Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS

The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory

A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory, and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013