Why Chinas Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector

China's thirteen years of reforms (1979-1991) have achieved an average GNP annual growth rate of 8.6%. What makes China's reforms from those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector. We argue that the organization structure of the economy matters. Unlike their unitary hierarchical structure based on the functional or specialization principles (the U-form), China's hierarchical economy has been the multi-layer-multi-regional one mainly based on territorial principle (the deep M-form, or briefly, the M-form). Reforms have further decentralized the M-form economy along regional lines, which provided flexibility and opportunities for carrying out regional experiments, for the rise of non-state enterprises, and for the emergence of markets. This is why China's non-state sector share of industrial output increased from 22% in 1978 to 47% in 1991 and its private sector's share from zero to about 10%, both being achieved without mass privatization and changes in the political system.

Technology, Innovation and Latecomer Strategies: Evidence from the Mobile Handset Manufacturing Sector in China

Since the entry of Chinese domestic mobile handset manufacturers in 1998, Chinese domestic suppliers have successfully surpassed the market share of joint ventures (JVs) while direct imports have been largely phased out. By examining China’s mobile handset manufacturing sector as a whole and through case studies, we found several factors that contributed to the success of China’s domestic handset manufacturers which can be classified into three categories: market conditions, competition, and government’s support.

Trade reform in Vietnam : opportunities with emerging challenges

In 1986 Vietnam initiated a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy where the government would keep playing a leading role. These renovation (doi moi) policies were successful at generating economic growth and reducing poverty. In the ten-year socioeconomic strategy endorsed by the Ninth Party Congress in April 2001, the authorities further articulated their development objectives in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. To reach these objectives, the government indicated that its structural reform priorities were to change Vietnam's trade and financial policies, liberalize the climate for private investment, increase the efficiency of public enterprises, and improve governance. The author argues that the pace of implementation of trade reform-which has been impressive so far-is raising new challenges. On one side, fast liberalization of trade reform may soon conflict with the slow pace of implementation of other reforms, including restructuring of state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks. On the other side, Vietnam would greatly benefit from fast implementation of trade reform and particularly fast accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially after China's recent WTO accession. Auffret concludes that implementation of trade reform will be a testing ground to reveal the extent of Vietnam's commitment to a market-oriented economy.Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade Policy,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,World Trade Organization,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Services

China’s Institutional Architecture: A New Institutional Economics and Organization Theory Perspective on the Links between Local Governance and Local Enterprises

We start our exploration of China’s institutional change by asking what the China experience can tell us about institutional economics and organization theory. We point to under-researched areas such as the formation of firms and the interplay between firms and local politics. Our findings support the dynamic capability approach which concentrates on activities rather than on pre-defined groups and models institution building as a co-operative game between the local business community and local government agencies. We find that the analysis of firms has to set in before they are formed by entrepreneurs and networks and we identify political management as a core competence of these two groups. While this contradicts the conventional view of clientelism or principle agent relations as institutional building blocks, we don’t propose competing models. Instead, we suggest focusing on a dynamic process in which the role of players can change. Faced with the spontaneous emergence of institutions, our concept of institutional architecture captures the fact that the two models can co-exist side by side and that, once the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions is given up, there can be a transition from local patron-client relations to local business-state coordination.entrepreneurship;dynamic capabilities;networks;institutional change;diversity and convergence of institutions

“One Country, Two Systems,” Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Law in China

With accumulation of sovereign debt in many large OECD countries it seems that attention is heightened on how to manage public resources more effectively. High levels of sovereign debt are partly related to the aftermath of the latest financial crisis, where resolution for many big economies was to intervene and use public resources to put an end to the expansion of the crisis. Public real estate is one of those resources, which’s efficient management has high importance on general public sector efficacy. It seems that governments around the world have a way to go toward efficiency in public real estate management. There seem to be rather wide differences in management practices and quality. This thesis is an attempt to quantify some choices Estonian government could take in terms of its public real estate management. Four different scenarios are compared and Monte Carlo Simulation tool is used for that purpose. Two of the scenarios are related to private sector involvement and two are not. Privatization of public assets does not only mean cashing out for the government. It has wider consequences by introducing market forces where they weren’t before. One of the most important points of interest in this thesis is what effect can market forces and change in incentives have on public real estate management. There can be both, positive and negative effects, but which ones would prevail? The model built during the process of the thesis tries to measure those effects with aggregate net present value and its volatility by looking at 30 years ahead. Simulation analyses is used to vary input variables in the range that seems to be supported by the observations made in the literature and in some cases, where data is not available, also according to more subjective view that of the author’s. As input and their characteristics are different for scenarios, it is of interest to document how do the main outputs, mean NPV and its volatility, vary along with inputs

Chinese Enterprise Reform as a Market Process

The reform of China's enterprise system increasingly reflects the outcome of China's emerging property rights market. We distinguish between a centrally-directed reform strategy, with characteristics similar to those of a Pigouvian tax, and a market-driven reform process, which captures the essential features of a Coasian approach to social cost. The Coase Theorem postulates that eliminating transaction costs and attaching well specified property rights to public goods that generate externalities will allow uncoordinated economic agents to negotiate institutional arrangements that produce socially efficient allocation of resources. Extending Coase's reasoning to the case of socialist transition ' we argue that reforms that expand competition, move toward well-specified assignment of ownership rights to public enterprises, and reduce transaction costs will motivate the "ultimate" owners, including officials of national and sub-national government agencies, to reconfigure their assets or to combine their assets with those of other jurisdictions and/or private investors to create more efficient ownership arrangements. We review the extent to which China's reforms have established the conditions for an effective market in ownership rights to industrial property. We tabulate progress from 1 980 to present along the three major analytic dimensions inherent in Coase's analysis: competition, property rights, and transaction costs. We conclude that the sheer size and diversity of China's industrial economy will motivate a continuation of decentralized reform initiatives. To support this Coasian reform process, central and provincial governments need to expand initiatives to clarify property rights, particularly the right of alienation, reduce impediments to competition, and facilitate the reduction of transaction costs.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39466/3/wp76.pd

China's New Regional Trade Agreements

This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade bloc centred on them.International Relations/Trade,

Chinese firms entering China's low-income market: Gaining competitive advantage by partnering governments

This paper investigates poverty alleviation efforts in China and the nature of governmententerprise partnerships there. We argue that firms partnering central and local governments can be an effective strategy to overcome resource-based obstacles in low-income markets. In China, local and central governments are owners of rare and valuable resources, thus offering better access to finance, infrastructure, technical and planning expertise, advocacy through government marketing and distribution channels, and links to other stakeholders. The findings are based on 16 case studies of firms entering the low-income market in China, of which two cases in the agricultural and telecommunication sector are studied in depth. --Partnerships,government,poverty alleviation,China,base of the pyramid