Inherent Game Characteristics of Electronic Negotiations

Negotiation activities have often been referred to as a game. For example, negotiators dance around each other, play with different strategies, follow rules and protocols, decide on particular moves from a set of alternatives, and try to achieve the ultimate goal of agreement. This paper presents the results of an explorative literature study examining the inherent game characteristics of electronic negotiations. To consider the context of information system explicitly, we analyse e-negotiations conducted in negotiation support systems. Our results reveal among others a strong social interaction element, various levels of difficulties and challenges, different activity choices that may lead to the same goal and continual feedback during these activities. With respect to current IS trends such as serious games and gamification, these identified game characteristics may serve as a basis for a gamified negotiation support system

The Political Economy of Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Institutional Choice in Trade and Taxation

Trade relations are governed by the multilateral GATT, whereas the avoidance of international double taxation rests on a network of around 2000 bilateral treaties. Given the two regimes’ similar economic rationales this difference between bilateralism in international double tax avoidance and multilateralism in the trade regime poses an empirical puzzle. In this paper we develop an answer to this puzzle. Differentiating between different stages of international cooperation, we first describe the institutional form in the bargaining and agreement stages of cooperation. This description shows that the regimes are quite similar in the bargaining stage, both exhibiting a mix of bilateral and multilateral bargaining. However, while agreement is multilateral in the trade regime it is bilateral in taxation. Based on stylized institutional histories of both cases we develop simple game theoretic models incorporating domestic level considerations. Building on these models we then go on to explain the institutional choice between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We show that state concerns for the distribution of benefits can be best achieved under bilateral bargaining in both regimes. However, in order to lower transaction costs there are also elements of multilateral bargaining. Agreement is multilateral in trade in order to overcome a free-rider problem that results from an interaction of concerns for distribution and enforcement. Since such a problem of free-riding does not exist in taxation, there is no need for binding multilateral agreement.Theories of International Cooperation; International Trade; International Double Taxation; Bilateralism; Multilateralism

The political economy of bilateralism and multilateralism: Institutional choice in international trade and taxation

Trade relations are governed by the multilateral GATT, whereas the avoidance of international double taxation rests on a network of around 2000 bilateral treaties. Given the two regimes similar economic rationales this difference between bilateralism in international double tax avoidance and multilateralism in the trade regime poses an empirical puzzle. In this paper we develop an answer to this puzzle. Differentiating between different stages of international cooperation, we first describe the institutional form in the bargaining and agreement stages of cooperation. This description shows that the regimes are quite similar in the bargaining stage, both exhibiting a mix of bilateral and multilateral bargaining. However, while agreement is multilateral in the trade regime it is bilateral in taxation. Based on stylized institutional histories of both cases we develop simple game theoretic models incorporating domestic level considerations. Building on these models we then go on to explain the institutional choice between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We show that state concerns for the distribution of benefits can be best achieved under bilateral bargaining in both regimes. However, in order to lower transaction costs there are also elements of multilateral bargaining. Agreement is multilateral in trade in order to overcome a free-rider problem that results from an interaction of concerns for distribution and enforcement. Since such a problem of free-riding does not exist in taxation, there is no need for binding multilateral agreement. -- Während Handelsbeziehungen durch das multilaterale GATT geregelt werden, beruht die Vermeidung internationaler Doppelbesteuerung auf einem Netzwerk von etwa 2000 bilateralen Verträgen. Da beide Regime die gleiche ökonomische Zielsetzung der Marktliberalisierung haben, stellt die unterschiedliche institutionelle Form ein empirisches Puzzle dar, das wir in diesem Papier lösen. Wir unterscheiden zwischen verschiedenen Phasen internationaler Kooperation und beschreiben zunächst die institutionelle Form in der Bargaining- und Agreement-Phase. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Systeme in der Bargaining-Phase sehr ähnlich sind: beide weisen einen Mix bilateraler und multilateraler Elemente auf. In der Agreement-Phase hingegen findet man Multilateralismus im Handelsregime und Bilateralismus im Steuerregime. Im zweiten Teil des Papiers leiten wir aus den nationalen Interessenkonstellationen in der Handels- und Steuerpolitik einfache spieltheoretische Modelle ab, mit deren Hilfe wir die institutionelle Wahl zwischen bilateraler und multilateraler Kooperation in beiden Phasen erklären. Wir zeigen, dass Staaten nach Verteilungsgewinnen streben, was am besten in bilateralen Verhandlungen erreicht werden kann. Bilaterales Verhandeln führt jedoch zu hohen Transaktionskosten, die durch multilaterale Elemente in den Verhandlungen reduziert werden können (Bargaining-Phase). Abkommen in Handelsbeziehungen sind multilateral, um ein free-riding zu vermeiden, das wiederum aus dem Streben nach Verteilungsgewinnen resultiert. Da free-riding im Steuerregime aufgrund der Spielstruktur kein gravierendes Problem ist, gibt es hier keine Notwendigkeit eines multilateralen Abkommens, so dass man hier Bilateralismus vorfindet (Agreement-Phase).

Compensation is All-American: Former College Football Star Chris Spielman’s Case Against His Alma Mater and How it Could Affect the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules

The lawsuit, Spielman v. IMG College, arose when Ohio State University (“OSU”) entered into a marketing deal through their marketing agency, IMG College (“IMG”), with corporations Honda Motor Co. (“Honda”) and Nike USA Inc. (“Nike”), to hang banners depicting images of former college athletes at school sporting events. Charles “Chris” Spielman, the named Plaintiff and former NCAA football player at OSU, brought this lawsuit because he claims that OSU and IMG unreasonably and illegally restrained trade by denying him the right to profit from his name, image, and likeness. This case plays a role in the ongoing conversation of whether NCAA athletes should be able to receive monetary compensation for their contributions to amateur athletics. Spielman alleges in his Complaint that the actions of OSU and IMG are contrary to a decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject to antitrust scrutiny. A decision in this case has the potential to have a major effect on the current form of the NCAA

Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach

"We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments' objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain." from authors' abstractTrade negotiations, Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling, Nash solution, Side payments, Cooperative games, Globalization, Markets, Doha Development Agenda,

Is Dual Agency in Real Estate Transactions a Cause for Concern?

We study dual agency in residential real estate, where the same agent/agency represents both the buyer and seller. We assess the extent to which dual agency suffers from an inherent conflict of interest, where the dual agent furthers the interest of one client at the expense of the other client’s, as well as principal-agent incentive misalignment where the agent furthers her own interest at the expense of one or both clients. And, we examine how these incentive conflicts affect agent behavior and transaction outcomes. To do so, we analyze 10,891 residential real estate transactions in Long Island, NY, from 2004- 2007. Specifically, we (i) identify how dual agency is correlated with house prices and time-to-sale, (ii) describe and assess agent behaviors that could generate these correlations, and (iii) provide some intuition as to the economic effects of prohibiting dual agency in real estate transactions. We find that the incidence of dual agency is uncorrelated with sale price and negatively correlated with time-to-sale. However, on very fast deals, list prices and sale prices are significantly higher on houses sold via dual agency. These findings are consistent with first-resort selling (agents first showing houses to in-house buyer clients) and strategic pricing (agents inducing their seller clients to set a higher list price in anticipation of an internal client agreeing to it) on some deals, in conjunction with agents leaning on sellers to accept a lower sale price on other deals. First-resort selling is indicative of incentive misalignment, while the latter two behaviors reflect a conflict of interest: strategic pricing transfers surplus from the buyer to the seller, and leaning on the seller transfers surplus from the seller to the buyer. Further, our results indicate little difference between dual-agent (same agent) and within-agency (same agency, but different agent) deals. Our findings provide some evidence of distorted outcomes associated with dual agency, mainly on fast deals, but the evidence indicates mild overall effects, suggesting that prohibiting the practice is not likely to substantially increase welfare.

Reallocation Problems in Agent Societies: A Local Mechanism to Maximize Social Welfare

Resource reallocation problems are common in real life and therefore gain an increasing interest in Computer Science and Economics. Such problems consider agents living in a society and negotiating their resources with each other in order to improve the welfare of the population. In many studies however, the unrealistic context considered, where agents have a flawless knowledge and unlimited interaction abilities, impedes the application of these techniques in real life problematics. In this paper, we study how agents should behave in order to maximize the welfare of the society. We propose a multi-agent method based on autonomous agents endowed with a local knowledge and local interactions. Our approach features a more realistic environment based on social networks, inside which we provide the behavior for the agents and the negotiation settings required for them to lead the negotiation processes towards socially optimal allocations. We prove that bilateral transactions of restricted cardinality are sufficient in practice to converge towards an optimal solution for different social objectives. An experimental study supports our claims and highlights the impact of a realistic environment on the efficiency of the techniques utilized.Resource Allocation, Negotiation, Social Welfare, Agent Society, Behavior, Emergence

Research on joint ventures in China: progress and prognosis

Previous published studies on international joint ventures (JVs) in China are reviewed and assessed by summarising important research patterns. A model of management of international JVs in China is developed which emphasises the central theme of cross-cultural management. Dimensions in research on international JVs in China and directions for future research are also discussed

Autonomous Agents for Business Process Management

Traditional approaches to managing business processes are often inadequate for large-scale organisation-wide, dynamic settings. However, since Internet and Intranet technologies have become widespread, an increasing number of business processes exhibit these properties. Therefore, a new approach is needed. To this end, we describe the motivation, conceptualization, design, and implementation of a novel agent-based business process management system. The key advance of our system is that responsibility for enacting various components of the business process is delegated to a number of autonomous problem solving agents. To enact their role, these agents typically interact and negotiate with other agents in order to coordinate their actions and to buy in the services they require. This approach leads to a system that is significantly more agile and robust than its traditional counterparts. To help demonstrate these benefits, a companion paper describes the application of our system to a real-world problem faced by British Telecom