Approximate reasoning using terminological models

Term Subsumption Systems (TSS) form a knowledge-representation scheme in AI that can express the defining characteristics of concepts through a formal language that has a well-defined semantics and incorporates a reasoning mechanism that can deduce whether one concept subsumes another. However, TSS's have very limited ability to deal with the issue of uncertainty in knowledge bases. The objective of this research is to address issues in combining approximate reasoning with term subsumption systems. To do this, we have extended an existing AI architecture (CLASP) that is built on the top of a term subsumption system (LOOM). First, the assertional component of LOOM has been extended for asserting and representing uncertain propositions. Second, we have extended the pattern matcher of CLASP for plausible rule-based inferences. Third, an approximate reasoning model has been added to facilitate various kinds of approximate reasoning. And finally, the issue of inconsistency in truth values due to inheritance is addressed using justification of those values. This architecture enhances the reasoning capabilities of expert systems by providing support for reasoning under uncertainty using knowledge captured in TSS. Also, as definitional knowledge is explicit and separate from heuristic knowledge for plausible inferences, the maintainability of expert systems could be improved

Reasoning about Action: An Argumentation - Theoretic Approach

We present a uniform non-monotonic solution to the problems of reasoning about action on the basis of an argumentation-theoretic approach. Our theory is provably correct relative to a sensible minimisation policy introduced on top of a temporal propositional logic. Sophisticated problem domains can be formalised in our framework. As much attention of researchers in the field has been paid to the traditional and basic problems in reasoning about actions such as the frame, the qualification and the ramification problems, approaches to these problems within our formalisation lie at heart of the expositions presented in this paper

Bayesian Probabilities and the Histories Algebra

We attempt a justification of a generalisation of the consistent histories programme using a notion of probability that is valid for all complete sets of history propositions. This consists of introducing Cox's axioms of probability theory and showing that our candidate notion of probability obeys them. We also give a generalisation of Bayes' theorem and comment upon how Bayesianism should be useful for the quantum gravity/cosmology programmes.Comment: 10 pages, accepted by Int. J. Theo. Phys. Feb 200

Rigorously assessing software reliability and safety

This paper summarises the state of the art in the assessment of software reliability and safety ("dependability"), and describes some promising developments. A sound demonstration of very high dependability is still impossible before operation of the software; but research is finding ways to make rigorous assessment increasingly feasible. While refined mathematical techniques cannot take the place of factual knowledge, they can allow the decision-maker to draw more accurate conclusions from the knowledge that is available

Plausible inference: A multi-valued logic for problem solving

A new logic is developed which permits continuously variable strength of belief in the truth of assertions. Four inference rules result, with formal logic as a limiting case. Quantification of belief is defined. Propagation of belief to linked assertions results from dependency-based techniques of truth maintenance so that local consistency is achieved or contradiction discovered in problem solving. Rules for combining, confirming, or disconfirming beliefs are given, and several heuristics are suggested that apply to revising already formed beliefs in the light of new evidence. The strength of belief that results in such revisions based on conflicting evidence are a highly subjective phenomenon. Certain quantification rules appear to reflect an orderliness in the subjectivity. Several examples of reasoning by plausible inference are given, including a legal example and one from robot learning. Propagation of belief takes place in directions forbidden in formal logic and this results in conclusions becoming possible for a given set of assertions that are not reachable by formal logic

The lexicographic closure as a revision process

The connections between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are well-known. A central problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning is the problem of default entailment, i.e., when should an item of default information representing "if A is true then, normally, B is true" be said to follow from a given set of items of such information. Many answers to this question have been proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have attempted any explicit connection to belief revision. The aim of this paper is to give an example of how such a connection can be made by showing how the lexicographic closure of a set of defaults may be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision by sets of sentences. Specifically we use the revision process of Nayak.Comment: 7 pages, Nonmonotonic Reasoning Workshop 2000 (special session on belief change), at KR200