Coalitions of things: supporting ISR tasks via Internet of Things approaches

In the wake of rapid maturing of Internet of Things (IoT) approaches and technologies in the commercial sector, the IoT is increasingly seen as a key ‘disruptive’ technology in military environments. Future operational environments are expected to be characterized by a lower proportion of human participants and a higher proportion of autonomous and semi-autonomous devices. This view is reflected in both US ‘third offset’ and UK ‘information age’ thinking and is likely to have a profound effect on how multinational coalition operations are conducted in the future. Much of the initial consideration of IoT adoption in the military domain has rightly focused on security concerns, reflecting similar cautions in the early era of electronic commerce. As IoT approaches mature, this initial technical focus is likely to shift to considerations of interactivity and policy. In this paper, rather than considering the broader range of IoT applications in the military context, we focus on roles for IoT concepts and devices in future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks, drawing on experience in sensor-mission resourcing and human-computer collaboration (HCC) for ISR. We highlight the importance of low training overheads in the adoption of IoT approaches, and the need to balance proactivity and interactivity (push vs pull modes). As with sensing systems over the last decade, we emphasize that, to be valuable in ISR tasks, IoT devices will need a degree of mission-awareness in addition to an ability to self-manage their limited resources (power, memory, bandwidth, computation, etc). In coalition operations, the management and potential sharing of IoT devices and systems among partners (e.g., in cross-coalition tactical-edge ISR teams) becomes a key issue due heterogeneous factors such as language, policy, procedure and doctrine. Finally, we briefly outline a platform that we have developed in order to experiment with human-IoT teaming on ISR tasks, in both physical and virtual settings

COIN is dead - long live transformation

Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011.1 Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deploy- ments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building activities over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less defini- tive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of military force. This paper explores those in light of the last ten years of counterinsurgenc

Implication of FORCEnet on coalition forces

The coalition navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) are in a period of transformation. They are stepping out of the Industrial Age of warfare and into the Informational Age of warfare. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the emerging theory to accomplish this undertaking. NCW describes "the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even partially networked force can employ to create a decisive war fighting advantage." 1 This theory is turned into a concept through Network Centric Operations (NCO) and implemented through the FORCEnet operational construct and architectural framework. The coalition navies are moving in a direction to develop and leverage information more effectively and efficiently. This will lead to an informational advantage that can be used as a combat multiplier to shape and control the environment, so as to dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat any enemy. This analysis was comprised of defining three TTCP AG-6 provided vignettes into ARENA model that captured Coalition ESG configurations at various FORCEnet levels. The results of the analysis demonstrated that enhanced FORCEnet capabilities such as FORCEnet Levels 2 and 4 would satisfy the capability gap for a needed network-centric ESG force that can effectively counter insurgency operations in Maritime warfare. Furthermore, the participating allied navies in the Coalition ESG should pursue acquisition strategies to upgrade their ship platforms in accordance with our recommendation which indicates that FORCEnet Level 2 is the best value.http://archive.org/details/implicationoffor109456926N

Space as a New Sphere of Future Information Warfare

Air power has seen constant development from the Wright Flyer’s first flight at Kitty Hawk on December 17, 1903 via the advent of the jet age with the service entry of the Messerschmitt Me 262 in 1942, to today’s multirole fighters (F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) and stealth aircraft (B-2 Spirit multi-role bomber). As a result of this evolution of one hundred years air power has emerged as a central component in power projection. As General William Mitchell said: ”Neither armies nor navies can exist unless the air is controlled over them.” (Mitchell 1925, xv)We have witnessed a corresponding development in space, albeit with a lag of nearly sixty years. The first satellite, the Sputnik, went in orbit on October 4, 1957 and the first manned spaceflight was accomplished on April 12, 1961 (by Yuri Gagarin). July 20, 1969 saw the first landing of man on the moon by Neil Armstrong; the first Space Shuttle launch was on April 12, 1981; and the International Space Station (ISS) has remained manned since November 2, 2000. Since 1961, more than 400 men and women have visited the realm of space. General Tommy Franks said:”The pieces of this operation (Iraqi Freedom) which have been successful would not have been so without space-based assets … it’s just simply a fact.”A major ingredient of success in modern warfare is the capability to collect and analyze information and then use it for the execution of command and control. Intelligence, surveillance, command and control, positioning, and targeting systems along with increasingly technical fire systems will have a key role in this area. Deliberate information warfare operations are conducted during times of crisis and war. They are planned based on of information obtained from intelligence and surveillance assets. The aim of the attacker in information operations is to produce a desired effect on targets by means of psychological warfare such as dissemination of information and other psychological operations; by using network attacks and deception along with other forms of information systems warfare; and by employing electronic warfare assets for jamming, and weapons to suppress the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and command and control systems.Space, the electromagnetic spectrum, virtual networks, the psychological domain, and media will occupy central roles in any future information warfare, and all these can be used in both defensive and offensive modes. The foregoing sums up as a concept of global information warfare. We already have space-based C4ISR, targeting, and positioning systems. The successful execution of operations in future wars depends on the gaining and maintaining of space supremacy. Space is in the process of becoming a new dimension in information warfare

A versatile force: the future of Australia's special operations capability

This study aims to provide an understanding of the Australian Defence Force\u27s special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. Summary Over the past decade, the demands of the ADF’s global and regional operations saw an unprecedented growth in Australia’s special operations capability. Indeed, Special Operations Forces became the ‘capability of choice’ for the Australian Government. However, as the ADF enters a period of transition from almost constant high-tempo operations to what might be a ‘soft power decade’, there’s a need to consider the future of the capability. Against this background, this study aims to inform policy decisions by providing an understanding of the special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. It argues against possible temptations to cut the capability. In a changing strategic environment, Special Operations Forces will continue to be an important instrument of Australian defence policy. The study entails a number of concrete policy recommendations to strengthen and readjust the special operations capability for a new era

Knowledge-Intensive Fusion for Situational Awareness: Band Sultan Dam Failure Scenario

This report provides a detailed specification of a humanitarian relief scenario involving significant civil-military cooperation. The scenario aims to highlight some challenges and opportunities for semantic integration and knowledge processing in support of humanitarian relief efforts undertaken against a backdrop of military conflict. The scenario depicts an earthquake and associated flood event occurring in Afghanistan at the time of the US-led coalition effort to displace the former Taliban regime. The flood event occurs as a secondary phenomenon to the earthquake and precipitates a full-scale humanitarian relief effort co-opting the resources of both humanitarian and military agencies. This scenario will serve to showcase the capabilities of the AKTiveSA TDS with respect to enhanced situation awareness and improved information fusion. Such capabilities depend on the ability to exploit multiple sources of information and sophisticated query capabilities in order to expedite the dissemination of relevant information to executive agencies in a timely and appropriate fashion. The scenario narrative draws attention to some of the information requirements demanded by military and humanitarian decision makers in the context of complex emergency situations. It also serves to illustrate the critical knowledge processing capabilities of agents with respect to the assessment of disaster situations and relief effort planning. Finally, the scenario provides an indication of the requirements for visualization and interaction that should be afforded to end-user agents in order to optimise their exploitation of system capabilities. This report also provides background information about the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of humanitarian agencies with respect to disaster relief and reviews guidelines on the nature of civil-military coordination in the context of disaster relief efforts in conflict situations

ADF capability snapshot 2016: C4ISR—winning in the networked battlespace

Overview This paper provides an assessment and overview of the ADF’s command, control, computing, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (known commonly as ‘C4ISR’) capabilities in the context of the ADF’s goal of pursuing a network-centric warfare capability. The paper is the final part of a series of ADF ‘capability snapshots’. The previous three (Navy, Army and Air Force) were released by ASPI in late 2015

Human Factors in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Gaps for Soldiers and Technology Recommendations

Abstract—We investigate the gaps for Soldiers in information collection and resource management for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR comprises the intelligence functions supporting military operations; we concentrate on ISR for physical sensors (air and ground platforms). To identify gaps, we use approaches from Human Factors (interactions between humans and technical systems to optimize human and system performance) at the level of Soldier functions/activities in ISR. Key gaps (e.g., the loud auditory signatures of some air assets, unofficial ISR requests, and unintended battlefield effects) are identified. These gaps illustrate that ISR is not purely a technical problem. Instead, interactions between technical systems, humans, and the environment result in unpredictability and adaptability in using technical systems. To mitigate these gaps, we provide technology recommendations. Keywords—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; ISR; human factors; human-systems integration; cognitive systems engineering; intelligenc