The intelligence cycle is dead, long live the intelligence cycle: Rethinking intelligence fundamentals for a new intelligence doctrine

In the spring of 2009 the UK Ministry of Defence elected to undertake a review of the existing military Joint Intelligence Doctrine. The existing doctrine, Joint Warfare Doctrine 2-00 (JWP 2-00) Intelligence Support to Joint Operations had been promulgated in 2003 largely on the basis of coalition-oriented expeditionary and peace support operations in the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan. This had replaced an earlier, first edition of JWP 2-00 issued in 1999

Artificial intelligence and UK national security: Policy considerations

RUSI was commissioned by GCHQ to conduct an independent research study into the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for national security purposes. The aim of this project is to establish an independent evidence base to inform future policy development regarding national security uses of AI. The findings are based on in-depth consultation with stakeholders from across the UK national security community, law enforcement agencies, private sector companies, academic and legal experts, and civil society representatives. This was complemented by a targeted review of existing literature on the topic of AI and national security. The research has found that AI offers numerous opportunities for the UK national security community to improve efficiency and effectiveness of existing processes. AI methods can rapidly derive insights from large, disparate datasets and identify connections that would otherwise go unnoticed by human operators. However, in the context of national security and the powers given to UK intelligence agencies, use of AI could give rise to additional privacy and human rights considerations which would need to be assessed within the existing legal and regulatory framework. For this reason, enhanced policy and guidance is needed to ensure the privacy and human rights implications of national security uses of AI are reviewed on an ongoing basis as new analysis methods are applied to data

Autonomic computing architecture for SCADA cyber security

Cognitive computing relates to intelligent computing platforms that are based on the disciplines of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other innovative technologies. These technologies can be used to design systems that mimic the human brain to learn about their environment and can autonomously predict an impending anomalous situation. IBM first used the term ‘Autonomic Computing’ in 2001 to combat the looming complexity crisis (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). The concept has been inspired by the human biological autonomic system. An autonomic system is self-healing, self-regulating, self-optimising and self-protecting (Ganek and Corbi, 2003). Therefore, the system should be able to protect itself against both malicious attacks and unintended mistakes by the operator

Girt by sea: understanding Australia’s maritime domains in a networked world

This study aims to provide the background, language and context necessary for an informed understanding of the challenges and dilemmas faced by those responsible for the efficacy of Australia’s maritime domain awareness system. Abstract Against a rapidly changing region dominated by the rise of China, India and, closer to home, Indonesia, Australia’s approaches to understanding its maritime domains will be influenced by strategic factors and diplomatic judgements as well as operational imperatives.  Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States and its relationships with regional neighbours may be expected to have a profound impact on the strength of the information sharing and interoperability regimes on which so much of Australia’s maritime domain awareness depends. The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, it seeks to explain in plain English some of the principles, concepts and terms that maritime domain awareness practitioners grapple with on a daily basis.  Second, it points to a series of challenges that governments face in deciding how to spend scarce tax dollars to deliver a maritime domain awareness system that is necessary and sufficient for the protection and promotion of Australia’s national interests

Dynamic cyber-incident response

Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profi t or non-commercial purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page. Any other reproduction or transmission requires prior written permission by NATO CCD COE.Traditional cyber-incident response models have not changed significantly since the early days of the Computer Incident Response with even the most recent incident response life cycle model advocated by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 2012) bearing a striking resemblance to the models proposed by early leaders in the field e.g. Carnegie-Mellon University (West-Brown, et al., 2003) and the SANS Institute (Northcutt, 2003). Whilst serving the purpose of producing coherent and effective response plans, these models appear to be created from the perspectives of Computer Security professionals with no referenced academic grounding. They attempt to defend against, halt and recover from a cyber-attack as quickly as possible. However, other actors inside an organisation may have priorities which conflict with these traditional approaches and may ultimately better serve the longer-term goals and objectives of an organisation

Imagery in the UK: Britain's troubled imagery intelligence architecture

Copyright © British International Studies Association 2009.This article examines the status, role and development of imagery intelligence in the UK government. It is argued that imagery intelligence occupies a subordinate and marginalised position compared to other forms of intelligence, chiefly from human sources and the interception of communications. The origins of that position are recounted, and the problems arising from internal struggles over control of imagery examined. It is concluded that the existing approach to imagery represents a serious problem and that a substantial restructuring and upgrading of imagery intelligence is essential if UK foreign policy decision-making is to be properly informed in the 21st Century.The Leverhulme Trus

Guide to Australia’s national security capability

This paper provides a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes in a range of environments, including domestically, at the border, offshore and in cyberspace. Introduction The period since 2001 has been transformative for Australia’s national security and our national security challenges continue to evolve. To meet these challenges, we need new ways to coordinate and develop our capability and to shape the national security environment. Significant advances have been made in recent years to build greater collaboration and interoperability across the national security community. However, the increasing complexity of national security threats requires an even more consistent and connected approach to capability planning that complements existing individual agency arrangements. To that end, the Government has developed a security classified National Security Capability Plan to provide a single consolidated picture of the capabilities that enable Australia to achieve national security outcomes. This Guide offers an overview of Australia’s national security capability planning. It identifies the functions performed by the national security community and how these achieve the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy (2013). Capability planning is one of the tools that support Government to better consider how capabilities can be directed to meet national security objectives. This ensures that capability investment is focussed and that Government can give appropriate consideration to redirecting existing capabilities to meet new or emerging risks and opportunities. It also highlights areas where agencies’ capabilities are interdependent, identifying focus areas for collaboration and interoperability. Having a better understanding of our capabilities will help us to make more informed decisions about what we need. Australia’s national security arrangements are underpinned by a number of agencies working across areas such as diplomacy, defence, development, border protection, law enforcement and intelligence. Australia’s national security agencies include: Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) Australian Crime Commission (ACC) Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) Australian Federal Police (AFP) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO) Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Department of Defence (Defence) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) Department of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT) Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) Office of National Assessments (ONA). The Capability Plan brings together, for the first time, a single view of the capabilities maintained by these agencies with the exception of Defence capabilities. Defence has a separate established capability planning process that includes the Defence White Paper (2013) and Defence Capability Plan (2012). Defence is a key contributor to Australia’s national security arrangements including leading the coordination and delivery of national security science and technology and works in close cooperation with other national security agencies. Defence capabilities will continue to be managed through existing mechanisms, principally the Defence Capability Plan. For the first time, the Capability Plan, and the accompanying Guide to Australia’s National Security Capability, presents a unified picture of the capabilities that exist across non-Defence national security agencies. Together with other strategic planning tools, this work informs the broader national security planning cycle and supports the objectives and implementation of overarching policy documents such as the National Security Strategy and the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. The Capability Plan complements the Defence Capability Plan and does not seek to duplicate it. It should also be noted that the Guide has not been designed to signal specific initiatives or tender opportunities. Such processes will continue to be managed by individual agencies

Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted Warfighting Solutions Version 1.0 : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph

Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations. Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got proper empirically supported foundations. Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, air and naval operations. This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical forms of autonomous weapons, that address the gap between Police or Law Enforcement and Military operations that is growing exponentially small. National adversaries are today in many instances hybrid threats, that manifest criminal and military traits, these often require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or Security objectives. The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.Comment: 52 pages, 6 Figures, over 40 references, reviewed by a reade