Interval valued bimatrix games

summary:Payoffs in (bimatrix) games are usually not known precisely, but it is often possible to determine lower and upper bounds on payoffs. Such interval valued bimatrix games are considered in this paper. There are many questions arising in this context. First, we discuss the problem of existence of an equilibrium being common for all instances of interval values. We show that this property is equivalent to solvability of a certain linear mixed integer system of equations and inequalities. Second, we characterize the set of all possible equilibria by mean of a linear mixed integer system

Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries

Suppose that an $m$-simplex is partitioned into $n$ convex regions having disjoint interiors and distinct labels, and we may learn the label of any point by querying it. The learning objective is to know, for any point in the simplex, a label that occurs within some distance $\epsilon$ from that point. We present two algorithms for this task: Constant-Dimension Generalised Binary Search (CD-GBS), which for constant $m$ uses $poly(n, \log \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right))$ queries, and Constant-Region Generalised Binary Search (CR-GBS), which uses CD-GBS as a subroutine and for constant $n$ uses $poly(m, \log \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right))$ queries. We show via Kakutani's fixed-point theorem that these algorithms provide bounds on the best-response query complexity of computing approximate well-supported equilibria of bimatrix games in which one of the players has a constant number of pure strategies. We also partially extend our results to games with multiple players, establishing further query complexity bounds for computing approximate well-supported equilibria in this setting.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, second version strengthens lower bound in Theorem 6, adds footnotes with additional comments and fixes typo

Reformulations of mathematical programming problems as linear complementarity problems

A family of complementarity problems are defined as extensions of the well known Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). These are (i.) Second Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) which is an LCP extended by introducing further equality restrictions and unrestricted variables, (ii.) Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (MLCP) which is an LCP with additional variables not required to be complementary and with a linear objective function which is to be minimized, (iii.) Second Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (SMLCP) which is an MLCP but the nonnegative restriction on one of each pair of complementary variables is relaxed so that it is allowed to be unrestricted in value. A number of well known mathematical programming problems, namely quadratic programming (convex, nonconvex, pseudoconvex nonconvex), bilinear programming, game theory, zero-one integer programming, the fixed charge problem, absolute value programming, variable separable programming are reformulated as members of this family of four complementarity problems

On some further properties of nonzero-sum diffential games

Optimality principle and open loop-closed loop control relations in nonzero-sum differential game