Might EPR particles communicate through a wormhole?

We consider the two-particle wave function of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen system, given by a two dimensional relativistic scalar field model. The Bohm-de Broglie interpretation is applied and the quantum potential is viewed as modifying the Minkowski geometry. In this way an effective metric, which is analogous to a black hole metric in some limited region, is obtained in one case and a particular metric with singularities appears in the other case, opening the possibility, following Holland, of interpreting the EPR correlations as being originated by an effective wormhole geometry, through which the physical signals can propagate.Comment: Corrected version, to appears in EP

A note on the Penrose junction conditions

Impulsive pp-waves are commonly described either by a distributional spacetime metric or, alternatively, by a continuous one. The transformation $T$ relating these forms clearly has to be discontinuous, which causes two basic problems: First, it changes the manifold structure and second, the pullback of the distributional form of the metric under $T$ is not well defined within classical distribution theory. Nevertheless, from a physical point of view both pictures are equivalent. In this work, after calculating $T$ als well as the ''Rosen''-form of the metric in the general case of a pp-wave with arbitrary wave profile we give a precise meaning to the term ``physically equivalent'' by interpreting $T$ as the distributional limit of a suitably regularized sequence of diffeomorphisms. Moreover, it is shown that $T$ provides an example of a generalized coordinate transformation in the sense of Colombeau's generalized functions.Comment: 9 pages, RevTeX, no figures, final version (typos corrected, references updated

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiments: a discrete data driven approach

We take the point of view that building a one-way bridge from experimental data to mathematical models instead of the other way around avoids running into controversies resulting from attaching meaning to the symbols used in the latter. In particular, we show that adopting this view offers new perspectives for constructing mathematical models for and interpreting the results of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiments. We first prove new Bell-type inequalities constraining the values of the four correlations obtained by performing Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiments under four different conditions. The proof is ``model-free'' in the sense that it does not refer to any mathematical model that one imagines to have produced the data. The constraints only depend on the number of quadruples obtained by reshuffling the data in the four data sets without changing the values of the correlations. These new inequalities reduce to model-free versions of the well-known Bell-type inequalities if the maximum fraction of quadruples is equal to one. Being model-free, a violation of the latter by experimental data implies that not all the data in the four data sets can be reshuffled to form quadruples. Furthermore, being model-free inequalities, a violation of the latter by experimental data only implies that any mathematical model assumed to produce this data does not apply. Starting from the data obtained by performing Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiments, we construct instead of postulate mathematical models that describe the main features of these data. The mathematical framework of plausible reasoning is applied to reproducible and robust data, yielding without using any concept of quantum theory, the expression of the correlation for a system of two spin-1/2 objects in the singlet state. (truncated here

Metaphysical and absolute possibility

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree”. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib without qualification.” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it