Instability in spatial evolutionary games

We investigate the aspects that influence the instability of spatial evolutionary games, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games. In this paper instability is defined as the proportion of strategy changes in the asymptotic period of the evolutionary process. The results show that with the Prisoner's Dilemma, when the level of noise present in the decision process is very low, the instability decreases as the synchrony rate decreases. With the Snowdrift this pattern of behavior depends strongly on the interaction topology and arises only for random and scale-free networks. However, for large noise values, the instability in both games depends only on the proportion of cooperators present in the population: it increases as the proportion of cooperators approaches 0.5. We advance an explanation for this behavior

Survival of the Fittest and Zero Sum Games

Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to features of quantum computation, in particular conservation laws leading to destructive interference. Compared to an altruistic scenario, competition introduces instability and eliminates the weaker species in a finite time.Comment: 6 pages, formatted according to journal style. Special Issue on Game Theory and Evolutionary Processes. (v2) Published version. Some clarifications added. Topological interpretation pointed ou

Pattern formation for reactive species undergoing anisotropic diffusion

Turing instabilities for a two species reaction-diffusion systems is studied under anisotropic diffusion. More specifically, the diffusion constants which characterize the ability of the species to relocate in space are direction sensitive. Under this working hypothesis, the conditions for the onset of the instability are mathematically derived and numerically validated. Patterns which closely resemble those obtained in the classical context of isotropic diffusion, develop when the usual Turing condition is violated, along one of the two accessible directions of migration. Remarkably, the instability can also set in when the activator diffuses faster than the inhibitor, along the direction for which the usual Turing conditions are not matched

"Stability of Spatial Equilibrium"

This paper focuses on externalities between economic agents. We consider spatial dis- tribution of economic activities in a multiregional dynamical system, where regions may be interpreted as clubs, social subgroups, species, or strategies. Our dynamics includes gravity models and replicator dynamics as special cases. Assuming that other variables, such as prices are solved as a function of the population distribution, we analyze both interior and corner equilibria of spatial distribution in a general class of dynamics, including the replicator dynamics and the gravity model. We derive the exact conditions for stable equilibrium and give some interpretations of the stability conditions. We show that interior equilibria are stable in the presence of strong agglomeration economies, but unstable in the presence of strong congestion diseconomies.

Evolutionary Dynamics of Populations with Conflicting Interactions: Classification and Analytical Treatment Considering Asymmetry and Power

Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination or cooperation of interacting entities will occur, be it spins, particles, bacteria, animals, or humans. Here, we analyze the case, where the entities are heterogeneous, particularly the case of two populations with conflicting interactions and two possible states. For such systems, explicit mathematical formulas will be determined for the stationary solutions and the associated eigenvalues, which determine their stability. In this way, four different types of system dynamics can be classified, and the various kinds of phase transitions between them will be discussed. While these results are interesting from a physics point of view, they are also relevant for social, economic, and biological systems, as they allow one to understand conditions for (1) the breakdown of cooperation, (2) the coexistence of different behaviors ("subcultures"), (2) the evolution of commonly shared behaviors ("norms"), and (4) the occurrence of polarization or conflict. We point out that norms have a similar function in social systems that forces have in physics