Working the Nexus: Teaching students to think, read and problem-solve like a lawyer

Despite a clear case for thinking skills in legal education, the approach to teaching these skills often appears to be implied in law curricula rather than identified explicitly. Thinking skills could be taught as part of reading law and legal problem solving. However, learning the full suite of thinking skills requires active teaching strategies which go beyond exposing students to the text of the law, and training them in its application by solving problem scenarios. The challenge for law teachers is to articulate how to learn legal thinking skills, and to do so at each level of the degree. This article outlines how the nexus between three component skills: critical legal thinking, reading law, and legal problem solving, can be put to work to provide a cohesive and scaffolded approach to the teaching of legal thinking. Although the approach in this article arises from the Smart Casual project, producing discipline-specific professional development resources directed at sessional teachers in law, we suggest that its application is relevant to all law teachers

The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law

Mutual disdain is an effective border patrol at the demarcation lines between disciplines. Social scientists tend to react with disdain when they observe how their findings are routinely stripped of all the caveats, assumptions and careful limitations once they travel into law. Likewise, lawyers tend to react with disdain when they read all the laborious proofs and checks for what looks to them like a minuscule detail in a much larger picture. But mutual disdain comes at a high price. All cross-border intellectual trade is stifled. This paper explores the social science/law border from the legal side. The natural barriers turn out to be significant, but not insurmountable. Specifically the paper looks at the challenges of integrating rigorous descriptive social science into the application of the law in force by courts and administrative authorities. This is where the gap is most difficult to bridge. The main impediments are implicit value judgments inherent in models, conceptual languages and strictly controlled ways of generating empirical evidence; the difference between explanation, hypothesis testing and prediction, on the one hand, and decision-making, on the other; the ensuing difference between theoretical and practical reasoning, and the judicial tradition of engaging in holistic thinking; last but not least, the strife of the legal system for autonomy, in order to maintain its viability. If a legal academic assumes the position of an outside observer, she may entirely ignore all these concerns and simply follow the methodological standards of descriptive social science. This is, for instance, what most of law and economics does. The legal academic may, instead, choose to contribute to the making of new law. She will then find it advisable to partly ignore the strictures of rigorous methodology in order to be open to more aspects of the regulatory issue. But it is not difficult, at least, to follow the standards of the social sciences for analysing the core problem. The integration is most difficult if an academic does doctrinal work. But it is precisely here where the division of intellectual labour between legal practice and legal academia is most important. Academics who themselves are versatile in the respective social science translate the decisive insights into suggestions for a better reading of statutory provisions or case law.law and economics, law and statistics, explanation vs. decision-making, practical reasoning, psychology of judicial decision-making

Model the System from Adversary Viewpoint: Threats Identification and Modeling

Security attacks are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly and limited details, making it difficult for security experts and for security analysts to create intelligible security specifications. For instance, to explain Why (attack objective), What (i.e., system assets, goals, etc.), and How (attack method), adversary achieved his attack goals. We introduce in this paper a security attack meta-model for our SysML-Sec framework, developed to improve the threat identification and modeling through the explicit representation of security concerns with knowledge representation techniques. Our proposed meta-model enables the specification of these concerns through ontological concepts which define the semantics of the security artifacts and introduced using SysML-Sec diagrams. This meta-model also enables representing the relationships that tie several such concepts together. This representation is then used for reasoning about the knowledge introduced by system designers as well as security experts through the graphical environment of the SysML-Sec framework.Comment: In Proceedings AIDP 2014, arXiv:1410.322

Human Perceptions of Fairness in Algorithmic Decision Making: A Case Study of Criminal Risk Prediction

As algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions that affect human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to predicting risk of criminal recidivism, concerns have been raised about the fairness of algorithmic decision making. Most prior works on algorithmic fairness normatively prescribe how fair decisions ought to be made. In contrast, here, we descriptively survey users for how they perceive and reason about fairness in algorithmic decision making. A key contribution of this work is the framework we propose to understand why people perceive certain features as fair or unfair to be used in algorithms. Our framework identifies eight properties of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, as latent considerations that inform people's moral judgments about the fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We validate our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with 576 people. We find that, based on a person's assessment of the eight latent properties of a feature in our exemplar scenario, we can accurately (> 85%) predict if the person will judge the use of the feature as fair. Our findings have important implications. At a high-level, we show that people's unfairness concerns are multi-dimensional and argue that future studies need to address unfairness concerns beyond discrimination. At a low-level, we find considerable disagreements in people's fairness judgments. We identify root causes of the disagreements, and note possible pathways to resolve them.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the Web Conference (WWW 2018). Code available at https://fate-computing.mpi-sws.org/procedural_fairness

The Developmental Path of the Lawyer

My mother does not drive, and I own a towel that I cannot use-these are my reasons for studying law. I am an integrated tapestry of elation and disappointment, risk and reward, ambiguity and conviction .. .. I discovered [through adversity] that transitional challenges were not permanent impediments to my progress, but were instead emboldening catalysts to my personal evolution and professional development. These two stories come from admissions essays submitted by members of Georgetown University Law Center\u27s class of 2014, recently published in the Law Center\u27s alumni magazine. The published essays provide fascinating views into the personal experiences and deep reflection that lead people to pursue legal studies

And If Your Friends Jumped Off A Bridge, Would You Do It Too? : How Developmental Neuroscience Can Inform Legal Regimes Governing Adolescents

Legal models of adolescent autonomy and responsibility in various domains of law span a spectrum from categorical prohibitions of certain behaviors to recognitions of total adolescent autonomy. The piecemeal approach to the limited decision-making capacity of adolescents lacks an empirical foundation in the differences between adolescent and adult decision-making, leading to counterintuitive and inconsistent legal outcomes. The law limits adolescent autonomy with respect to some decisions that adolescents are perfectly competent to make, and in other areas, the law attributes adult responsibility and imposes adult punishments on adolescents for making decisions that implicate their unique volitional vulnerabilities. As developmental neuroscientists discover more about the biological underpinnings of juvenile decision-making, policymakers now have the opportunity to enhance consistency within and across the legal domains that regulate adolescent behavior. To serve this goal, our paper typologizes extant legal regimes that account for the limitations of adolescent decision making, reviews the neuroscientific evidence about how the brain’s developing structures and functions affect decision making, explores case studies of how certain youth behaviors that implicate the adolescent brain’s unique vulnerabilities intersect with the legal system, and proposes a matrix-based approach for the consistent legal evaluation of adolescent behavior

Retributive Justice: Its Social Context

Until relatively recently, social psychologists have given less attention to retributive justice than to other forms of justice, such as distributive and procedural justice. Although interest in retributive justice is increasing, the fact remains that social psychological research on retribution has tended to ignore, or at least downplay, the insights of sociologists in deference to an approach that examines how individuals respond to deviant acts. Without rejecting psycholgical analyses, this chpater draws attention to the social context and social consequences of retributive justice. Group dynamics are at play in a wide array of settings in which people respond to rule or norm violations, but in this essay I will draw primarily upon more than a quarter century of research, much of it previously unpublished, that examines community reactions to criminal events. However, at the end of the essay I argue that the issues raised by the research can and should be tested in more mundane settings in which rule violations occur

Personality disorder and the law: some awkward questions

This article raises five key problems for the law in its dealings with those with severe personality disorder. These problems are set in the context of a legislative agenda that has embraced the conflicting objectives of rehabilitation and incapacitation, while striving to improve treatment for those with severe personality disorder, and minimizing the risk that they are thought to pose to themselves or others. The problems are examined from the perspectives of legislators, realists, clinicians and courts, empiricists and, finally, normativists; in short, what should the law be doing in this arena? The article concludes by urging a cautionary adherence to issues of legal principle in preference to the, albeit starkly portrayed, alternatives: namely, the seductive attractions of therapeutic intervention, or the destructive effects of indeterminate containment