Information Sharing Games

In this paper we study information sharing situations.For every information sharing situation we construct an associated cooperative game, which we call an information sharing game.We show that the class of information sharing games co-incides with the class of cooperative games with a population monotonic allocation scheme.game theory

Information Sharing Games

In this paper we study information sharing situations.For every information sharing situation we construct an associated cooperative game, which we call an information sharing game.We show that the class of information sharing games co-incides with the class of cooperative games with a population monotonic allocation scheme.

Cooperative Games arising from Information Sharing Situations

Relations are established between information sharing (IS) situations and IS-games on one hand and information collecting (IC) situations and IC-games on the other hand. It is shown that IC-games can be obtained as convex combinations of so-called local games. Properties are described which IC-games possess if all related local games have the respective properties. Special attention is paid to the classes of convex IC-games and of k-concave IC-games. This last class turns out to consist of total big boss games. For the class of total big boss games a new solution concept is introduced: bi-monotonic allocation schemes.cooperative games;information;big boss games;bi-monotonic allocation scheme

Sharing Non-Anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources Optimally

In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of resources is used by a heterogeneous set of selfish users. The cost of a resource is a (non-decreasing) function of the set of its users. Under the assumption that the costs of the resources are shared by uniform cost sharing protocols, i.e., protocols that use only local information of the resource's cost structure and its users to determine the cost shares, we exactly quantify the inefficiency of the resulting pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, we show tight bounds on prices of stability and anarchy for games with only submodular and only supermodular cost functions, respectively, and an asymptotically tight bound for games with arbitrary set-functions. While all our upper bounds are attained for the well-known Shapley cost sharing protocol, our lower bounds hold for arbitrary uniform cost sharing protocols and are even valid for games with anonymous costs, i.e., games in which the cost of each resource only depends on the cardinality of the set of its users

Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition- proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.correlated equilibrium ; coalitions ; information sharing ; games with positive externalities

Competition in Wireless Systems via Bayesian Interference Games

We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information about their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference games. Each wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available bandwidth to maximize its data rate. Such competitive models represent situations in which several wireless devices share spectrum without any central authority or coordinated protocol. In contrast to games where devices have complete information about their opponents, we consider scenarios where the devices are unaware of the interference they cause to other devices. Such games, which are modeled as Bayesian games, can exhibit significantly different equilibria. We first consider a simple scenario of simultaneous move games, where we show that the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is where both devices spread their power equally across the entire bandwidth. We then extend this model to a two-tiered spectrum sharing case where users act sequentially. Here one of the devices, called the primary user, is the owner of the spectrum and it selects its power profile first. The second device (called the secondary user) then responds by choosing a power profile to maximize its Shannon capacity. In such sequential move games, we show that there exist equilibria in which the primary user obtains a higher data rate by using only a part of the bandwidth. In a repeated Bayesian interference game, we show the existence of reputation effects: an informed primary user can bluff to prevent spectrum usage by a secondary user who suffers from lack of information about the channel gains. The resulting equilibrium can be highly inefficient, suggesting that competitive spectrum sharing is highly suboptimal.Comment: 30 pages, 3 figure

Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour

More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content

Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually increasing offers.Gradual bargaining; Common values; Incomplete information; Repeated games