639 research outputs found
Enabling Privacy-preserving Auctions in Big Data
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many
upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the
characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity,
volume, variety, and veracity, and we believe any auction mechanism design in
the future should take the following factors into consideration: 1) generality
(variety); 2) efficiency and scalability (velocity and volume); 3) truthfulness
and verifiability (veracity). In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
construction for auction mechanism design in the big data, which prevents
adversaries from learning unnecessary information except those implied in the
valid output of the auction. More specifically, we considered one of the most
general form of the auction (to deal with the variety), and greatly improved
the the efficiency and scalability by approximating the NP-hard problems and
avoiding the design based on garbled circuits (to deal with velocity and
volume), and finally prevented stakeholders from lying to each other for their
own benefit (to deal with the veracity). We achieve these by introducing a
novel privacy-preserving winner determination algorithm and a novel payment
mechanism. Additionally, we further employ a blind signature scheme as a
building block to let bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported
by the auctioneer. The comparison with peer work shows that we improve the
asymptotic performance of peer works' overhead from the exponential growth to a
linear growth and from linear growth to a logarithmic growth, which greatly
improves the scalability
Exact algorithms for the matrix bid auction.
In a combinatorial auction, multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. These buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets of the available items. A special kind of combinatorial auction is the so-called matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004). The matrix bid auction imposes restrictions on what a bidder can bid for a subsets of the items. This paper focusses on the winner determination problem, i.e. deciding which bidders should get what items. The winner determination problem of a general combinatorial auction is NP-hard and inapproximable. We discuss the computational complexity of the winner determination problem for a special case of the matrix bid auction. We present two mathematical programming formulations for the general matrix bid auction winner determination problem. Based on one of these formulations, we develop two branch-and-price algorithms to solve the winner determination problem. Finally, we present computational results for these algorithms and compare them with results from a branch-and-cut approach based on Day & Raghavan (2006).Algorithms; Bids; Branch-and-price; Combinatorial auction; Complexity; Computational complexity; Exact algorithm; Mathematical programming; Matrix; Matrix bids; Research; Winner determination;
An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions
Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System
An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions
An auction is combinatorial when bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. Computer scientists are interested in combinatorial auctions because they are concerned with the expressiveness of bidding languages, as well as the algorithmic aspects of the underlying combinatorial problem. The combinatorial problem has attracted attention from operations researchers, especially those working in combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming, who are fascinated by the idea of applying these tools to auctions. Auctions have been studied extensively by economists, of course. Thus, the newly emerging field of combinatorial auctions lies at the intersection of computer science, operations research, and economics. In this article, we present a brief introduction to combinatorial auctions, based on our book, Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press, 2006), in which we look at combinatorial auctions from all three perspectives.Auctions
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