195,827 research outputs found

    Service-level based response by assignment and order processing for warehouse automation

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    Along with tremendous growth of online sales in this Internet era, unprecedented intensive competition in shortening the delivery time of orders has been occurring among several major online retailers. On the other hand, the idea of customer-oriented service creates a trend of diversified pricing strategy. Different price options are offered to cater to diversified needs of customers. It has become an urgent need for online sales industries to provide the differentiated service levels for different classes of customers with different priorities based on the charging prices and resource constraints of the supply network. In response to the challenges mentioned above, this thesis focuses on providing differentiated service levels to different customers within the warehouse automation system, which is the key point of the supply network. To concentrate on the research topic, the process of a user’s order in warehouse automation system is broken down into the waiting process and retrieving process, which is related to order processing policy and storage assignment method respectively. Priority Based Turn-over Rate (PBTR) storage assignment method, Priority Based Weighted Queuing (PBWQ) policy and joint optimization of storage assignment and PBWQ policy are proposed, developed, explored and validated in this thesis. Utility function of charging price and order processing time is developed to measure the performances of the proposed methods. Compared with the classical turn over rate assignment method, PBTR has 23.21% of improvement under the measurement of utility function, when different classes of customers have different needs for products. PBWQ improves the system performance by 18.15% compared with First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) policy under baseline setting of experiments. Joint optimization of storage assignment and PBWQ policy has the improvement of 19.64% in system performance compared with the baseline system which applies both classical storage assignment method and FCFS order processing policy

    Antitrust Analysis for the Internet Upstream Market: a BGP Approach

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    In this paper we study concentration in the European Internet upstream access market. Measurement of market concentration depends on correctly defining the market, but this is not always possible as Antitrust authorities often lack reliable pricing and traffic data. We present an alternative approach based on the inference of the Internet Operators interconnection policies using micro-data sourced from their Border Gateway Protocol tables. Firstly we propose a price-independent algorithm for defining both the vertical and geographical relevant market boundaries, then we calculate market concentration indexes using two novel metrics. These assess, for each undertaking, both its role in terms of essential network facility and of wholesale market dominance. The results, applied to four leading Internet Exchange Points in London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Milan, show that some vertical segments of these markets are extremely competitive, while others are highly concentrated, putting them within the special attention category of the Merger Guidelines

    Network Neutrality and the Evolution of the Internet

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    In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity requirements, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micromanagement of traffic network management. --Broadband Internet,network neutrality,quality of service differentiation,congestion pricing,interclass externality pricing,interconnection agreements

    Network neutrality and the evolution of the internet

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    In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity require-ments, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micro-management of traffic network management. --

    On Optimal Service Differentiation in Congested Network Markets

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    As Internet applications have become more diverse in recent years, users having heavy demand for online video services are more willing to pay higher prices for better services than light users that mainly use e-mails and instant messages. This encourages the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to explore service differentiations so as to optimize their profits and allocation of network resources. Much prior work has focused on the viability of network service differentiation by comparing with the case of a single-class service. However, the optimal service differentiation for an ISP subject to resource constraints has remained unsolved. In this work, we establish an optimal control framework to derive the analytical solution to an ISP's optimal service differentiation, i.e. the optimal service qualities and associated prices. By analyzing the structures of the solution, we reveal how an ISP should adjust the service qualities and prices in order to meet varying capacity constraints and users' characteristics. We also obtain the conditions under which ISPs have strong incentives to implement service differentiation and whether regulators should encourage such practices

    A Study of Non-Neutral Networks with Usage-based Prices

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    Hahn and Wallsten wrote that network neutrality "usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of non-neutral behaviors under a simple model of linear demand-response to usage-based prices. We take into account advertising revenues and consider both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In particular, we model the impact of side-payments between service and content providers. We also consider the effect of service discrimination by access providers, as well as an extension of our model to non-monopolistic content providers

    Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of internet traffic quality regulation

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    In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traffic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on minimum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insensitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities.

    Market driven network neutrality and the fallacies of Internet traffic quality regulation

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    In the U.S. paying for priority arrangements between Internet access service providers and Internet application providers to favor some traffic over other traf-fic is considered unreasonable discrimination. In Europe the focus is on mini-mum traffic quality requirements. It can be shown that neither market power nor universal service arguments can justify traffic quality regulation. In particular, heterogeneous demand for traffic quality for delay sensitive versus delay insen-sitive applications requires traffic quality differentiation, priority pricing and evolutionary development of minimal traffic qualities. --
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