19,448 research outputs found
Non-cooperative power control game in D2D underlying networks with variant system conditions
In this paper, the problem of power control using a game theoretic approach based on sigmoid cost function is studied for device-to-device (D2D) communications underlying cellular networks. A non-cooperative game, where each D2D transmitter and a cellular user select their own transmit power level independently, is analyzed to minimize their user-serving cost function and achieve a target signal to interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) requirement. It is proved analytically that the Nash equilibrium point of the game exists and it is unique under certain constraints. Numerical results verify the analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game with variant system conditions, such as path loss exponents, target SINR, interference caused by the cellular user, pricing coefficients, and sigmoid control parameter
Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach
Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue
for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed
to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device
(D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To
optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular
modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation
mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set
of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the
packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We
first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed
auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm
is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel
gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed
auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of
iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and
show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The
simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good
performance on the system sum rate.Comment: 26 pages, 6 fgures; IEEE Journals on Selected Areas in
Communications, 201
Pricing and Resource Allocation via Game Theory for a Small-Cell Video Caching System
Evidence indicates that downloading on-demand videos accounts for a dramatic
increase in data traffic over cellular networks. Caching popular videos in the
storage of small-cell base stations (SBS), namely, small-cell caching, is an
efficient technology for reducing the transmission latency whilst mitigating
the redundant transmissions of popular videos over back-haul channels. In this
paper, we consider a commercialized small-cell caching system consisting of a
network service provider (NSP), several video retailers (VR), and mobile users
(MU). The NSP leases its SBSs to the VRs for the purpose of making profits, and
the VRs, after storing popular videos in the rented SBSs, can provide faster
local video transmissions to the MUs, thereby gaining more profits. We conceive
this system within the framework of Stackelberg game by treating the SBSs as a
specific type of resources. We first model the MUs and SBSs as two independent
Poisson point processes, and develop, via stochastic geometry theory, the
probability of the specific event that an MU obtains the video of its choice
directly from the memory of an SBS. Then, based on the probability derived, we
formulate a Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the average profit of both the
NSP and the VRs. Also, we investigate the Stackelberg equilibrium by solving a
non-convex optimization problem. With the aid of this game theoretic framework,
we shed light on the relationship between four important factors: the optimal
pricing of leasing an SBS, the SBSs allocation among the VRs, the storage size
of the SBSs, and the popularity distribution of the VRs. Monte-Carlo
simulations show that our stochastic geometry-based analytical results closely
match the empirical ones. Numerical results are also provided for quantifying
the proposed game-theoretic framework by showing its efficiency on pricing and
resource allocation.Comment: Accepted to appear in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, special issue on Video Distribution over Future Interne
Spectrum review: potential reform directions
The purpose of this review is to ensure Australia\u27s spectrum policy and management framework framework will serve the country well into the future, and to examine what policy and regulatory changes are needed to meet current challenges.
Introduction
On 23 May 2014 the Minister for Communications, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, announced a review of spectrum policy arrangements. The review is an opportunity to boost innovation and productivity with resulting benefits to the broader community. It is also part of the Government’s commitment to streamlining regulation and cutting red tape.
The Department of Communications (the Department) is undertaking the review in conjunction with the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Terms of Reference for the review were released with the Minister’s announcement along with an issues paper seeking stakeholder feedback. The review will report to the Minister in early 2015. Implementation of reforms will likely commence in 2015 but the Department is seeking feedback from stakeholders on sequencing and timing.
This paper provides context and suggests some reform principles and options for discussion. These have been prepared after consideration of stakeholder feedback on the issues paper.
The proposals are not intended to cover the full range of possible reforms and feedback as to amendments or additional proposals is welcome. The proposals do not represent the final views of the Department or the views of the Australian Government
Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish
users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their
maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this
paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce
selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can
be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power
levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We
mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit
powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention
capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and
propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users
and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using
intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our
results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed
to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the
intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect
monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation
results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using
intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention
rules.Comment: 33 pages, 6 figure
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