Trade Facilitation in Asia and the Pacific: Which Policies and Measures affect Trade Costs the Most?

This paper presents findings from an initial analysis of new non-tariff trade cost estimates and their determinants, based on a bilateral database of comprehensive trade cost maintained by ESCAP. Results of the non-tariff policy-related trade costs modeling exercise strongly suggest that improving port efficiency (liner shipping connectivity) and access to information and communication technology facilities is essential to reducing trade costs.trade facilitation, trade costs, measures, policy, tariff, non-tariff, port efficiency, liner shipping connectivity, logistics, information and communication technology, information technology, public-private partnership, business environment, ASEAN, China, India, Japan, Korea

Improving information/disturbance and estimation/distortion trade-offs with non universal protocols

We analyze in details a conditional measurement scheme based on linear optical components, feed-forward loop and homodyne detection. The scheme may be used to achieve two different tasks. On the one hand it allows the extraction of information with minimum disturbance about a set of coherent states. On the other hand, it represents a nondemolitive measurement scheme for the annihilation operator, i.e. an indirect measurement of the Q-function. We investigate the information/disturbance trade-off for state inference and introduce the estimation/distortion trade-off to assess estimation of the Q-function. For coherent states chosen from a Gaussian set we evaluate both information/disturbance and estimation/distortion trade-offs and found that non universal protocols may be optimized in order to achieve better performances than universal ones. For Fock number states we prove that universal protocols do not exist and evaluate the estimation/distortion trade-off for a thermal distribution.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures; published versio

Market based compensation, price informativeness and short-term trading

This paper shows that there is a natural trade-off when designing market based executive compensation. The benefit of market based pay is that the stock price aggregates speculators’ dispersed information and there-fore takes a picture of managerial performance before the long-term value of a firm materializes. The cost is that informed speculators’ willingness to trade depends on trading that is unrelated to any information about the firm. Ideally, the CEO should be shielded from shocks that are not informative about his actions. But since information trading is impossible without non- nformation trading (due to the ”no-trade” theorem), shocks to prices caused by the latter are an unavoidable cost of market based pay. This trade-off generates a number of insights about the impact of market conditions, e.g. liquidity and trading horizons, on optimal market based pay. A more liquid market leads to more market based pay while short-term trading makes it more costly to provide such incentives leading to lower CEO effort and worse firm performance on average. The model is consistent with recent evidence showing that market based CEO incentives vary with market conditions, e.g. bid-ask spreads, the probability of informed trading (PIN) or the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. JEL Classification: G39, D86, D82Executive compensation, liquidity, Moral Hazard, stock price informativeness, trading

A Market-based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling

In this paper, we report on the design of a novel market-based approach for decentralised scheduling across multiple factories. Specifically, because of the limitations of scheduling in a centralised manner -- which requires a center to have complete and perfect information for optimality and the truthful revelation of potentially commercially private preferences to that center -- we advocate an informationally decentralised approach that is both agile and dynamic. In particular, this work adopts a market-based approach for decentralised scheduling by considering the different stakeholders representing different factories as self-interested, profit-motivated economic agents that trade resources for the scheduling of jobs. The overall schedule of these jobs is then an emergent behaviour of the strategic interaction of these trading agents bidding for resources in a market based on limited information and their own preferences. Using a simple (zero-intelligence) bidding strategy, we empirically demonstrate that our market-based approach achieves a lower bound efficiency of 84%. This represents a trade-off between a reasonable level of efficiency (compared to a centralised approach) and the desirable benefits of a decentralised solution

Does the information environment affect the value relevance of financial statement data?

Recent studies demonstrate that the usefulness of financial statement data for valuation of stocks varies depending on specific economy- and firm-level conditions. This empirical study identifies a novel firm-level influential condition. It hypothesizes and finds that for firms that trade at a premium to book value the value-relevance of two fundamental financial statement value drivers (i.e. earnings and book value), is negatively related to the level of sophistication of the firm's information environment. However, for firms that trade at a discount to book value, the level of sophistication of information environment does not affect the value-relevance of these financial statement value drivers. The level of complexity of the firm's information environment is proxied by the firm's capitalized value. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of nonfinancial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange