URDP: General Framework for Direct CCA2 Security from any Lattice-Based PKE Scheme

Design efficient lattice-based cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is a challenge problem. To the date, full CCA2-security of all proposed lattice-based PKE schemes achieved by using a generic transformations such as either strongly unforgeable one-time signature schemes (SU-OT-SS), or a message authentication code (MAC) and weak form of commitment. The drawback of these schemes is that encryption requires "separate encryption". Therefore, the resulting encryption scheme is not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice and it is inappropriate for many applications such as small ubiquitous computing devices with limited resources such as smart cards, active RFID tags, wireless sensor networks and other embedded devices. In this work, for the first time, we introduce an efficient universal random data padding (URDP) scheme, and show how it can be used to construct a "direct" CCA2-secure encryption scheme from "any" worst-case hardness problems in (ideal) lattice in the standard model, resolving a problem that has remained open till date. This novel approach is a "black-box" construction and leads to the elimination of separate encryption, as it avoids using general transformation from CPA-secure scheme to a CCA2-secure one. IND-CCA2 security of this scheme can be tightly reduced in the standard model to the assumption that the underlying primitive is an one-way trapdoor function.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1302.0347, arXiv:1211.6984; and with arXiv:1205.5224 by other author

Classical Verification of Quantum Computations

We present the first protocol allowing a classical computer to interactively verify the result of an efficient quantum computation. We achieve this by constructing a measurement protocol, which enables a classical verifier to use a quantum prover as a trusted measurement device. The protocol forces the prover to behave as follows: the prover must construct an n qubit state of his choice, measure each qubit in the Hadamard or standard basis as directed by the verifier, and report the measurement results to the verifier. The soundness of this protocol is enforced based on the assumption that the learning with errors problem is computationally intractable for efficient quantum machines

Multilinear Maps in Cryptography

Multilineare Abbildungen spielen in der modernen Kryptographie eine immer bedeutendere Rolle. In dieser Arbeit wird auf die Konstruktion, Anwendung und Verbesserung von multilinearen Abbildungen eingegangen

Chosen-ciphertext security from subset sum

We construct a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of the Subset Sum problem. Our scheme achieves the standard notion of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) and can be used to encrypt messages of arbitrary polynomial length, improving upon a previous construction by Lyubashevsky, Palacio, and Segev (TCC 2010) which achieved only the weaker notion of semantic security (IND-CPA) and whose concrete security decreases with the length of the message being encrypted. At the core of our construction is a trapdoor technique which originates in the work of Micciancio and Peikert (Eurocrypt 2012

A Cryptographic Test of Quantumness and Certifiable Randomness from a Single Quantum Device

We give a protocol for producing certifiable randomness from a single untrusted quantum device that is polynomial-time bounded. The randomness is certified to be statistically close to uniform from the point of view of any computationally unbounded quantum adversary, that may share entanglement with the quantum device. The protocol relies on the existence of post-quantum secure trapdoor claw-free functions, and introduces a new primitive for constraining the power of an untrusted quantum device. We then show how to construct this primitive based on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem. The randomness protocol can also be used as the basis for an efficiently verifiable "quantum supremacy" proposal, thus answering an outstanding challenge in the field

Cryptography based on the Hardness of Decoding

This thesis provides progress in the fields of for lattice and coding based cryptography. The first contribution consists of constructions of IND-CCA2 secure public key cryptosystems from both the McEliece and the low noise learning parity with noise assumption. The second contribution is a novel instantiation of the lattice-based learning with errors problem which uses uniform errors

A Cryptographic Test of Quantumness and Certifiable Randomness from a Single Quantum Device

We give a protocol for producing certifiable randomness from a single untrusted quantum device that is polynomial-time bounded. The randomness is certified to be statistically close to uniform from the point of view of any computationally unbounded quantum adversary, that may share entanglement with the quantum device. The protocol relies on the existence of post-quantum secure trapdoor claw-free functions, and introduces a new primitive for constraining the power of an untrusted quantum device. We show how to construct this primitive based on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem, and prove that it has a crucial adaptive hardcore bit property. The randomness protocol can be used as the basis for an efficiently verifiable "test of quantumness", thus answering an outstanding challenge in the field.Comment: 45 page

Classical Verification of Quantum Computations

We present the first protocol allowing a classical computer to interactively verify the result of an efficient quantum computation. We achieve this by constructing a measurement protocol, which enables a classical verifier to use a quantum prover as a trusted measurement device. The protocol forces the prover to behave as follows: the prover must construct an n qubit state of his choice, measure each qubit in the Hadamard or standard basis as directed by the verifier, and report the measurement results to the verifier. The soundness of this protocol is enforced based on the assumption that the learning with errors problem is computationally intractable for efficient quantum machines

How to Watermark Cryptographic Functions

We introduce a notion of watermarking for cryptographic functions and propose a concrete scheme for watermarking cryptographic functions. Informally speaking, a digital watermarking scheme for cryptographic functions embeds information, called a \textit{mark}, into functions such as one-way functions and decryption functions of public-key encryption. There are two basic requirements for watermarking schemes. (1) A mark-embedded function must be functionally equivalent to the original function. (2) It must be difficult for adversaries to remove the embedded mark without damaging the original functionality. In spite of its importance and usefulness, there have only been a few theoretical works on watermarking for functions (or programs). Furthermore, we do not have rigorous definitions of watermarking for cryptographic functions and concrete constructions. To solve the above problem, we introduce a notion of watermarking for cryptographic functions and define its security. Furthermore, we present a lossy trapdoor function (LTF) based on the decisional linear (DLIN) problem and a watermarking scheme for the LTF. Our watermarking scheme is secure under the DLIN assumption in the standard model. We use techniques of dual system encryption and dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) to construct our watermarking scheme. This is a new application of DPVS. Our watermarking for cryptographic functions is a generalized notion of copyrighted functions introduced by Naccache, Shamir, and Stern (PKC 1999) and our scheme is based on an identity-based encryption scheme whose private keys for identities (i.e., decryption functions) are marked, so our technique can be used to construct black-box traitor tracing schemes