36 research outputs found
A Generalized Ideal Secret Sharing Scheme
Sharing a secret efficiently amongst a group of
participants is not easy since there is always an adversary /
eavesdropper trying to retrieve the secret. In secret sharing
schemes, every participant is given a unique share. When the
desired group of participants come together and provide their
shares, the secret is obtained. For other combinations of shares,
a garbage value is returned. A threshold secret sharing scheme
was proposed by Shamir and Blakeley independently. In this
(n,t) threshold secret sharing scheme, the secret can be obtained
when at least t out of n participants contribute their shares.
This paper proposes a novel algorithm to reveal the secret only
to the subsets of participants belonging to the access structure.
This scheme implements totally generalized ideal secret sharing.
Unlike threshold secret sharing schemes, this scheme reveals
the secret only to the authorized sets of participants, not any
arbitrary set of users with cardinality more than or equal to t.
Since any access structure can be realized with this scheme, this
scheme can be exploited to implement various access priorities
and access control mechanisms. A major advantage of this
scheme over the existing ones is that the shares being distributed
to the participants is totally independent of the secret being
shared. Hence, no restrictions are imposed on the scheme and it
finds a wider use in real world applications
Higher-Order Threshold Implementation of the AES S-Box
In this paper we present a threshold implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard’s S-box which is secure against first- and second-order power analysis attacks. This security guarantee holds even in the presence of glitches, and includes resistance against bivariate attacks. The design requires an area of 7849 Gate Equivalents and 126 bits of randomness per S-box execution. The implementation is tested on an FPGA platform and its security claim is supported by practical leakage detection tests
Efficient and Low-Cost RFID Authentication Schemes
Security in passive resource-constrained Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tags is of much interest nowadays. Resistance against illegal tracking,
cloning, timing, and replay attacks are necessary for a secure RFID
authentication scheme. Reader authentication is also necessary to thwart any
illegal attempt to read the tags. With an objective to design a secure and
low-cost RFID authentication protocol, Gene Tsudik proposed a timestamp-based
protocol using symmetric keys, named YA-TRAP*. Although YA-TRAP* achieves its
target security properties, it is susceptible to timing attacks, where the
timestamp to be sent by the reader to the tag can be freely selected by an
adversary. Moreover, in YA-TRAP*, reader authentication is not provided, and a
tag can become inoperative after exceeding its pre-stored threshold timestamp
value. In this paper, we propose two mutual RFID authentication protocols that
aim to improve YA-TRAP* by preventing timing attack, and by providing reader
authentication. Also, a tag is allowed to refresh its pre-stored threshold
value in our protocols, so that it does not become inoperative after exceeding
the threshold. Our protocols also achieve other security properties like
forward security, resistance against cloning, replay, and tracking attacks.
Moreover, the computation and communication costs are kept as low as possible
for the tags. It is important to keep the communication cost as low as possible
when many tags are authenticated in batch-mode. By introducing aggregate
function for the reader-to-server communication, the communication cost is
reduced. We also discuss different possible applications of our protocols. Our
protocols thus capture more security properties and more efficiency than
YA-TRAP*. Finally, we show that our protocols can be implemented using the
current standard low-cost RFID infrastructures.Comment: 21 pages, Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing,
and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), Vol 2, No 3, pp. 4-25, 201
Shuffle and Mix: On the Diffusion of Randomness in Threshold Implementations of Keccak
Threshold Implementations are well-known as a provably firstorder secure Boolean masking scheme even in the presence of glitches. A precondition for their security proof is a uniform input distribution at each round function, which may require an injection of fresh randomness or an increase in the number of shares. However, it is unclear whether violating
the uniformity assumption causes exploitable leakage in practice. Recently, Daemen undertook a theoretical study of lossy mappings to extend the understanding of uniformity violations. We complement his work by entropy simulations and practical measurements of Keccak’s round function. Our findings shed light on the necessity of mixing operations in addition to bit-permutations in a cipher’s linear layer to propagate
randomness between S-boxes and prevent exploitable leakage. Finally, we argue that this result cannot be obtained by current simulation methods, further stressing the continued need for practical leakage measurements
Differential Power Analysis on (Non-)Linear Feedback Shift Registers
Differential power analysis (DPA) is a statistical analysis of the power traces of cryptographic computations. DPA has many applications including key-recovery on linear feedback shift register based stream ciphers. In 2017, Dobraunig et. al. presented a DPA on Keymill to uncover the bit relations of neighbouring bits in the shift registers, effectively reduces the internal state guessing space to 4-bit. In this work, we generalise the analysis methodology to uncover more bit relations on both linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and non-linear feedback shift registers (NLFSRs) and with application to fresh re-keying scheme --- LR-Keymill. In addition, we improve the DPA on Keymill by halving the data resources needed for the attack
Changing of the Guards: a simple and efficient method for achieving uniformity in threshold sharing
Since they were first proposed as a countermeasure against differential power analysis (DPA) in 2006, threshold schemes have attracted a lot of attention from the community concentrating on cryptographic implementations. What makes threshold schemes so attractive from an academic point of view is that they come with an information-theoretic proof of resistance against a specific subset of side-channel attacks: first-order DPA. From an industrial point of view they are attractive as a careful threshold implementation forces adversaries to DPA of higher order, with all its problems such a noise amplification. A threshold scheme that offers the mentioned provable security must exhibit three properties: correctness, incompleteness and uniformity. A threshold scheme becomes more expensive with the number of shares that must be implemented and the required number of shares is lower bound by the algebraic degree of the function being shared plus 1. Defining a correct and incomplete sharing of a function of degree d in d+1 shares is straightforward. However, up to now there is no generic method to achieve uniformity and finding uniform sharings of degree-d functions with d+1 shares is an active research area. In this paper we present a simple and relatively cheap method to find a correct, incomplete and uniform d+1-share threshold scheme for any S-box layer consisting of degree-d invertible S-boxes. The uniformity is not implemented in the sharings of the individual S-boxes but rather at the S-box layer level by the use of feed-forward and some expansion of shares. When applied to the Keccak-p nonlinear step Chi, its cost is very small
Self-Timed Masking: Implementing Masked S-Boxes Without Registers
Masking is one of the most used side-channel protection techniques.
However, a secure masking scheme requires additional implementation costs, e.g. random number, and transistor count. Furthermore, glitches and early evaluation can temporally weaken a masked implementation in hardware, creating a potential source of exploitable leakages. Registers are generally used to mitigate these threats, hence increasing the implementation\u27s area and latency.
In this work, we show how to design glitch-free masking without registers with the help of the dual-rail encoding and asynchronous logic. This methodology is used to implement low-latency masking with arbitrary protection order. Finally, we present a side-channel evaluation of our first and second order masked AES implementations
A First-Order SCA Resistant AES without Fresh Randomness
Since the advent of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) in the late 1990s protecting embedded devices against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks has been a major research effort. Even though many different first-order secure masking schemes are available today, when applied to the AES S-box they all require fresh random bits in every evaluation. As the quality criteria for generating random numbers on an embedded device are not well understood, an integrated Random Number Generator (RNG) can be the weak spot of any protected implementation and may invalidate an otherwise secure implementation. We present a new construction based on Threshold Implementations and Changing of the Guards to realize a first-order secure AES with zero per-round randomness. Hence, our design does not need a built-in RNG, thereby enhancing security and reducing the overhead
A Note on Masking Generic Boolean Functions
Masking is a popular countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks (SCA). In the literature, a myriad of proposals of masking schemes can be found. They are typically defined by a masked multiplication, since this can serve as a basic building block for any nonlinear algorithm. However, when masking generic Boolean functions of algebraic degree t, it is very inefficient to construct the implementation from masked multiplications only. Further, it is not immediately clear from the description of a masked multiplication, how to efficiently implement a masked Boolean function.
In this work, we fill this gap in the literature with a detailed description and investigation of a generic masking methodology for Boolean functions of any degree t at any security order d
Threshold Implementations with Non-Uniform Inputs
Modern block ciphers designed for hardware and masked with Threshold Implementations (TIs) provide provable security against first-order attacks. However, the application of TIs leaves designers to deal with a trade-off between its security and its cost, for example, the process to generate its required random bits. This generation cost comes with an increased overhead in terms of area and latency. Decreasing the number of random bits for the masking allows to reduce the aforementioned overhead.
We propose to reduce the randomness to mask the secrets, like the plaintext. For that purpose, we suggest relaxing the requirement for the uniformity of the input shares and reuse randomness for their masking in first-order TIs. We apply our countermeasures to first-order TIs of the Prince and Midori64 ciphers with three shares. Since the designs with non-uniform masks are no longer perfect first-order probing secure, we provide further analysis by calculating bounds on the advantage of a noisy threshold-probing adversary. We then make use of the PROLEAD tool, which implements statistical tests verifying the robust probing security to compare its output with our estimates. Finally, we evaluate the designs on FPGA to highlight the practical security of our solution. We observe that their security holds while requiring four times less randomness over uniform TIs