Financial market integration under EMU

The single most important policy-induced innovation in the international financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime is the institution of the European Monetary Union. This paper provides an account of how the process of financial integration has promoted financial development in the euro area. It starts by defining financial integration and how to measure it, analyzes the barriers that can prevent it and the effects of their removal on financial markets, and assesses whether the euro area has actually become more integrated. It then explores to which extent these changes in financial markets have influenced the performance of the euro-area economy, that is, its growth and investment, as well as its ability to adjust to shocks and to allow risk-sharing. The paper concludes analyzing further steps that are required to consolidate financial integration and enhance the future stability of financial markets

Financial Market Integration under EMU

The European Monetary Union (EMU) has been the single most important policy-induced innovation in the international financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. By eliminating exchange rate risk, EMU has eliminated a key obstacle to financial integration. But while a single currency is a necessary condition for the emergence of pan-European capital markets, it is not a sufficient one. Other frictions may still stand in the way of full integration: persistent differences in regulations applying to financial intermediaries, tax treatment, standard contractual clauses and business conventions, issuance policy, security trading systems, settlement systems, availability of information, and judicial enforcement may still segment financial markets along national borders. In the process that preceded and accompanied the introduction of the euro, however, monetary unification triggered a sequence of policy actions and private sector responses that swept aside many other regulatory barriers to financial integration. To what extent has this process of regulatory reform led to actual financial integration? And if European financial markets have actually become more integrated, to what extent have these changes spurred growth and investment in Europe? Will financial integration affect also the ability of households to shoulder risks, or the ability of European economies to adjust to macroeconomic shocks? Which policy lessons can we draw for the future of European financial markets?978-92-79-08237-5, Jappelli, Pagano, euro area, financial markets, financial integration, EMU

Competition and Stability in Banking

I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by exacerbating the coordination problem of depositors/investors on the liability side and fostering runs/panics, and by increasing incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on the intensity of competition.antitrust, regulation, crisis, risk-taking, mergers, state aid, bail-outs

Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care

Havighurst and Richman seek to show the nature--and to suggest the cumulative attitude--of the many regressive tendencies of the financing, regulatory and legal regime governing the private side of US health care

Some Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance

The ability to share risk efficiently in the economy is essential to welfare and growth. However, the increased frequency of natural catastrophes over the last decade has raised once again questions associated to the limits of insurability in a free-market economy, and to the relevance of public interventions on risk-sharing markets. In this paper, we explore the potential reasons for the lack of insurance specifically associated to catastrophe environmental risks. Our final aim is to link each source of possible market inefficiency to its possible remedies.

The Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure

This paper proposes a functional approach to designing and managing the financial systems of countries, regions, firms, households, and other entities. It is a synthesis of the neoclassical, neo-institutional, and behavioral perspectives. Neoclassical theory is an ideal driver to link science and global practice in finance because its prescriptions are robust across time and geopolitical borders. By itself, however, neoclassical theory provides little prescription or prediction of the institutional structure of financial systems that is, the specific kinds of financial intermediaries, markets, and regulatory bodies that will or should evolve in response to underlying changes in technology, politics, demographics, and cultural norms. The neoclassical model therefore offers important, but incomplete, guidance to decision makers seeking to understand and manage the process of institutional change. In accomplishing this task, the neo-institutional and behavioral perspectives can be very useful. In this proposed synthesis of the three approaches, functional and structural finance (FSF), institutional structure is endogenous. When particular transaction costs or behavioral patterns produce large departures from the predictions of the ideal frictionless' neoclassical equilibrium for a given institutional structure, new institutions tend to develop that partially offset the resulting inefficiencies. In the longer run, after institutional structures have had time to fully develop, the predictions of the neoclassical model will be approximately valid for asset prices and resource allocations. Through a series of examples, the paper sets out the reasoning behind the FSF synthesis and illustrates its application.