18,797 research outputs found
Synchronisation effects on the behavioural performance and information dynamics of a simulated minimally cognitive robotic agent
Oscillatory activity is ubiquitous in nervous systems, with solid evidence that synchronisation mechanisms underpin cognitive processes. Nevertheless, its informational content and relationship with behaviour are still to be fully understood. In addition, cognitive systems cannot be properly appreciated without taking into account brain–body– environment interactions. In this paper, we developed a model based on the Kuramoto Model of coupled phase oscillators to explore the role of neural synchronisation in the performance of a simulated robotic agent in two different minimally cognitive tasks. We show that there is a statistically significant difference in performance and evolvability depending on the synchronisation regime of the network. In both tasks, a combination of information flow and dynamical analyses show that networks with a definite, but not too strong, propensity for synchronisation are more able to reconfigure, to organise themselves functionally and to adapt to different behavioural conditions. The results highlight the asymmetry of information flow and its behavioural correspondence. Importantly, it also shows that neural synchronisation dynamics, when suitably flexible and reconfigurable, can generate minimally cognitive embodied behaviour
Neuroethology, Computational
Over the past decade, a number of neural network researchers have used the term computational neuroethology to describe a specific approach to neuroethology. Neuroethology is the study of the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of behavior in animals, and hence it lies at the intersection of neuroscience (the study of nervous systems) and ethology (the study of animal behavior); for an introduction to neuroethology, see Simmons and Young (1999). The definition of computational neuroethology is very similar, but is not quite so dependent on studying animals: animals just happen to be biological autonomous agents. But there are also non-biological autonomous agents such as some types of robots, and some types of simulated embodied agents operating in virtual worlds. In this context, autonomous agents are self-governing entities capable of operating (i.e., coordinating perception and action) for extended periods of time in environments that are complex, uncertain, and dynamic. Thus, computational neuroethology can be characterised as the attempt to analyze the computational principles underlying the generation of behavior in animals and in artificial autonomous agents
Can biological quantum networks solve NP-hard problems?
There is a widespread view that the human brain is so complex that it cannot
be efficiently simulated by universal Turing machines. During the last decades
the question has therefore been raised whether we need to consider quantum
effects to explain the imagined cognitive power of a conscious mind.
This paper presents a personal view of several fields of philosophy and
computational neurobiology in an attempt to suggest a realistic picture of how
the brain might work as a basis for perception, consciousness and cognition.
The purpose is to be able to identify and evaluate instances where quantum
effects might play a significant role in cognitive processes.
Not surprisingly, the conclusion is that quantum-enhanced cognition and
intelligence are very unlikely to be found in biological brains. Quantum
effects may certainly influence the functionality of various components and
signalling pathways at the molecular level in the brain network, like ion
ports, synapses, sensors, and enzymes. This might evidently influence the
functionality of some nodes and perhaps even the overall intelligence of the
brain network, but hardly give it any dramatically enhanced functionality. So,
the conclusion is that biological quantum networks can only approximately solve
small instances of NP-hard problems.
On the other hand, artificial intelligence and machine learning implemented
in complex dynamical systems based on genuine quantum networks can certainly be
expected to show enhanced performance and quantum advantage compared with
classical networks. Nevertheless, even quantum networks can only be expected to
efficiently solve NP-hard problems approximately. In the end it is a question
of precision - Nature is approximate.Comment: 38 page
Experiential fantasies, prediction, and enactive minds
A recent surge of work on prediction-driven processing models--based on Bayesian
inference and representation-heavy models--suggests that the material basis of conscious
experience is inferentially secluded and neurocentrically brain bound. This paper develops
an alternative account based on the free energy principle. It is argued that the free energy
principle provides the right basic tools for understanding the anticipatory dynamics of the
brain within a larger brain-body-environment dynamic, viewing the material basis of some
conscious experiences as extensive--relational and thoroughly world-involving
Beyond persons: extending the personal / subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals and artificial agents
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centered concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered
A framework for Thinking about Distributed Cognition
As is often the case when scientific or engineering fields emerge, new concepts are forged or old ones are adapted. When this happens, various arguments rage over what ultimately turns out to be conceptual misunderstandings. At that critical time, there is a need for an explicit reflection on the meaning of the concepts that define the field. In this position paper, we aim to provide a reasoned framework in which to think about various issues in the field of distributed cognition. We argue that both relevant concepts, distribution and cognition, must be understood as continuous. As it is used in the context of distributed cognition, the concept of distribution is essentially fuzzy, and we will link it to the notion of emergence of system-level properties. The concept of cognition must also be seen as fuzzy, but for different a reason: due its origin as an anthropocentric concept, no one has a clear handle on its meaning in a distributed setting. As the proposed framework forms a space, we then explore its geography and (re)visit famous landmarks
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