Policy-agnostic programming on the client-side

Browser security has become a major concern especially due to web pages becoming more complex. These web applications handle a lot of information, including sensitive data that may be vulnerable to attacks like data exfiltration, cross-site scripting (XSS), etc. Most modern browsers have security mechanisms in place to prevent such attacks but they still fall short in preventing more advanced attacks like evolved variants of data exfiltration. Moreover, there is no standard that is followed to implement security into the browser. A lot of research has been done in the field of information flow security that could prove to be helpful in solving the problem of securing the client-side. Policy- agnostic programming is a programming paradigm that aims to make implementation of information flow security in real world systems more flexible. In this paper, we explore the use of policy-agnostic programming on the client-side and how it will help prevent common client-side attacks. We verify our results through a client-side salary management application. We show a possible attack and how our solution would prevent such an attack

An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the BrowserID SSO System

The web constitutes a complex infrastructure and as demonstrated by numerous attacks, rigorous analysis of standards and web applications is indispensable. Inspired by successful prior work, in particular the work by Akhawe et al. as well as Bansal et al., in this work we propose a formal model for the web infrastructure. While unlike prior works, which aim at automatic analysis, our model so far is not directly amenable to automation, it is much more comprehensive and accurate with respect to the standards and specifications. As such, it can serve as a solid basis for the analysis of a broad range of standards and applications. As a case study and another important contribution of our work, we use our model to carry out the first rigorous analysis of the BrowserID system (a.k.a. Mozilla Persona), a recently developed complex real-world single sign-on system that employs technologies such as AJAX, cross-document messaging, and HTML5 web storage. Our analysis revealed a number of very critical flaws that could not have been captured in prior models. We propose fixes for the flaws, formally state relevant security properties, and prove that the fixed system in a setting with a so-called secondary identity provider satisfies these security properties in our model. The fixes for the most critical flaws have already been adopted by Mozilla and our findings have been rewarded by the Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program.Comment: An abridged version appears in S&P 201

The Web SSO Standard OpenID Connect: In-Depth Formal Security Analysis and Security Guidelines

Web-based single sign-on (SSO) services such as Google Sign-In and Log In with Paypal are based on the OpenID Connect protocol. This protocol enables so-called relying parties to delegate user authentication to so-called identity providers. OpenID Connect is one of the newest and most widely deployed single sign-on protocols on the web. Despite its importance, it has not received much attention from security researchers so far, and in particular, has not undergone any rigorous security analysis. In this paper, we carry out the first in-depth security analysis of OpenID Connect. To this end, we use a comprehensive generic model of the web to develop a detailed formal model of OpenID Connect. Based on this model, we then precisely formalize and prove central security properties for OpenID Connect, including authentication, authorization, and session integrity properties. In our modeling of OpenID Connect, we employ security measures in order to avoid attacks on OpenID Connect that have been discovered previously and new attack variants that we document for the first time in this paper. Based on these security measures, we propose security guidelines for implementors of OpenID Connect. Our formal analysis demonstrates that these guidelines are in fact effective and sufficient.Comment: An abridged version appears in CSF 2017. Parts of this work extend the web model presented in arXiv:1411.7210, arXiv:1403.1866, arXiv:1508.01719, and arXiv:1601.0122

Uniform: The Form Validation Language

Digital forms are becoming increasingly more prevalent but the ease of creation is not. Web Forms are difficult to produce and validate. This design project seeks to simplify this process. This project is comprised of two parts: a logical programming language (Uniform) and a web application. Uniform is a language that allows its users to define logical relationships between web elements and apply simple rules to individual inputs to both validate the form and manipulate its components depending on user input. Uniform provides an extra layer of abstraction to complex coding. The web app implements Uniform to provide business-level programmers with an interface to build and manage forms. Users will create form templates, manage form instances, and cooperatively complete forms through the web app. Uniform’s development is ongoing, it will receive continued support and is available as open-source. The web application is software owned and maintained by HP Inc. which will be developed further before going to market

Protection Models for Web Applications

Early web applications were a set of static web pages connected to one another. In contrast, modern applications are full-featured programs that are nearly equivalent to desktop applications in functionality. However, web servers and web browsers, which were initially designed for static web pages, have not updated their protection models to deal with the security consequences of these full-featured programs. This mismatch has been the source of several security problems in web applications. This dissertation proposes new protection models for web applications. The design and implementation of prototypes of these protection models in a web server and a web browser are also described. Experiments are used to demonstrate the improvements in security and performance from using these protection models. Finally, this dissertation also describes systematic design methods to support the security of web applications

Building Web Based Programming Environments for Functional Programming

Functional programming offers an accessible and powerful algebraic model for computing. JavaScript is the language of the ubiquitous Web, but it does not support functional programs well due to its single-threaded, asynchronous nature and lack of rich control flow operators. The purpose of this work is to extend JavaScript to a language environment that satisfies the needs of functional programs on the Web. This extended language environment uses sophisticated control operators to provide an event-driven functional programming model that cooperates with the browser\u27s DOM, along with synchronous access to JavaScript\u27s asynchronous APIs. The results of this work are used toward two projects: (1) a programming environment called WeScheme that runs in the web browser and supports a functional programming curriculum, and (2) a tool-chain called Moby that compiles event-driven functional programs to smartphones, with access to phone-specific features