between proportionalism, extremist party positioning and polarisation; the idea that party system polarisation is less reflective of voter polarisation; and concur with previous research that argues that the role of a pivotal centre party is critical for the party system.XL201

What Comes After January 6? On the Contingent Congressional Procedure

Most criticism of the system of presidential election focuses on the Electoral College, and most criticism of the Electoral College focuses narrowly on the shortcomings of the Electoral College itself. The objections are well known. The most basic is an objection of political principle. The Electoral College, on its face, deviates from the democratic principle of one-person-one-vote and gives the vote of a citizen in Wyoming approximately the same weight as 3.5 votes in California. The result is an unequal distribution of political power, both between citizens and among states. We can call this the 3.5:1 problem. There are also pragmatic worries about things that could go wrong. There is the risk that the winner of the national popular vote will not be the winner in the Electoral College: the wrong winner problem. There is the risk that one or more of the human electors will, in a moment of independence, seize the opportunity to vote contrary to their pledge: the faithless elector problem. Forty-eight states award their electoral votes as a block, creating an additional democratic imbalance: the winner-take-all problem. These shortcomings, and others like them, are the subject of a vast literature, and the Electoral College is, by a considerable distance, the clause of the Constitution that has generated the most proposals for amendment. Let me stipulate the obvious: the criticisms seem to me valid, and reform is desirable. But the Electoral College may not be the most urgent problem. This symposium was held shortly after the events of January 6, 2021, which demonstrated the necessity of paying attention to other parts of the system of presidential election. The Electoral Count Act of 1887 has come in for scorching criticism, as has the administration of elections inside the states. Those are major problems but have received so much recent attention that I shall leave them to one side. I wish to call attention instead to a different but overlapping and equally severe group of problems. The Electoral College is embedded within a process that starts well before the Iowa caucuses and continues, if necessary, to what happens after the electoral votes are counted on January 6: that is, to the “contingent procedure” in the House of Representatives. Proposals for electoral reform often take a narrow focus, tacitly assuming that the College itself can be eliminated while leaving the rest of the system unchanged. That may be correct, but it cannot be taken for granted, and questions need to be asked about potential effects elsewhere, and especially on the outer extremities of the process. Alexander Bickel made that observation in a trenchant book he published fifty years ago; the issues he raised need further exploration. I shall discuss three questions: (1) What is the relationship of the Electoral College to the early stages of the election campaign? (2) What would be the effect of abolishing the Electoral College on the two-party system? (3) What is the relationship of the two-party system to the very last step in the process, the contingent procedure in the House of Representatives? These are not, of course, the only questions that could be asked about the interactive effects of the Electoral College with other parts of the process, but they provide a useful point of entry. The crucial link here is the two-party system. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that, among the world’s constitutional democracies, the United States is anomalous in two ways: it is the only one to employ anything resembling the Electoral College, and it is the only one to have a deeply entrenched two-party system. Are these two things connected? Historically, without a doubt. Bickel thought they were structurally connected as well: that if you lose the Electoral College, you also lose two-party democracy. I do not think his argument succeeds, but the problem is exceptionally difficult. As I shall explain, the three questions are interdependent, and the answers are anything but clear. The effect of abolishing the Electoral College on the national presidential campaign—that is, the campaign after the nominating conventions—can perhaps be guessed at, but the effect on the party primaries is hard to estimate and could have profound consequences for the nature of the political parties themselves. As for the two-party system, its roots, both historical and theoretical, seem to me extremely poorly understood. The system has been around for so long that it is taken for granted as almost an immovable object. But nothing in the Constitution or in the laws of political science mandates two parties, and the entire construct is (I think) more unstable than is commonly supposed. Whether, in general, two-party democracy is to be preferred to multiparty democracy is not a question I attempt to decide. Multiparty democracy works extremely well in some of the world’s most stable democracies. Perhaps it would work here, too. But my point is a different one. The consolidation of the two-party system is the principal reason the contingent congressional procedure has not been used since 1825 – a time when Jefferson, Adams, and Madison were still alive. Although there have been a couple of close shaves, the two-party system has ensured that one of the two candidates wins an outright majority in the Electoral College. Calls for reform of the congressional procedure have therefore been rare. Why worry about a problem that never occurs? But if the delicate balance were to be disrupted—if (as the Framers expected) presidential elections were routinely sent for resolution to Congress—the consequences would be cataclysmic. That is my principal point. January 6 came perilously close to sending us along that path. Reform of the Electoral College itself can perhaps be postponed. Reform of the contingent congressional procedure cannot

Moving Towards a Normalised Path: Political Islam in Contemporary Indonesia

As the largest predominantly Muslim country of the globe, Indonesia nearly achieves two decades of its democratisation wave since the downfall of the Au- thoritarian Rule in 1998. Political parties, one of the crucial democratic institutions, have a signifi- cant responsibility to maintain the democratic system as they are the sole official representatives to create leaders and policies in the government. This paper portrays the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia particularly Islam-based parties slightly under two decades since Post- New Order regime. Islam-based parties have a potential to be a moderate-offi- cial force in the government. It could be proven by the threefold indicator. First is the ripeness of Islam-based parties in coping with both internal and external stimuli such as the leadership change and elite conflicts, the constitutional re- form and the electoral result. Second is the role of Muslim political forces in the parliament particularly in addressing the policy making of controversial bills. Third is the involvement of Islam-based parties in the administration cabinet. To sum up, by applying the analytical framework on the party goal, political Islam in Indonesia has three distinctive features: As “the vote-seekers” in the election, as “the issue-advocates” in the legislature and as “the office-seekers” in the execu- tive. These denote to a normalised path of political Islam in reaching out the embedded democracy

Islamism, party change, and strategic conciliation: Evidence from Tunisia

What happens to an Islamist party after moderating its behaviour and ideology? Existing work on Islamist parties has elaborated the varied causes of moderation. Yet, the mixed findings do not capture the full range of Islamist dynamics. This article draws on a multiyear, interview-based study of the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda to interrogate the process of intraparty change after moderation. Islamist parties face a two-level problem with external and internal trade-offs. I argue that the intraparty characteristics that enable moderation may also contribute to undermining a party’s institutional structure and identity as it responds to an uncertain political context. These findings bring processual evidence from Islamist parties into broader explanations of party change and highlight the ongoing effects of moderation, not just its causes