1,876 research outputs found
An FPTAS for Bargaining Networks with Unequal Bargaining Powers
Bargaining networks model social or economic situations in which agents seek
to form the most lucrative partnership with another agent from among several
alternatives. There has been a flurry of recent research studying Nash
bargaining solutions (also called 'balanced outcomes') in bargaining networks,
so that we now know when such solutions exist, and also that they can be
computed efficiently, even by market agents behaving in a natural manner. In
this work we study a generalization of Nash bargaining, that models the
possibility of unequal 'bargaining powers'. This generalization was introduced
in [KB+10], where it was shown that the corresponding 'unequal division' (UD)
solutions exist if and only if Nash bargaining solutions exist, and also that a
certain local dynamics converges to UD solutions when they exist. However, the
bound on convergence time obtained for that dynamics was exponential in network
size for the unequal division case. This bound is tight, in the sense that
there exists instances on which the dynamics of [KB+10] converges only after
exponential time. Other approaches, such as the one of Kleinberg and Tardos, do
not generalize to the unsymmetrical case. Thus, the question of computational
tractability of UD solutions has remained open. In this paper, we provide an
FPTAS for the computation of UD solutions, when such solutions exist. On a
graph G=(V,E) with weights (i.e. pairwise profit opportunities) uniformly
bounded above by 1, our FPTAS finds an \eps-UD solution in time
poly(|V|,1/\eps). We also provide a fast local algorithm for finding \eps-UD
solution, providing further justification that a market can find such a
solution.Comment: 18 pages; Amin Saberi (Ed.): Internet and Network Economics - 6th
International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010.
Proceedings
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement
auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function
subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful
mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the
participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of
general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first
truthful, budget-feasible and -approximate mechanisms that run in
polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions.
Prior to our work, the only -approximation mechanism known for
non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value
queries.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone
submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two
candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet
ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly
enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem
where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal
value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online
setting as well.
To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the
case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain
-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular
objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a -system.
With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known
for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting
that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial
time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201
Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and O(1)-approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Since the introduction of the problem by Singer [40], obtaining efficient mechanisms for objectives that go beyond the class of monotone submodular functions has been elusive. Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where-crucially-the agents are not ordered according to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present, e.g., at most k agents can be selected. We obtain O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a p-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guaran
Cooperation through social influence
We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft
Annual Report Of Research and Creative Productions, January to December, 2011
2011 Annual Report of Research and Creative Productions, Morehead State University, Division of Academic Affairs, Research and Creative Productions Committee
Annual Report Of Research and Creative Productions, January to December, 2011
2011 Annual Report of Research and Creative Productions, Morehead State University, Division of Academic Affairs, Research and Creative Productions Committee
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