The journey from citizen to councillor: a report on newly elected councillors in Victoria

In 2013, the VLGA initiated a research project to elicit the experiences of newly-elected councillors. It was prompted by anecdotal evidence which suggested that some aspects of the transition, from citizen to councillor, posed particular difficulties and challenges. This report provides some insight into the experience of newly-elected  councillors. This includes the reasons for standing for council, their  relationship with the local community and with fellow councillors, the  information needed to work effectively, the rewards and the challenges.  The research project had two components. First, a literature review was  prepared with the support of the Australian Centre for Excellence in Local  Government Research (ACELG); this review confirmed a lack of empirical  data about the specific experience of new councillors and suggested it an  area worthy of local investigation (UTS, 2013). It also guided the design of  the surveys, which formed the second component of the project. Two surveys were conducted by the VLGA. The first was a quantitative survey conducted over December 2013-January 2014. The voluntary, online survey captured the views of 62 respondents (a response rate of 23%); women and men were equally represented. Between them, the respondents represented  41 different councils across the State (52% of all councils); 6 regional (60%  of regional councils); 19 metropolitan (61% of metropolitan councils); and 16  rural (42% of rural councils).  The second was a set of open-ended interviews of 12 people (March 2014);  these were conducted over the phone and, on average, took 45 minutes to  complete. Most of the quotations which follow are derived from those  conversations. Together, the surveys explored the expectations and experiences of first-time  councillors, particularly their perceptions of the role and the challenges of  meeting their own expectations and those of their community. The design of  the qualitative phase was informed by the outcomes of the online survey and  allowed some themes to be explored in greater depth.  &nbsp

Russia's soft and sharp power in southeast Europe — the Russian hybrid influence operation in Montenegro

This is a chapter published in a conference publication that was written within the framework of the project “Reality Check Series: Sources, Tools, and Impact of External Non-EU-Engagement in Southeast Europe.” The project was led by the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (SOG) with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office (Stability Pact for Southeast Europe sponsored by Germany).Whether its role is described as spoiler or opportunist, the Kremlin strategy in the Balkans is to drag its rivals’ involvement down to a level that would make countries of the region subjects to Moscow’s interference. Not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, burdened with endemic corruption, suffering from a democratic deficit, ethnic tensions, and protracted bilateral disputes, the Western Balkans’ countries are an ideal target for Russia. Preventive operations often seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance. The coup attempt in Montenegro, in October 2016, is a good example of the Russian hybrid influence operations in the Balkans. The goal of Moscow was to prevent NATO membership of the country. To prove it, this work focuses on Moscow’s attempts to influence Montenegro prior to the coup attempt.The paper argues that the coup plot in Montenegro is the culmination of more than a two-years long hybrid influence operation. This includes a) Russian attempts to influence Montenegro through economic means; b) Moscow’s effort to establish a lasting naval (military) presence in Montenegro; c) The intensive media campaign; d) Deepening Russia’s influence on pro-Russian Serbian nationalists in Montenegro and open political and financial support for their activities. When overt means of influence appear to have been inefficient, a covert operation looks like a viable option. That’s what happened in Montenegro.Accepted manuscrip

FISA Reform

Congress and the Executive Branch are poised to take up the issue of FISA reform in 2014. What has been missing from the discussion is a comprehensive view of ways in which reform could be given effect—i.e., a taxonomy of potential options. This article seeks to fill the gap. The aim is to deepen the conversation about abeyant approaches to foreign intelligence gathering, to allow fuller discussion of what a comprehensive package could contain, and to place initiatives that are currently under consideration within a broader, over-arching framework. The article begins by considering the legal underpinnings and challenges to the President\u27s Surveillance Program. It then examines how technology has altered the types of information available, as well as methods of transmission and storage. The article builds on this to develop a taxonomy for how a statutory approach to foreign intelligence gathering could be given force. It divides foreign intelligence gathering into two categories: front-end collection and back-end analysis and use. Each category contains a counterpoise structured to ensure the appropriate exercise of Congressionally-mandated authorities. For the front-end, this means balancing the manner of collection with requirements for approval. For the back-end, this means offsetting implementation with transparency and oversight. The article then considers the constituent parts of each category

Research, Analysis and Insight into National Standards (RAINS) Project. Second Report: Understanding New Zealand’s Very Local National Standards

This is the second report of the Research, Analysis and Insight into National Standards (RAINS) project, a three-year study of the introduction of National Standards into New Zealand primary and intermediate schools

Assessing New York City's Youth Gun Violence Crisis: Crews - Volume I - Defining the Problem: Crews and Gun Violence

The success or failure of community strategies to address the youth gun violence crisis is often attributed in part to how well the problem is understood and diagnosed. With support from The New York Community Trust, the Crime Commission has undertaken an analysis of youth gun violence and crew activity -- violent turf rivalries among less-organized, smaller and normally younger groups than traditional gangs -- in select New York City communities. Our initial findings from available data, existing research and interviews with stakeholders are presented in a series of papers titled, Assessing New York City's Youth Gun Violence Crisis: Crews

Managing Ethnic Conflict in Darfur: An Analysis of Third-Party Interventions

Persistent ethnic conflict in Darfur has been met by third-party interventions with varying degrees of success. This paper seeks to isolate different methods of intervention in order to understand what types are effective in reducing the number of people affected by violence caused by ethnic conflict. Each intervention is separated into three categories based on their nature: humanitarian, militaristic, and diplomatic. These actions are then juxtaposed with data from medical journals that describe the effects of violence, including death by violence, death by disease, and child mortality rates. The success of an intervention is measured by its ability to reduce the number of people negatively affected by the violence. This analysis suggests that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while humanitarian and diplomatic interventions produce ambiguous results. The results are significant in their ability to shed light on effective methods by which to alleviate one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century

Tackling Ultra-Poverty Through the Graduation Approach: Situating Sustainable Livelihoods in the Landscape of Social Protection and Safety Nets

BRAC was founded in Bangladesh in 1972 and now works in nine other countries with very impoverished populations: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Philippines, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia. From its years of experience designing and implementing microfinance and other programs, BRAC gained the insight that a unique set of interventions is required to bring out of extreme poverty those who they, and now others, call the "ultra-poor": people living on half or less of a US $1.25-a-day poverty threshold. BRAC pioneered the approach in 2002 by combining social safety nets with support for income-generating, and named it the Graduation approach, or Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP) program. Graduation programs complement small cash stipends and in-kind asset transfers with several other sequenced interventions including savings, training, social integration and health care services. Over the last decade the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Ford Foundation, and other donors have supported ten pilots across different continents which have been carefully analyzed, and in which over 75% of participants have met Graduation requirements. This paper summarizes the landscape and institutional context within which the Targeting the Ultra-poor program sits, in order to help BRAC and other organizations to expand its scale and encourage others to support and adopt this approach, thereby helping an additional one million families graduate from ultra-poverty by 2020

National Security Space Launch

The United States Space Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, formerly known as the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, was first established in 1994 by President William J. Clinton’s National Space Transportation Policy. The policy assigned the responsibility for expendable launch vehicles to the Department of Defense (DoD), with the goals of lowering launch costs and ensuring national security access to space. As such, the United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) started the EELV program to acquire more affordable and reliable launch capability for valuable U.S. military satellites, such as national reconnaissance satellites that cost billions per satellite. In March 2019, the program name was changed from EELV to NSSL, which reflected several important features: 1.) The emphasis on “assured access to space,” 2.) transition from the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine used on the Atlas V to a US-sourced engine (now scheduled to be complete by 2022), 3.) adaptation to manifest changes (such as enabling satellite swaps and return of manifest to normal operations both within 12 months of a need or an anomaly), and 4.) potential use of reusable launch vehicles. As of August 2019, Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA) have all submitted proposals. From these, the U.S. Air Force will be selecting two companies to fulfill approximately 34 launches over a period of five years, beginning in 2022. This paper will therefore first examine the objectives for the NSSL as presented in the 2017 National Security Strategy, Fiscal Year 2019, Fiscal Year 2020, and Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA), and National Presidential Directive No. 40. The paper will then identify areas of potential weakness and gaps that exist in space launch programs as a whole and explore the security implications that impact the NSSL specifically. Finally, the paper will examine how the trajectory of the NSSL program could be adjusted in order to facilitate a smooth transition into new launch vehicles, while maintaining mission success, minimizing national security vulnerabilities, and clarifying the defense acquisition process.No embargoAcademic Major: EnglishAcademic Major: International Studie