Privatization, Information and Incentives

In this paper, the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two mod- concerns the transactions cats faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects, The Fundamental Privatization Theorem (analogous to The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated.

The 2007 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking and Payments: an overview

The 2007 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland this summer, as we have over the past several years. The following document summarizes and ties together the contributions presented at the workshop this year.Monetary policy ; Monetary theory ; Money ; Banks and banking

Choosing policy instruments for pollution control : a review

This paper presents the design of cost effective interventions to protect the environment from excessive pollution in developing countries. The concept of intervention is motivated by the typical explanation for environmental problems in economic theory--external effects. The aim of the paper is to review the relevant theoretical and empirical economic literature in order: (a) to distill the principal lessons and evaluate general rules of thumb; and (b) to identify gaps that need to be filled in order to make them more accessible and relevant to developing countries. The paper defines broadly the range of policy instruments that can be used to address pollution problems in developing countries. It includes instruments that have traditionally been in the realm of public finance, such as taxes, prices and subsidies. But it also covers regulations and other instruments designed to affect the amount of pollution or to mitigate its damage. To limit the scope of this paper, the authors treat pollution control policies, but not policies to address other environmental problems, such as soil erosion, deforestation, desertification or other natural resource problems. Many of the principles presented, however, broadly relate to the problem of correcting for external effects, and can be applied to these other problems as well. It also focuses on domestic problems and does not deal explicitly with trans-national or global pollution externalities.Economic Theory&Research,Water and Industry,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Pollution Management&Control,Environmental Economics&Policies

Why Some Sectors of Transition Economies are less Reformed than Others? The Case of Research and Education

We analyze university research and education in transition countries. University system differs from industry in the nature of product that it produces. University system is engaged in production of public goods rather than private goods. The sector also suffers from measurement problem. We argue that because of these factors reforms were slower in this sector leading to low productivity growth. Lobby groups succeeded to gain significant control inside administrative structures regulating the sector. The case studies from the Czech Republic and Slovakia provide the evidence in support of this argument.Research, education, public good, transition, reform, productivity

Plausible Cooperation, Second Version

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations dramatically complicate coordination. Equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.Repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation

Credit policies : lessons from East Asia

Directed credit programs were a major tool of development in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, their usefulness was reconsidered. Experience in most countries showed that they stimulated capital-intensive projects, that preferential funds were often (mis)used for nonpriority purposes, that a decline in financial discipline led to low repayment rates, and that budget deficits swelled. Moreover, the programs were hard to remove. But Japan and other East Asian countries have long touted the merits of focused, well-managed directed credit programs, saying they are warranted when there is a significant discrepancy between private and social benefits, when invesment risk is too high on certain projects, and when information problems discourage lending to small and medium-size firms. The assumption underlying policy-based assistance and other forms of industrial assistance (such as lower taxes) is that the main constraint on new or expanding enterprises is limited to access to credit. The authors give an overview of credit policies in East Asian countries (China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) as well as India, and summarize what these countries have learned about directed credit programs. Among the lessons: 1) Credit programs must small, narrowly focused, and of limited duration (with clear sunset provisions); 2) subsidies must be low to minimize distortion of incentives as well as the tax on financial intermediation that all such programs entail; 3) credit programs must be financed by long-term funds to prevent inflation and macroeconomic instability, recourse to central bank credit should be avoided except in the very early stages of development when the central bank's assistance can help jump-start economic growth; 4) they should aim at achieving positive externalities (or avoiding negative ones), any help to declining industries should include plans for their timely phaseout; 5) they should promote industrialization and export orientation in a competitive private sector with internationaly competitive operations; 6) they should be part of a credible vision of economic development that promotes growth with equity and should involve a long-term strategy to develop a sound financial system; 7) policy based loans should be channeled through well-capitalized, administratively capable financial institutions, professionally managed by autonomous managers; 8) they should be based on clear, objective, easily monitored criteria; 9) programs should aim for a good repayment record and few losses; and 10) they should be supported by effective mechanisms for communication and consultation between the public and private sectors, including the collection and dissemination of basic market information.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Housing Finance,Banks&Banking Reform

Effecting Cooperation

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations dramatically complicate coordination. Equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.Repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation

Review of Economic Theories of Regulation

This paper reviews the economic theories of regulation. It discusses the public and private interest theories of regulation, as the criticisms that have been leveled at them. The extent to which these theories are also able to account for privatization and deregulation is evaluated and policies involving re-regulation are discussed. The paper thus reviews rate of return regulation, price-cap regulation, yardstick regulation, interconnection and access regulation, and franchising or bidding processes. The primary aim of those instruments is to improve the operating efficiency of the regulated firms. Huge investments will be needed in the regulated network sectors. The question is brought up if regulatory instruments and institutions primarily designed to improve operating efficiency are equally well-placed to promote the necessary investments and to balance the resulting conflicting interests between for example consumers and investors.Regulation, Deregulation, Public Interest Theories, Private Interest Theories, Interest Groups, Public Choice, Market Failures, Price-cap Regulation, Rate of Return Regulation, Yardstick Competition, Franchise Bidding, Access Regulation.

Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1) biological uncertainty 2) natural uncertainty 3) individual information, and 4) monitoring problem. The consequences of these four types of information insufficiencies on the choice of regulatory tools are explored. We discuss in this context three types of regulatory tools: land takings, environmental fees/charges, and contracts. The efficiency of each type of regulatory tools is shown dependent on the specific informational constraints that the regulatory faces.Biodiversity conservation, Information, Regulatory tools

Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture

There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a framework for assessing the needs and efficiency of economic organizations and public interventions in agriculture. Our new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of alternative market, contract, internal, and hybrid modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction costs and their institutional (distribution and enforcement of de-facto rights between individuals, groups, organizations), behavioral (agents preferences, ability, bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, trust), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), natural, and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms and other agrarian organizations; specification of the economic role of government and the needs for public interventions in agrarian sector; assessment of comparative of alternative forms of public involvement in agrarian sector (partnership, regulation, taxation, assistance, provision, in house organization, fundamental property rights modernization). The paper provides new powerful tools for understanding the agrarian organizations and their efficiency, and for improvement of public policies, collective actions, farming and business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life.market, private and public modes of governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations, agricultural policies, transaction costs, New Institutional Economics