When incentives backfire: Spillover effects in food choice

Little is known about how peers influence the impact of incentives. We investigate two mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers' actions and peers' incentives. In a field experiment on snack choice in the school lunchroom (choice of grapes versus cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of peers incentivized, and whether or not it can be observed that peers' choices are incentivized. We show that, while peers' actions - picking grapes - have a positive spillover effect on children's take-up of grapes, seeing that peers are incentivized to pick grapes has a negative spillover effect on take-up. When incentivized choices are public, incentivizing all children to pick grapes has no statistically significant effect on take-up, as the negative spillover offsets the positive impacts of incentives on take-up

Motivating Whistleblowers

Law-breaking activities within an organization bene?ting the ?rm at the expense of the general public are widespread but di¢ cult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We employ a novel laboratory experiment to investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval, and their interactions, a¤ect the decision to blow the whistle. Experimental results show that: i) ?nancial rewards signi?cantly increase the likelihood of whistleblowing and do not substantially crowd out non-monetary motivations activated by expectations of social judgment; and ii) the possibility of social judgment decreases (increases) whistleblowing when the public is unaware (aware) of the negative externalities generated by fraud, suggesting that whistleblowers are at least partly motivated by a desire for social approval. Our ?ndings suggest that whistleblowers on corporate fraud should be ?nancially rewarded and should be shielded from public/media scrutiny when the social cost of the illegal activity is not visible or salient to the public. We also ?nd evidence of an interesting relationship between political orientation and social judgment: while left-leaning subjects react to the possibility of receiving social approval or disapproval as expected, right-leaning people are una¤ected by it

Negative Externalities and Environmental Regulation: An Application of the Principal-Agent Model

This thesis considers optimal enforcement strategies in the context of principal-agent relationships for industries where there is a high risk of negative externalities. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill—the largest accidental spill of all time—is used as a case study to highlight the regulatory issues that can arise in industries that can have far-reaching and negative impacts on society. An in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the disaster makes it clear that complex principal-agent relationships between agencies and firms are common in the industry, as are problems with conflicting objectives, improper incentives, and moral hazard. As these are all features of the principal-agent model, this economic analysis tool is used to provide insights for resolving issues and proposing a new optimal enforcement strategy for the industry. As many features of the offshore drilling industry are common in other industries with high risk for negative externalities, the recommendations in this thesis can be applied generally to these other industries as well

On the Provision of Public Goods on Networks: Incentives, Exit Equilibrium, and Applications to Cyber .

Attempts to improve the state of cyber-security have been on the rise over the past years. The importance of incentivizing better security decisions by users in the current landscape is two-fold: it not only helps users protect themselves against attacks, but also provides positive externalities to others interacting with them, as a protected user is less likely to become compromised and be used to propagate attacks against other entities. Therefore, security can be viewed as a public good. This thesis takes a game-theoretic approach to understanding the theoretical underpinnings of users' incentives in the provision of public goods, and in particular, cyber-security. We analyze the strategic interactions of users in the provision of security as a non-excludable public good. We propose the notion of exit equilibrium to describe users' outside options from mechanisms for incentivizing the adoption of better security decisions, and use it to highlight the crucial effect of outside options on the design of incentive mechanisms for improving the state of cyber-security. We further focus on the general problem of public good provision games on networks. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in these games. We show that previous results in the literature can be recovered as special cases of our result. We provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of users' efforts at the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient outcomes, and semi-cooperative equilibria of these games, by linking users' effort decisions to their centralities in the interaction network. Using this characterization, we separate the effects of users' dependencies and influences (outgoing and incoming edges, respectively) on their effort levels, and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the network. We also propose the design of inter-temporal incentives in a particular type of security games, namely, security information sharing agreement. We show that either public or private assessments can be used in designing incentives for participants to disclose their information in these agreements. Finally, we present a method for crowdsourcing reputation that can be useful in attaining assessments of users' efforts in security games.PhDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/133328/1/naghizad_1.pd

Understanding Privacy Disclosure in the Online Market for Lemons: Insights and Requirements for Platform Providers

Future used car markets may use personal data to reduce information asymmetries between car sellers and buyers, e. g. on past driving behavior. Reducing information asymmetries is attractive for used car platforms as they can move from pure information provision to orchestrating transactions. However, car sellers and buyers have to agree to sharing personal data. What kind of data is interesting for them? Under what circumstances are they willing to share this data? What should a platform do to support data sharing? We explore those research questions as part of the Cardossier project by conducting experiments with the Car-Market Game, simulating a future car market. The results indicate that there is no market for pure personal data (e. g. photographs of sellers), but there is a market for car usage data. From future used car platforms the participants expect disclosure control and disclosure transparency in an environment free of interpersonal trust

Factions and Political Competition

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. Several key theoretical predictions of the model find a counterpart in our empirical analysis of newly coded data on the provision of water services in Mexico.

Turning Carbon Into Gold: Incentivizing the New Alchemy

One approach to help address climate change is carbon capture and utilization (CCU). CCU involves capturing atmospheric carbon dioxide and using it to generate marketable products. CCU, however, needs significant additional research and development to reach its potential. Development of CCU could yield benefits far in excess of its actual ability to sequester carbon. Research and development of CCU could stimulate improvements in carbon capture technologies, incentivize the capture and sequestration of carbon, and generate products that can benefit society generally. Nevertheless, most CCU uses remain only theoretical, or significant barriers prevent their current implementation. A number of policy tools are available to incentivize CCU research: patents, prizes, grants, and tax credits. This article reviews the strengths and weaknesses of each. Then, it discusses how best to apply these policies to incentivize a number of possible CCU opportunities, including construction materials, fuels, chemicals, and algae-derived products