63 research outputs found
Long Response to Scheuer-Yariv: "A Classical Key-Distribution System based on Johnson (like) noise - How Secure?", physics/0601022
This is the longer (partially unpublished) version of response; the shorter
version (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605013) is published in Physics Letters
A. We point out that the claims in the comment-paper of Scheuer and Yariv are
either irrelevant or incorrect. We first clarify what the security of a
physically secure layer means. The idealized Kirchoff-loop-Johnson-like-noise
(KLJN) scheme is totally secure therefore it is more secure than idealized
quantum communication schemes which can never be totally secure because of the
inherent noise processes in those communication schemes and the statistical
nature of eavesdropper detection based on error statistics. On the other hand,
with sufficient resources, a practical/non-ideal realization of the KLJN cipher
can arbitrarily approach the idealized limit and outperform even the idealized
quantum communicator schemes because the non-ideality-effects are determined
and controlled by the design. The cable resistance issue analyzed by Scheuer
and Yariv is a good example for that because the eavesdropper has insufficient
time window to build a sufficient statistics and the actual information leak
can be designed. We show that Scheuer's and Yariv's numerical result of 1%
voltage drop supports higher security than that of quantum communicators.
Moreover, choosing thicker or shorter wires can arbitrarily reduce this voltage
drop further; the same conclusion holds even according to the equations of
Scheuer and Yariv.Comment: The older long response and the newer brief response (in press, PLA)
with modelling data are fuse
Johnson(-like)-Noise-Kirchhoff-Loop Based Secure Classical Communicator Characteristics, for Ranges of Two to Two Thousand Kilometers, via Model-Line
A pair of Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise communicators, which is able to
work over variable ranges, was designed and built. Tests have been carried out
on a model-line performance characteristics were obtained for ranges beyond the
ranges of any known direct quantum communication channel and they indicate
unrivalled signal fidelity and security performance of the exchanged raw key
bits. This simple device has single-wire secure key generation and sharing
rates of 0.1, 1, 10, and 100 bit/second for corresponding copper wire
diameters/ranges of 21 mm / 2000 km, 7 mm / 200 km, 2.3 mm / 20 km, and 0.7 mm
/ 2 km, respectively and it performs with 0.02% raw-bit error rate (99.98 %
fidelity). The raw-bit security of this practical system significantly
outperforms raw-bit quantum security. Current injection breaking tests show
zero bit eavesdropping ability without triggering the alarm signal, therefore
no multiple measurements are needed to build an error statistics to detect the
eavesdropping as in quantum communication. Wire resistance based breaking tests
of Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv type give an upper limit of eavesdropped raw bit ratio
of 0.19 % and this limit is inversely proportional to the sixth power of cable
diameter. Hao's breaking method yields zero (below measurement resolution)
eavesdropping information.Comment: Featured in New Scientist, Jason Palmer, May 23, 2007.
http://www.ece.tamu.edu/%7Enoise/news_files/KLJN_New_Scientist.pdf
Corresponding Plenary Talk at the 4th International Symposium on Fluctuation
and Noise, Florence, Italy (May 23, 2007
Computing vs. Genetics
This chapter first presents the interrelations between computing and genetics, which both are based on information and, particularly, self-reproducing artificial systems. It goes on to examine genetic code from a computational viewpoint. This raises a number of important questions about genetic code. These questions are stated in the form of an as yet unpublished working hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that many genetic alterations are caused by the last base of certain codons. If this conclusive hypothesis were to be confirmed through experiementation if would be a significant advance for treating many genetic diseases
AI Resistant (AIR) Cryptography
highlighting a looming cyber threat emanating from fast developing artificial intelligence. This strategic threat is further magnified with the advent of quantum computers. AI and quantum-AI (QAI) represent a totally new and effective vector of cryptanalytic attack. Much as modern AI successfully completes browser search phrases, so it is increasingly capable of guessing a rather narrow a-priori list of plausible plaintexts. This guessing is most effective over device cryptography where the message space is limited. Matching these guesses with the captured ciphertext will greatly accelerate the code breaking process. We never faced such a plaintext-originated attack on a strategic level, and never had to prepare for it. Now we do. Proposing to apply a well-known martial art tactics: using the opponent\u27s strength against them: constructing ciphertexts that would provide false answers to the AI attacker and lead them astray. We are achieving this defensive measure by pivoting away from the norm of small, known-size key and pattern-loaded ciphers. Using instead large keys of secret size, augmented with ad-hoc unilateral randomness of unbound limits, and deploying a pattern-devoid algorithm with a remarkably low computational burden, so it can easily handle very large keys. Thereby we achieve large as desired unicity distances. This strategy has become feasible just when the AI threat looms. It exploits three new technologies coming together: (i) non-algorithmic randomness, (ii) very large and inexpensive memory chips, and (iii) high throughout communication networks. These pattern-devoid, randomness rich ciphers also turn up to be an important option in the toolbox NIST prepares to meet the quantum challenge. Avoiding the computational load of mainstay ciphers, AIR-cryptography presents itself as the ciphers of choice for medical, military and other battery-limited devices for which data security is paramount. In summary: we are pointing out a fast emerging cyber challenges, and laying out a matching cryptographic answer
New Key Expansion Function of Rijndael 128-Bit Resistance to The Related-Key Attacks
A master key of special length is manipulated based on the key schedule to create round sub-keys in most block ciphers. A strong key schedule is described as a cipher that will be more resistant to various forms of attacks, especially in related-key model attacks. Rijndael is the most common block cipher, and it was adopted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, USA in 2001 as an Advance Encryption Standard. However, a few studies on cryptanalysis revealed that a security weakness of Rijndael refers to its vulnerability to related-key differential attack as well as the related-key boomerang attack, which is mainly caused by the lack of nonlinearity in the key schedule of Rijndael. In relation to this, constructing a key schedule that is both efficient and provably secure has been an ongoing open problem. Hence, this paper presents a method to improve the key schedule of Rijndael 128-bit for the purpose of making it more resistance to the related-key differential and boomerang attacks. In this study, two statistical tests, namely the Frequency test and the Strict Avalanche Criterion test were employed to respectively evaluate the properties of bit confusion and bit diffusion. The results showed that the proposed key expansion function has excellent statistical properties and agrees with the concept of Shannons diffusion and confusion bits. Meanwhile, the Mixed Integer Linear Programming based approach was adopted to evaluate the resistance of the proposed approach towards the related-key differential and boomerang attacks. The proposed approach was also found to be resistant against the two attacks discovered in the original Rijndael. Overall, these results proved that the proposed approach is able to perform better compared to the original Rijndael key expansion function and that of the previous research
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