Being : a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger

In my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality, and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger, nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well. Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism 2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second Heidegger

Intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā

The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that ‘there are things that do not exist’. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul. Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality. Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul’s action of creating mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical. Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation.the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turke